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ABSTRACT 
 
Police misconduct is a relatively rare event, though typically, it is a male 
dominated event. As such, research on police misconduct has largely ignored women. 
Generally, research examines differences in misconduct by using sex as a control 
variable, or has focused on small samples of female officers using qualitative methods. 
Neither of these methods is able to explore or explain the possibility that factors related 
to officers’ decisions to commit misconduct may differentially impact males and females. 
As a consequence, we are left with a shallow understanding of when and why women 
commit misconduct. 
This research fills this gap by a large sample (N=3,085) of matched police officers 
in the New York City Police Department, half of which committed career-ending 
misconduct between 1975 and 1996. Additionally, unlike previous research, this data 
includes a large sample (N=435) of females. Research has determined that some factors, 
such as having children or employment problems, are risk factors for misconduct 
regardless of sex; likewise, other factors, such as age and higher education, create 
protection against misconduct. Using logistic regression and split-sample z-score 
comparisons, analyses will focus on examining how the predictors differentially explain 
the likelihood of police misconduct for men and women. 
As expected, some predictors of misconduct that are salient for women, such as 
getting divorced, are not statistically significant for men; likewise, some variables that 
are significant for both men and women have a larger effect size for one sex, such as 
citizen complaints, which are of more predictive value for women than for men. These 
findings yield important theoretical, empirical, and policy implications. Notably, there is 
evidence that a gendered theory of police misconduct may be necessary. Additionally, 
conceptualizations within mainstream criminological theories may need to be rethought; 
	  ii 
for example, divorce was found to be a protective factor for women in this study, rather 
than a risk factor as both strain and life-course criminology would indicate. The findings 
also demonstrate the need for gender-specific models when studying police misconduct. 
Finally, the results of this study yield important policy implications, such as the utility of 
gender-specific hiring considerations and early-intervention “red flags.” 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
State of Women in Policing 
The occupation of policing is an extension of traditionally male roles associated 
with protection and order maintenance, thus it is unsurprising that it has been, and in 
some ways remains, a male-oriented profession (Martin, 1980). Female police officers 
were not permitted until 1910, and even then they were relegated to duties dealing with 
women and children or tasks that required nurturing, such as dealing with victims (Gau, 
Terrill, & Paoline, 2012; Martin, 1980; Sklansky, 2006). Early policewomen formed the 
International Association of Policewomen in 1915 in order to achieve goals such as better 
workplace standards and the promotion of preventive and protective police services 
(Martin, 1980). Reform within departments was closely aligned with greater social 
reform movements that sought better protections for women and children, especially in 
urban environments, and increased female participation in the workplace (Martin, 
1980). Between 1946 and 1971, women’s representation in policing remained relatively 
stagnant at an average of 1.5% of police departments, but by 1975 that number had 
nearly doubled to 2.9% (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1976; Martin, 1980; Williams, 
1946). Despite these gains in representation, policewomen were still confined to 
secretarial or juvenile assignments during this time (Crites, 1973; Martin, 1980), despite 
recommendations from The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice (1967) stating that “policewomen can be an invaluable asset to 
modern law enforcement and their present role should be broadened”	  (p. 125). 
Even in the 21st century, women have had difficulties making inroads into a 
profession characterized by masculinity and machismo (Gau, Terrill, & Paoline, 2012; 
National Center for Women and Policing, 2002; Sklansky, 2006; U.S. Census Bureau, 
2001). For example, females accounted for only 13% of sworn officers in agencies with 
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more than 100 sworn officers in 2000, up only slightly from 9% in 1990. Moreover, only 
7.3% of top command positions in 2000 were held by women (National Center for 
Women and Policing, 2001). The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal 
Opportunity Act of 1972 forced police agencies to actively recruit females. These laws 
required all government agencies receiving federal money, including state and local 
agencies, to increase their hiring of females and minorities (Belknap & Shelley, 1992; 
Garcia, 2003; Gau et al., 2012; Remmington, 1983). 
However, because female recruitment was forced on agencies, there was 
substantial resistance from the nearly all-white male rank-and-file (Garcia, 2003; Hunt, 
1990). Even today, women in policing are faced with sexual harassment, job assignments 
consistent with beliefs about sex-appropriate tasks, questioning of overall capability to 
do the job, and social isolation (Balkin, 1988; Franklin, 2007; Holdaway & Parker, 1998; 
Hunt, 1990; Poole & Pogrebin, 1988). This affects the ability of women to do their jobs as 
police officers due to blocked institutional support including peer support and mentoring 
opportunities (Franklin, 2007; Haar, 1997; Holdaway & Parker, 1998; Hunt, 1990; Lord, 
1986; Poole & Pogrebin, 1998). It is unsurprising, then, that recruitment of women into 
police departments has plateaued, with their numbers remaining similar today to those 
of 10 years ago. Likewise, just as women compose a small percentage of police officers in 
general, women are also a minority of “bad cops,” or those who commit misconduct 
(Kane & White, 2009).  
Prevalence of Police Misconduct 
To date, researchers have failed to come to a consensus regarding a universal 
definition of police misconduct. The vast range of police activities make it difficult to 
determine if administrative violations, or what might be argued is simply poor judgment 
such as losing one’s badge or falling asleep on the job, should be classified in the same 
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category as serious criminal activity like stealing and selling drugs, stealing evidence, or 
extreme police brutality qualifying as assault (Manning, 2009). Still others question 
whether misconduct should only include criminal activity, such as theft or assault, and 
leave out behavior that is not overtly criminal in nature but is still an abuse of one’s 
police authority, such as offensive verbal encounters with citizens (see Kane & White, 
2009). 
Despite the definitional disagreement, scholars do agree that it is a rare event, 
especially among women. In terms of citizen complaints, it is agreed that a small number 
of officers account for a disproportionate numbers of complaints (Goldstein, 1977; 
Walker & Bumphus, 1992); specifically, the Christopher Commission’s investigation of 
the Los Angeles Police Department found that less than 1% of officers accounted for 15% 
of citizen complaints, a ratio that could not be accounted for by assignment or arrests 
(Christopher Commission, 1991). Studies of the Boston Police Department, Los Angeles 
Sheriff’s Department, and Kansas City Police Department demonstrated similar trends 
(Walker, Alpert, & Kenney, 2001). Another study found that roughly 2% of officers in the 
NYPD committed career-ending misconduct between 1975 and 1996 (Kane & White, 
2009). It is unclear exactly how many officers commit misconduct because it is likely 
that a good deal of the phenomenon goes undetected or unreported. The police 
subculture is the primary culprit for the “dark figure” of misconduct. The culture of 
police departments is one of intense loyalty and solidarity, with extreme informal 
sanctions for those found to be violating the code of silence (Levitt, 2009). Even 
departments without such entrenched corruption as was present in the Serpico-era New 
York City Police Department (NYPD) have a strict, informal “blue wall of silence” (Knapp 
Commission, 1972; Mollen Commission, 1994; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a/b; Skolnick, 
2002, 2005). 
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As difficult as it is to ascertain clear data on police officer misconduct in general, 
it is even more difficult to do so among female officers. Kane and White (2009) found 
that of the 2% of officers who committed career-ending misconduct, women were only a 
small percentage. Some have argued that women are less likely to commit misconduct 
because female officers tend to de-escalate situations using logical reasoning and 
interpersonal skills to settle disputes rather than turning to violence (Belknap & Shelley, 
1992; Rabe-Hemp, 2008; Rabe-Hemp & Schuck, 2007). Additionally, women are 
typically excluded from the police subculture, and thus cut-off from opportunities for 
organized or group misconduct (see, e.g., Belknap & Shelley, 1992; Chu & Sun, 2007; 
Reiner, 1992). 
Definition of the Research Problem 
The limitations of the current body of police misconduct research, including the 
small subset of police misconduct studies focusing on female officers, have empirical, 
theoretical, and policy implications for both researchers and police departments. This 
section outlines each of these implications, why these implications are problematic, and 
how this study fills the gaps presented by these implications. 
Empirical Implications 
Outside of use of force, there is a dearth of research on female officer misconduct, 
seemingly for two main reasons. First, as noted above, it is fairly uncommon relative to 
male misconduct (Archbold & Schulz, 2012; Lersch, 1998). A recent study of the NYPD 
found that only 13% of officers who committed career-ending misconduct over a 22-year 
period were female (Kane & White, 2009). Second, women comprise a small number of 
police officers overall — roughly 13% (National Center for Women and Policing, 2001). 
Combined, these facts make finding samples with adequate statistical power for 
quantitative analysis extremely difficult. 
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As a result, research on women in policing (especially female misconduct) has 
followed one of two paths. Some research uses small samples (generally less than 100 
officers) of female officers, without a male comparison sample. Research of this kind is 
usually qualitative in nature or is survey-based (see, e.g., Haarr & Morash, 1999; Rabe-
Hemp, 2008, 2009). Other studies use larger samples of officers, both male and female, 
and use sex as a control variable (see, e.g., Chappell & Piquero, 2004; Kane & White, 
2009, 2012; Piquero & Wolfe, 2011). This is known as the “add gender and stir” 
approach (Chesney-Lind, 1986; Daly, 1997). While this allows researchers to see the 
direct effect of gender, this method lacks nuance, as gender differences in predictor 
effects are lost. 
Given the data constraints on police researchers in the form of low sample sizes 
of female officers, this is an understandable approach. This method, however, is rooted 
in the assumption that the predictors of misconduct are the same for both men and 
women. This assumption is inconsistent with literature demonstrating gendered 
pathways of risk in a variety of settings (Belknap & Holsinger, 2006; see also Burgess-
Proctor, 2012; Reisig, Holtfreter, & Morash, 2006). Gendered pathways can only be 
accounted for by using gender-specific models, which are especially important when 
gender-specific policies are implemented without fully understanding how the risk 
factors vary by gender (Holtfreter & Cupp, 2007). In the context of police misconduct, it 
is unclear whether gender exerts direct or indirect effects, or possibly both, on police 
misconduct, and whether indirect effects are moderating or mediating in nature, thus the 
field’s general (albeit limited) understanding of gender’s effect on misconduct is 
incomplete at best – and completely misleading at worst. 
This research fills the gap in the literature by exploring important questions 
regarding the impact of gender on police misconduct by addressing these two main 
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concerns with previous research. First, the sample used in this study is large enough 
(N=3,085) to include a substantial number of women (N=435) from which to draw 
empirical conclusions about the effect (both direct and indirect) of sex on police 
misconduct. These women are also rather evenly split between both the study group 
(“Bad cops”) and the comparison group, providing enough statistical power in both 
groups to make comparisons between them. Second, in combination with the large 
sample of men and women, this study uses quantitative methods to draw specific 
conclusions about the direct and indirect effects of gender on police misconduct. This 
overcomes both previous methodological deficiencies, allowing for the interaction of sex 
with other variables of interest to construct a more complete picture about the 
differences between men and women regarding their likelihood to commit misconduct. 
Specifically, this research hypothesizes that the factors that predict police misconduct 
affect men and women differently, both in sex-specific ways and across sexes. 
Theoretical Implications 
Mainstream theories of criminality and deviance such as strain, deterrence, social 
control, and social learning, were created using the deviance patterns of white males 
(Daly, 1992; Daly & Chesney-Lind, 1988; Smith & Paternoster, 1989). Theories used to 
explain female deviance have historically used a qualitatively different set of explanatory 
factors relative to theories of male deviance (Smith & Paternoster, 1989). Thus, early 
theorists believed that theories of male deviance had limited utility in explaining female 
criminality (see, e.g, Adler, 1975; Klein, 1973; Smart, 1977).  
Similarly, theories of police misconduct are also based largely on the misconduct 
of male officers. The subcultural theory of police misconduct, for example, argue that 
officers engage in misconduct because the police subculture promotes deviance and 
wrongdoing (Knapp Commission, 1972; Micuccui & Gomme, 2005; Mollen Commission, 
	  7 
1994; Skolnick, 2005; Stoddard, 1968). The police subculture values masculinity, 
camaraderie, and loyalty above all else, which perpetuates both misconduct itself as a 
show of power and the “blue wall of silence” that prohibits reporting misconduct 
(Bittner, 1974; Stoddard, 1968; Van Maanen, 1980; Westley, 1970). Taking this theory a 
step further, Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert (1998) articulate an anthropological theory of 
misconduct that emphasizes socialization and culture, especially the police worldview of 
“us vs. them.” This worldview begins during a selective recruitment process that 
eliminates diversity and continues throughout the academy and field training, during 
which officers are taught to have high trust and solidarity with other officers (especially 
white male officers). Likewise, this culture and socialization is top-down, meaning that 
chiefs and top brass set the tone for the culture of the department. Thus, a culture of 
misconduct is bred at the top of the ranks and trickles down to the rank-and-file (see also 
Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Lastly, Sherman’s (1974) classic explanation of police 
misconduct, the “rotten apples” theory, illustrates misconduct within police departments 
using an analogy of a barrel of apples. In some instances, misconduct is a result of a “few 
bad apples”  (i.e., particular officers) within an otherwise honest barrel; other times, 
misconduct comes in “rotten pockets” (i.e., units or divisions) in an otherwise honest 
barrel (Sherman, 1974). 
Using mainstream criminological theoretical perspectives to explain gender 
differences in deviance in general, and police misconduct specifically, can be problematic 
because there are profound differences in overall offending/deviance patterns between 
men and women (Smith & Paternoster, 1989; Steffensmeier & Allan, 1996; 
Steffensmeier, Schwartz, Zhong, & Acker, 2005). Women are more likely than men to 
engage in traditionally female crime, such as shoplifting and prostitution (Steffensmeier 
& Allan, 1996; Steffensmeier et al., 2005). They are also much less likely than men to 
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commit violent crimes (Koons-Witt & Schram, 2003; Lauritsen, Heimer, & Lynch, 2009; 
Steffensmeier & Allan, 1996; Steffensmeier et al., 2005). Even in non-street crime, there 
are discernible gender patterns. White-collar crime research has found that women 
account for a large percentage of embezzlement cases, but the vast majority of them are 
small dollar amounts, consistent with their orientation within the bottom of the 
organizational hierarchy (Daly, 1989; Holtfreter, 2005; Steffensmeier et al., 2013). Thus 
it is consistent with both street and white-collar criminal behavior that female police 
officers commit not only less misconduct than do male officers, but also different forms 
of it (Lersch, 1998; Steffensmeier, 1979; Van Wormer, 1981). 
Additionally, there is some research that indicates the “gender gap” in offending 
may be converging, at least for some offenses (Heimer, 2000; Lauritsen et al., 2009). 
Originally, the narrowing of the gender gap was believed to be due to an increase in the 
female share of crime (see Adler, 1975, Simon, 1975). More recent research, however, 
indicates that a larger decrease of male offending relative to female offending in the 
1990s rather than an increase in female offending can at least partially account for this 
convergence of the gender gap (Lauritsen et al., 2009; see also Heimer, 2000; 
Steffensmeier et al., 2005; Steffensemeier, Zhong, Ackerman, Schwartz, & Agha, 2006). 
Alternatively, it is possible that changes in the gender gap are unrelated to changes in 
offending patterns and more closely connected to changes in arrest, conviction, or 
sentencing patterns (Lauritsen et al., 2009; Steffensmeier et al., 2005, 2006). Thus, even 
though there is evidence that the gender gap is narrowing, the contention that women 
commit less crime than men, ceteris parabus, is still valid. It is likely, then, that similar 
patterns may be seen in occupational deviance, such as police misconduct. 
Even using police-specific theories to explain both male and female misconduct 
creates problems. The subcultural theory of misconduct is problematic because it 
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assumes all police officers are male, leaving most female officers at the periphery of the 
subculture. Thus it cannot adequately explain why some female officers commit 
misconduct; they should not, based on their social orientation outside of the subculture. 
Likewise, Sherman’s (1974) “rotten apples” theory also falls short in explaining female 
misconduct. Sherman himself argues that, while many departments say that their 
instances of misconduct are few and far between (rotten apples), it is more accurate that 
departments suffer from rotten pockets, such as the Buddy Boys scandal in the 1980s in 
New York City (McAlary, 1987). In some cases, the corruption and misconduct can go 
beyond rotten pockets to become systemic, organized corruption. In both cases, 
misconduct is group-oriented, yet female officers are often excluded from these groups. 
This research will offer theoretical interpretations that better explain the 
differences in male and female police misconduct. Recent explorations of male and 
female criminal behavior demonstrate that some mainstream theories have the capacity 
to explain both male and female offending (see, e.g., Agnew & Brezina, 1997; Augustyn & 
McGloin, 2013; Broidy, 2001; Broidy & Agnew, 1997; Hubbard & Pratt, 2002; Kaufman, 
2009; Smith, 1979), but they do so by differentiating between male and female 
predictors and pathways. Theoretical tests of strain have found that men and women 
have been socialized to have vastly different coping responses to anger; men are more 
likely to respond to anger with externalized deviant coping strategies such as crime, 
whereas women often experience anger in combination with emotions like shame and 
guilt that prompt internalized deviant strategies like eating disorders (Broidy & Agnew, 
1997; Jennings, Piquero, Gover, & Perez, 2009; Kaufman, 2009; Piquero & Sealock, 
2004; Sharp et al., 2001, 2005). Similar studies of strain in police contexts have found 
that men and women report qualitatively different kinds of stresses as well as using 
different coping mechanisms in response to those stressors (Dowler, 2005; Haarr & 
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Morash, 1999; Poteyeva & Sun, 2009). Thus it is clear that traditional theories, both 
mainstream and police-specific, require gender-specific interpretations because of the 
gendered pathways and predictors of deviant behavior. 
Daly’s (1992) gendered pathways to crime approach explains that female 
offenders are more likely than men to have suffered past abuse (especially sexual abuse), 
be economically disadvantaged, and be addicted to drugs or alcohol. This seminal study 
launched feminist pathways research, and has been supported in a number of contexts 
included female recidivism (Reisig, Holtfreter, & Morash, 2006), help-seeking of 
battered women (Burgess-Proctor, 2012), and gender-specific programming (Belknap & 
Holsinger, 2006). This evidence of gendered risk and protective factors provides support 
for the contention that men and women differ in the factors that impact their likelihood 
of misconduct. This study will identify the gendered predictors of misconduct to 
theoretically frame the gendered pathway to misconduct. 
Policy Implications 
Police departments have typically implemented a number of policies to curb 
police misconduct. Two of the most popular include early intervention (EI) systems and 
changes to hiring practices. EI systems warn agency leaders when an officer is 
demonstrating problematic performance. The “red flags” used in these systems usually 
relate to the number of citizen complaints, sick days, or use-of-force reports (Walker, 
2003; Willis, 2014; Worden, Harris, & McLean, 2014). When an officer is “flagged” by 
the system, the officer’s supervisor will make a course correction by requiring an 
intervention that will curb the problematic behavior. These systems are specifically 
designed to identify officers who may present future problems before they commit 
serious infractions, so the interventions are non-punitive, such as anger management or 
diversity training or task re-assignment (Walker & Alpert, 2004; Willis, 2014; Worden et 
	  11 
al., 2014). Hiring practices are also used to address concerns of misconduct, especially 
corruption. For example, new hiring practices were put in place in the New York City 
Police Department following the Serpico scandal and the findings of the Knapp 
Commission in the 1970s. Unfortunately, these new hires were largely let go during the 
layoffs of the early 1980s, thus corruption and misconduct continued during the 1980s 
and early 1990s (White, 2014b). Background investigators consider a number of facts 
when making hiring recommendations, many of which are correlated with misconduct 
research findings. For example, background investigators look for a criminal history, 
which is also a risk factor for misconduct. 
These policies are problematic in relation to the gender disparity in police 
misconduct because they are based on research that does not adequately account for this 
gender difference. Early intervention systems, for example, are designed to improve 
officers’ performance rather than serve as a conduit for formal discipline, but the 
underlying assumption is the same regardless of the intended purpose: That certain 
factors, such as excessive numbers of citizen complaints or use-of-force reports, serve as 
indicators of behavior that is problematic, potentially reaching the point of misconduct 
(Walker, 2003; Worden et al., 2014). If the indicators used to measure problem behavior 
are gendered in nature (i.e., certain indicators are applicable only to one sex or have 
opposite effects depending on gender), then one gender or the other may be incorrectly 
flagged. For example, if citizen complaints are used to indicate problematic behavior, but 
women are differentially assigned to community-oriented policing assignments and thus 
have different kinds of citizen encounters, it is possible that women may be unfairly 
flagged for problem behavior. This is consistent with Harris’s (2011) work on police 
career pathways, in which he argues that EI systems that use multiple indicators as 
separate qualifying factors of misconduct are more likely to identify different kinds of 
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problem officers due to varying career pathways. Harris (2011) focuses on complaint-
based pathways, but there are many ways that career pathways could be measured and if 
any of them are gendered, then the EI systems can create gendered outcomes. 
The criteria used by background investigators may also be gendered. For 
example, background investigators look for a criminal history, which is a risk factor for 
misconduct. If criminal history is only salient for men, however, and not for women, 
then some women may be unfairly excluded from employment. The same could also be 
true for early intervention systems. In many early intervention systems, citizen 
complaints are often used as a red flag of increasingly problematic behavior. If citizen 
complaints have a stronger effect on one sex than the other, however, their use may have 
greater predictive utility for one sex versus the other. Additionally, early intervention 
systems could use personal strains, such as the death of a family member or a divorce, as 
red flags for possible future misconduct. If these stressors operate negatively for one sex 
and positively for the other, however, one sex may be unfairly targeted for interventions. 
By identifying the gendered risk factors and pathways to misconduct, this study 
will allow police departments to make better decisions regarding outcomes affected by 
misconduct rates. Just as greater racial parity has lowered rates of misconduct, it is 
possible that greater gender parity will positively affect rates of officer misconduct. 
Steffensmeier, Schwartz, and Roche (2013) note in a study of white-collar offenders that 
women “do business in a way that carries a sense of connectedness and bring a more 
ethical perspective to the workplace” (p. 452), attributes which are beneficial to any work 
setting, including police departments. The results of this study may also boost efforts to 
increase the retention rates of female officers. A clear understanding of the gendered 
nuances of police misconduct may aid departments in addressing the culture and strain 
associated with female policing. 
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Research Questions 
In order to address the deficiencies of previous research on female police 
misconduct, this study focuses on three main research questions: 
Research Question 1: Do predictors of misconduct affect men and 
women the same way?  
Research Question 2: Do some predictors serve as risk factors for men 
but protective factors for women, or vice versa? 
Research Question 3: What risk factors predict women’s commission 
of career-ending misconduct? 
The answers to these questions will further inform police and feminist scholars in the 
study of police misconduct and how female police officers fit into the discussion. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Following this introduction to the 
definition and scope of the problem of gender and police officer misconduct is a 
comprehensive review of the literature. This review discusses the difficulties associated 
with defining police misconduct; explains the ways in which previous research has 
operationalized officer misconduct and the benefits and limitations of each type; outlines 
the benefits and limitations to different methods of measuring police officer misconduct; 
addresses various forms of data on police misconduct, including up-and-coming new 
forms of data; describes the risk and protective factors for police misconduct found in 
previous research; provides a brief overview of the NYPD, especially during the study 
time period of the 1970s through the mid-1990s; and details various theoretical 
explanations of police misconduct, including how each is explained through the lens of 
gender. 
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The third chapter of the dissertation provides an explanation of the data used in 
the study and the methodology employed for the quantitative analyses. The data come 
from official records of the NYPD. It includes all officers who were fired from the NYPD 
between 1975 and 1996 (termed “bad cops”), who were then matched with a randomly 
selected officer who had not been fired (as of 1996) who was in the same academy class 
as the “bad cop.” The variables included in the study are also discussed, including: The 
dependent misconduct variables; the primary independent variable of sex; additional 
independent variables used as predictors of misconduct; and control variables. 
The fourth chapter details the results for both the full sample (N=3,085) and the 
female portion of the sample (N=435). A logistic regression was performed on the full 
sample (N=3,085) to determine the effects of established correlates of misconduct when 
using sex as a control, simulating the most common quantitative method used in police 
misconduct research. The sample was then split by sex and the same logistic regression 
performed on both subsamples. The z-scores of the coefficients for each predictor were 
compared to determine if the effects of the predictors varied by sex.  
Finally, the fifth chapter presents a discussion of these findings and their 
empirical, theoretical, and policy implications. It also outlines limitations of this study 
and provides directions for future research in the area of gender and police misconduct. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The History and Role of the Police 
Police misconduct is, at its core, a violation of the function, or role, of the police. 
As such, it is imperative that the police role be understood before attempting to dissect 
the causes and consequences of police misconduct. Determining what constitutes this 
role, however, has been debated for decades and there is still not a clear answer. Most 
scholars agree that the police have the authority to use force, up to and including deadly 
force, to enforce the law; at the very least, society has given this power to police, thus the 
legitimacy of the authority goes with it. Miller (1975) explains that “the patrolman’s most 
formidable discretionary power is his ability to use force to maintain his authority” (p. 
86). Manning (1978) argues that in creating an organization (the police) with a 
monopoly on force, society has molded a police mandate that includes the efficient, 
apolitical, and professional enforcement of the law. He goes on to explain that the police 
have cornered themselves into an impossible task, staking out a vast and unmanageable 
social domain (see also Wilson, 1968). This role ambiguity creates a dilemma for officers, 
who justify their law-breaking as a necessary means to the achieve order and apprehend 
the worst offenders (Stoddard, 1968). 
This creates difficulty in forming a cohesive, holistic definition of the police 
function. Part of this difficulty is rooted in changes in social context. Historically, police 
departments served an order maintenance role rooted in street justice (Kelling & Moore, 
1988; Lane, 1992; Sykes, 1986). This early period was known as the political era because 
the police function was rooted in the exceptionally intense political atmosphere of most 
major urban centers that owned (and corrupted) their police departments nearly from 
the start and the myriad of social ills with which police departments had to contend. The 
role of American police was largely oriented in terms of the provision of social services 
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(Lane, 1992). In the mid- to late-1800s and even into the 20th century, police officers 
were more like social workers, with departments serving as homeless shelters, soup 
kitchens, and orphanages (Haller, 1976; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Lardner & Reppetto, 
2000).  
Though police officers engaged in law enforcement, they had little to no training 
and there was little emphasis placed on legal procedure (Haller, 1976; Kelling & Moore, 
1988; Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). Thus, departments relied on informal processes for 
handling crime. Since police officers walked their beats, and their beats sometimes took 
them a mile or more away from the station house, officers relied on street justice to 
handle problems (Haller, 1976; Kelling & Moore, 1988). Petty crimes were dealt with 
using the baton or “hickory stick” (Haller, 1976). Because they were expected to be 
physically imposing, many of the first police officers were former blue-collar workers 
such as welders, steel workers, mechanics, and shipyard workers; post-Civil War 
appointments were often made to former Union soldiers (Haller, 1976). 
Two factors epitomized life in urban cities in the early decades of police 
departments: High rates of immigration, especially from Europe, which contributed to 
rapidly growing populations within relatively fixed borders. Urban centers like Chicago 
and New York had populations that grew at an exponential rate due to high levels of 
immigration, especially from Europe (Lane, 1992; Walker, 1976). Cities were 
geographically segregated by ethnicity, and officers were recruited to patrol their 
respective ethnicity’s part of the city (Haller, 1976; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Miller, 1975). 
In Chicago, black officers were recruited to handle crime in the black areas of the city, 
while Italians were assigned to combat crime against Italians. Likewise, the Five Points 
section of New York City, a largely Irish portion of the rapidly growing city, was patrolled 
by Irish police officers. This ethnically-based system of patronage brought with it an 
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expectation of absolute loyalty to the political machine in power that often pitted officers 
against their own kinsmen (Haller, 1976; Miller, 1975). 
Ethnic tensions and political favors meant that police officers were “important 
cogs in political machines,” and law enforcement was run as a racket through which 
officers could make extra money (Haller, 1976, p. 307; see also Miller, 1975; Worrall, 
2014). In fact, the inequality of pay relative to the dangers of the job colored the type of 
men willing to become police officers and is a hallmark of the policing job that continued 
into modern times. Police graft was expected and even encouraged in early police 
departments, and tacit coordination of illegal enterprises like gambling and prostitution 
were common, especially during Prohibition (Haller, 1976, 1990). These practices 
continued as a common form of police corruption well into the late twentieth century, as 
illustrated by the 1972 Serpico scandal in New York, in which one-third of the 
department was found to have engaged in organized corruption (Knapp Commission, 
1972; Lardner, 1996). 
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the political and social landscape of 
America dictated that the police become a crime-fighting entity. This came to be known 
as the professional era of policing, driven largely by police reformers like August Vollmer 
and the creation of professional organizations, such as the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police in 1893 (Kelling & Moore, 1988; Worrall, 2014). These reformers argued 
that in order for police officers to do their jobs and be taken seriously, they needed to 
separate from local politics and become neutral enforcers of law (Worrall, 2014). Unlike 
the political era, when officers were given jobs as political favors with the only 
requirements being loyalty to their political patrons and sometimes a particular ethnic or 
racial background, professional police departments used criteria like educational 
background, criminal history, and psychological readiness (Kelling & Moore, 1988).  
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The federal government, most notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
spearheaded the implementation of professionalism in law enforcement agencies 
(Walker, 1976). In fact, J. Edgar Hoover, who revolutionized the Bureau, was far ahead 
of his time in creating a more efficient and professional police force. He created a 
national registry of fingerprints in 1924, the federal crime laboratory in 1932, and the 
first training academy in 1935 (FBI, 2011; Kessler, 2002). Under his leadership, the FBI 
standardized everything from the paperwork to the “G-man” uniform of a black suit, 
white shirt, and bowler hat (Kessler, 2002). 
Following suit, reformers implemented professional standards in local police 
departments by introducing police academies and civil service examinations. They also 
advocated measuring police effectiveness through the use of numerical indicators, such 
as arrests or citizen complaints (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Technological advances such as 
the advent of the telephone and automobile, made it possible for police officers to 
conduct their business farther from the precinct. Officers could patrol larger areas using 
a patrol car and citizens could request service by calling the police to report crimes 
(Haller, 1976; Kelling & Moore, 1988).  
The professional era of policing emphasized a mandate in which police were “a 
mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiably coercive force” (Bittner, 1970, p. 46; 
see also Kelling & Moore, 1988). This role as crime-fighter was directly at odds with the 
routine activities of police; roughly 75% of police activities are tasks other than those 
related to fighting crime (Bittner, 1970; Manning, 1978). These tasks include writing 
reports, attending training, and visiting schools or community organizations. The 
development in the 1930s of the Uniform Crime Reports, and departments’ increased 
reliance upon them and the comparisons they generated, provided concrete evaluation 
measures (Walker, 1984). Thus, police officers are evaluated based on numbers like 
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arrests and clearance rates, thereby creating a disjunction between ends (evaluation 
measures) and means (activities while on duty) (Manning, 1978). 
This mandate of fighting crime fits squarely with Van Maanen’s (1978) discussion 
of how police officers orient themselves toward both citizens and their jobs. He argued 
that citizens who encounter the police fall into one of three groups: The know-nothing, 
the suspicious person, or the asshole. The majority of people are know-nothings, 
conceptualized as members of the general public who are well meaning and cooperative, 
but ultimately know nothing about what it means to be a police officer. These people are 
harmless, registering as slight annoyances to officers. Suspicious persons are those who 
are believed to have committed a crime, whether because of concrete factors (e.g., fits the 
description of a wanted person) or “gut feelings” developed through years of experience 
(e.g., a person who seemingly is out of place, such as a teenager in an industrial park 
after dark). These people are handled cautiously and formally. Finally, there are 
assholes, or people who do not accept a situation as police have defined it. These are the 
people who become argumentative with police or otherwise challenge an officer’s 
authority. During a routine traffic stop, the know-nothing is the driver who is polite and 
accepts the citation without questioning the officer’s judgment; the suspicious person is 
the driver who acts suspiciously towards the officer, most likely for some other reason 
(e.g., the driver may have an active bench warrant or have marijuana in the trunk); the 
asshole is the driver who angrily shouts at the officer and does not cooperate with 
routine traffic stop procedures (e.g., refuses to provide identification).  
Under this framework, the role of the police is “asshole control.” Police are called 
when assholes get out of control and cause problems, and it is the job of police officers to 
bring them under control – likely through what Van Maanen calls street justice. In some 
cases, assholes are only arrested for “resisting arrest,” which is cop-speak for “contempt 
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of cop.” Van Maanen (1978) notes that officers view street justice as an opportunity to do 
“real” police work, demonstrating that police consider their mandate largely as one 
oriented towards law enforcement or crime fighting. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the professional model was called into question as the 
national crime rate exploded. The serious crime (UCR index crimes) rate in the United 
States increased from 5.0 crimes per 1,000 people in 1950 to 14.3 per 1,000 people in 
1970 (Reynolds, 1995). Particularly, police agencies were unable to improve their 
numbers even with the emphasis on preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for 
service (Kelling & Moore, 1988). The 1960s also brought with it intense political and 
social strife with the civil rights and antiwar movements, challenging the authority and 
legitimacy of police. A slowing economy in the 1970s also presented problems for police 
agencies (Kelling & Moore, 1988; Willis, 2014). As a result, police departments turned to 
a more community-oriented problem-solving perspective that allowed for better use of 
scarce resources and relied on community involvement in defining crime problems and 
in preventing and controlling crime (Goldstein, 1990; Skolnick & Bayley, 1986; Weisburd 
& Eck, 2004). This strategy allowed departments to be more responsive to the needs of 
their specific communities and at least attempt to regain a sense of public trust and 
legitimacy (Crank, 1994; Willis, 2014). Crank (1994) goes so far as to argue that the 
implementation of community policing is symbolic in nature, similar to the adoption of 
other policing innovations like CompStat (Maguire, 2014).  
The 1970s also saw police departments partner with research organizations to 
better understand the mechanisms of police approaches. In 1972, the Kansas City (KS) 
Police Department and the Police Foundation studied the effectiveness of the foundation 
of American policing: Preventive patrol. The results of this study demonstrated that 
targeted crime prevention strategies are likely a better use of police resources than 
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routine preventive patrol (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, & Brown, 1974). An analysis of foot 
patrol in Newark, New Jersey, found that in neighborhoods with foot patrol, residents 
experienced less fear of crime, even when there was no effect on the actual crime rate 
(Police Foundation, 1981). 
In addition to police strategies, internal departmental changes also benefited 
from research. For example, the Dallas (TX) Police Department implemented several 
human resources programs aimed at increasing recruitment of women and minorities, 
improving officer education, and decentralizing department decision-making. The 
evaluations performed by the Police Foundation determined that while the perceptions 
of the rank-and-file did not change, there was a noticeable increase in both officer 
education levels and the number of women in the department (Kelling & Wycoff, 1978). 
The community-oriented problem-solving approach requires broad measures of 
effectiveness, such as quality of life in neighborhoods, reduction of fear, and increased 
order. It fits with Bittner’s (1970) conceptualization of the police role as one of 
peacekeeper rather than law enforcer. This is especially salient in areas where police 
officers must patrol highly vulnerable populations such as the mentally ill on skid row 
(Bittner, 1967). In this model, police must protect people from themselves and others. 
Effective peacekeeping requires particularization of knowledge, a restricted relevance of 
culpability, and a background in ad hoc decision-making. Particularization of knowledge 
refers to a beat cop’s ability to know and remember the people, places, and events within 
his or her beat. Officers who familiarize themselves with every aspect of their beat are 
better able to command authority while engaging in some measure of informality with 
the residents of their beat, which allows them to maintain control and keep peace 
(Bittner, 1967). An officer describes this to Bittner (1967) when he says, “If I want to be 
in control of my work and keep the street relatively peaceful, I have to know the people. 
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To know them I must gain their trust, which means that I have to be involved in their 
lives” (p. 372).  
A restricted reliance on culpability refers to the ability of officers to recognize that 
some illegal behavior is best handled using nonlegal, informal sanctions. For example, 
officers may simply ask intoxicated individuals to vacate doorways and other public 
spaces at night rather than arresting them for loitering or vagrancy (Bittner, 1967). This 
is especially true in situations where culpability is ambiguous. Finally, effective cops 
need a background in ad-hoc decision-making because every beat has its unique set of 
factors. These factors, such as knowledge of prior events or the mentality of those 
inhabiting one’s beat (e.g., vulnerability and exploitation of residents of skid row create 
an elevated sense of risk even towards seemingly innocuous provocations), require 
officers to make decisions that may not be strictly in keeping with the letter of the law. 
Bittner (1967) notes that officers patrolling skid row use the protection of arrested 
persons as the most common explanation for minor arrests, and the responses in 
different incidents of the same type may vary based on the needs of the people involved 
and what will best preserve order and peace. 
Bittner’s characterization of good policing means that officers do what needs to 
be done to mitigate aggregate harm. Good officers might not arrest the rowdy drunk man 
in the park if it means instigating a riot. Muir (1977) elaborates on this issue in his idea 
of police as “craftsmen,” epitomized in the person of Mike Marshall. Marshall knows his 
beat and knows the people in it, understanding that most problems can be resolved 
without handcuffs. In this way, police officers are the solvers of human problems, 
whatever those problems may be – and sometimes buying a candy bar and calling a 
guardian rather than arresting a disorderly man becomes the better solution of the 
human problem. Manning (1978) uses the peacekeeping framework in his policy 
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suggestions for police departments, insisting that police departments should have 
several specialized units for various peacekeeping endeavors (e.g., domestic unit or 
juvenile unit), with only one squad dedicated to felony crime suppression (and possibly 
another unit for riot control). 
Some have argued that a new era of policing has emerged out of the community-
oriented policing era: Cops as soldiers, or an era of the police role as warlike (Sklonick & 
Fyfe, 1993). This is unsurprising given the decades-old “war on crime,” and even more 
recently, the wars on drugs and now terrorism. The analogy of cops as soldiers is in some 
ways fitting, as departments have already created a paramilitary police force, complete 
with military-like uniforms, ranks, a centralized hierarchy, use of weapons (and 
increased use of military-grade weapons such as explosives and high-powered weapons 
like MP-5s), and boot-camp style academies (Maguire, 2014; Kraska & Kappeler, 1997; 
Sklonick & Fyfe, 1993). In fact, some community-oriented policing strategies use a 
paramilitary approach and are referred to in terms of counterinsurgency (Metz, 2013). 
The use of military-grade technology includes surveillance and communication needs, 
such as surveillance drones and night-vision goggles, “extend[ing] the level of police 
surveillance and control over the populace” (Maguire, 2014, p. 86). 
Police officers have traditionally viewed their role as one similar to Van Maanen 
(1978), but in recent years, the perception has changed to one of cops as soldiers. In 
some ways, these are not incompatible; for example, police still engage in asshole 
control, they simply do so with better weapons and with a stronger show of force. This 
perception on the part of police officers as to their occupational role is instilled even 
before the academy through selection and recruitment, as departments recruit those who 
will succeed in the academy and field training. Additionally, the events of September 11, 
2001, infused, especially in the New York Police Department, the realization that local 
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first responders must be ready to combat terrorism in a paramilitary-like manner 
(White, 2014b). This emphasis on counter-terrorism and the internalization of the 
mandate of urban warfare rather than traditional policing has led to an increase in the 
use of force in general (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993), especially regarding aggressive tactics 
such as the NYPD’s use of stop-question-and-frisk (Fagan, Geller, Davies, & West, 2010; 
White, 2014b). 
The Many Forms of Police Misconduct 
Defining Misconduct 
As often as the term police misconduct is used in the literature, a clear and 
comprehensive definition is somewhat elusive (Ivkovic, 2005b). Many people contend 
that misconduct only refers to the use of force. Since police have a virtual monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force (Bittner, 1970; Klockars, 1996), and because force can escalate 
to lethal force, this focus on police brutality and excessive force is unsurprising. News 
coverage of incidents such as the Rodney King beating in 1992 made police brutality and 
excessive force a topic of conversation among both politicians and the general public. 
Likewise, popular media often depicts police officers engaging in excessive force, thus 
leading people to believe that this is the norm. There are, however, a number of activities 
that can be considered misconduct (Ivkovic, 2005b). Perjury (lying while under oath), 
verbal abuse during citizen encounters like swearing or racial slurs, and misuse of a 
department-issued firearm are all examples of police misconduct that are not considered 
use of force (Kane & White, 2009). 
Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert (1998) describe four broad categories of deviant 
police behavior: Police crime, occupational deviance, abuse of authority, and corruption. 
Police crimes consist of criminal behavior that is committed while in the course of one’s 
duty as a police officer. Kappeler and colleagues (1998) explain, “the factor which 
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distinguishes police crime is the commission of the crime while on the job or by using 
some aspect of the occupational position to carry out the illegality” (p. 21). Using this 
explanation, some police officers commit crimes that are not classified as police crime, 
such as an officer who assaults his or her neighbor after an argument. 
Occupational deviance is based on the work of Sutherland (1940) and others that 
describes workplace crime, or white-collar crime. In the context of policing, occupational 
deviance consists of “inappropriate work-related activities in which police may 
participate” (Kappeler et al., 1998, p. 22). Specifically, police occupational deviance is 
only possible because of one’s status as a police officer. Examples of police occupational 
deviance include inappropriate searches or lying to the public about aspects of an 
investigation. 
Corruption, while seemingly simple to define, has no clear definition among 
scholars (Hale, 1989; Kappeler et al., 1998). Some consider any wrongdoing to be 
corruption, whereas others define it more narrowly, usually requiring an element of 
personal gain (e.g., Goldstein, 1977; Sherman, 1978) or monetary compensation 
(McMullan, 1961). Of Stoddard’s (1968) 10 categories of police deviancy, six are overtly 
connected to corruption in some form: Mooching (gratuities), chiseling (demanding off-
duty free admission or price discounts), favoritism (using police authority to avoid minor 
violations like traffic tickets), extortion, bribery, and perjury. Kappeler and colleagues 
(1998) bring consensus to the definition by noting that police corruption must involve 
the use of police authority in pursuit of personal gain. Standard examples of corruption 
include embezzlement of public funds, extortion, and bribery. 
Finally, Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert (1998) describe police abuse of authority. 
Using Carter’s (1985) broad definition of abuse of authority that includes “any action by 
a police officer without regard to motive, intent, or malice that tends to injure, insult, 
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tread on human dignity, manifest feelings of inferiority, and/or violate an inherent legal 
right of the police constituency” (p. 322), Kappeler and associates (1998) explain that 
abuse of authority can take three forms: Physical (e.g., use of excessive force), 
psychological (e.g., verbal abuse or harassment), and legal abuse (e.g., perjury or 
evidence tampering. 
Clearly these categories may overlap, especially occupational deviance with the 
other three forms of police deviance (Kane & White, 2009). Police crime, police 
corruption, and police abuse of authority fit into the category of occupational deviance 
because they take place as part of the police occupation. A police officer accepts bribes 
because he is a police officer (i.e., the briber would not be bribing the officer if he or she 
was not a police officer). Likewise, an officer can only abuse one’s authority if one is 
vested with said authority. Some incidents include facets of multiple forms of deviance, 
such as “shaking down” drug dealers (corruption) while simultaneously assaulting the 
dealers, stealing their drugs, and subsequently selling them (police crime and abuse of 
authority) – and all of these behaviors are also examples of police occupational deviance. 
Using similar terms, Barker and Carter (1995) created a typology that breaks 
police deviance into two categories: Occupational deviance and abuse of authority. They 
argue that this typology structures deviance based on the locus of behavior; when officers 
abuse their police authority, they break external conduct standards (i.e., those set by 
society), whereas occupational deviance violates internal, organizational standards of 
conduct (see also Kappeler et al., 1998). Through this lens, police misconduct can be 
defined externally through official means such as citizen review boards, criminal and 
civil legislation, or court decisions, or internally through administrative rules and 
regulations (Kappeler et al., 1998). External deviance is directed towards citizens, such  
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as excessive use of force, while internal deviance is directed at the organization, such as 
ignoring department regulations prohibiting the acceptance of free meals or drinks. 
The internal/external typification, however, does not clearly delineate forms of 
misconduct. For example, police departments administratively prohibit (internal) 
officers from being arrested (external) (Kane & White, 2009). Departments, then, 
administratively sanction three basic forms of police misconduct: Police crime, police 
corruption, and abuse of authority (Kane & White, 2009). Police crime is conduct in 
which one’s police authority is used to carry out activity that is also prohibited by 
criminal statute (for example, theft of evidence; see also Kappeler et al., 1998). Officers 
may commit crimes, such as tax evasion, that are not considered police crime because 
the opportunity to commit the crime is not structured by their status as a police officer. 
Behavior classified as police corruption is conduct in which one’s police authority is used 
for personal profit (for example, “shaking down” drug dealers). This is the behavior 
traditionally associated with police misconduct. Kane and White (2013) note that the 
definition of corruption varies, depending on whether it is limited only to illegal 
behavior. If so, then conduct like accepting gratuities is not considered corruption. The 
third category is abuse of authority, or conduct that includes physical, psychological, or 
legal abuse. This includes traditional forms of abuse such as excessive force, but also 
includes legal abuse of authority such as perjury (Kane & White, 2009; see also Carter, 
1985; Kappeler et al., 1998).  
Kane and White (2009, 2013) note that some of these categories may overlap, 
such as an incident in which an officer shakes down a drug dealer (police corruption) and 
assaults the dealer or steals his or her drugs (police crime). Recently, there has been an 
increase in the overlap between corruption and police brutality, or abuse of authority (in 
some cases, police crime). For example, the Mollen Commission hearings uncovered 
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numerous instances of bribery accompanied by kidnapping, robbery, or attempted 
murder (Kane & White, 2013). 
There is also the question of whether police misconduct must be committed while 
on-duty. Kane and White (2009, 2013) argue that misconduct can occur off-duty, such as 
a police officer’s misuse of a department-issued firearm (see also Fyfe, 1988) or abuse of 
authority during disputes such as domestic violence or bar fights. These off-duty crimes 
come into conflict with common conceptualizations of misconduct because, while 
criminal in nature, these activities are not related to one’s official capacity as a police 
officer, leading some scholars to argue that these crimes should not be included in the 
definition of misconduct (Manning, 2009). Kane and White (2013), however, maintain 
that in most cases, the officers abuse their authority as police officers in off-duty 
encounters, thus bringing their behavior under the purview of the police department and 
classifying it as misconduct; this is consistent with the policies of departments to 
discipline officers for misconduct regardless of duty status. 
Operationalization of Misconduct 
Because the concept of misconduct is so difficult to define, its operationalization 
is not uniform within the literature. There are three main ways in which misconduct has 
traditionally been operationalized: Violations of administrative regulations, activity that 
is criminal in nature, and activity that is career-ending.  
When police misconduct is operationalized as a violation of administrative 
regulations, the activity included in the study is limited activity that is barred by 
organizational rules and regulations. Operationalizing misconduct in this way includes 
most activities that are traditionally viewed to be misconduct, such as criminal activity 
(i.e., departments administratively prohibit criminal activities) and actions officially 
ruled to be an abuse of authority (e.g., organizational determination of excessive force) 
	  29 
(Kane & White, 2009). It also includes other actions that are not criminal, such as 
sleeping on the job or accepting gratuities. Because these actions are not usually 
considered to be police misconduct by the general public, however, some may find this 
operationalization too broad, lumping together officers guilty of serious crimes and 
officers who accepted a free meal or fell asleep while filing reports (Kappeler et al., 1998).  
Operationalizing police misconduct in terms of criminal activity alone means that 
actions are statutorily prohibited. Crimes ranging from homicide or manslaughter to 
perjury are included in this category. A limitation of this operationalization is that 
behavior that would, on its face, seem to be criminal but does not result in a criminal 
charge or resulted in acquittal would likely be excluded from examination. For example, 
the officers charged in the Rodney King beating in 1992 were acquitted of assault and 
other criminal charges, though two were later convicted of federal civil rights violations 
(Kappeler et al., 1998); depending on the method of measuring misconduct, this incident 
could be excluded because the officers were not convicted of a crime. Another limitation 
is that behavior that is a violation of civil, rather than criminal, statutes is also excluded. 
Activities like the New York Police Department’s policy of stop-question-and-frisk are 
legal on their face, but are arguably a violation of civil rights and an abuse of police 
authority (Center for Constitutional Rights, 2011; Floyd v. City of New York, 2013). 
Finally, misconduct may be operationalized as behavior that leads to an officer’s 
removal from the force (i.e., it is career-ending) (Kane, 2002; Kane & White, 2009, 
2013). This kind of operationalization includes both administrative and criminal actions, 
but does not include actions that result in any sanction less than termination of 
employment. This poses a limitation of this type of operationalization, as officers may 
engage in behavior that does not result in dismissal but may be criminal or 
administratively forbidden nonetheless.  
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This critique is particularly salient for instances in which officers engage in 
behavior that has been officially deemed to be acceptable, but others outside the 
department would call into question. For example, James Peters of the Scottsdale 
(Arizona) Police Department shot seven people (killing six of them) over a 10-year period 
(Merrill, 2013). While all of the shootings were deemed “within policy” by the internal 
review board, many questioned the necessity of such force, especially after the city 
agreed to a settlement of $4.25 million after the sixth fatality (Merrill, 2013). This is an 
example of what Fyfe (1986) refers to as the “split-second syndrome,” in which 
investigators analyze only the few seconds preceding the incident of force rather than 
taking into account the entire interaction. Walker (2008) notes that a number of factors 
can affect how misconduct is handled within a department, including the influence of 
police unions and collective bargaining agreements on disciplinary measures.  
Measurement of Misconduct 
There are several ways in which researchers have measured police officer 
misconduct. One of the most common methods of measuring misconduct is some type of 
formal, organizational sanction, such as instigation of an internal affairs investigation or 
formal departmental discipline (e.g., notation in an officer’s personnel file or being 
placed on paid or unpaid administrative leave) (e.g., Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). In these 
instances, researchers rely on official records of administrative action against an officer. 
This is perhaps the broadest measurement of misconduct, as it includes not only 
violations of administrative regulations but also criminal activity since most departments 
require administrative sanctions when an officer is arrested (Kane & White, 2009). 
The most egregious of formal sanctions is the termination of employment (Kane, 
2002; Kane & White, 2009, 2013). With this method, an incident is considered 
misconduct only if an officer was “involuntarily separated,” or fired, from the 
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department as a result of their behavior. This may include the accumulation of small, 
administrative infractions (e.g., habitually falling asleep on the job or losing one’s badge) 
or one larger, more serious offense (e.g., failing a drug test or being arrested). Measuring 
misconduct in this way also relies on official records, as termination of employment is 
noted in personnel and other organizational records (Kane & White, 2009). 
Official records are common data sources in police misconduct research because 
they contain information on a host of factors that other forms of data cannot include, 
such as performance evaluations, background investigation reports, and written 
reprimands in personnel files. Internal records, however, present concerns of selection 
bias, as the data only include offenses on which the department took official action 
(Manning, 2009). The broad discretion of supervisors in pursuing official sanctions of 
misconduct means that some offenses, such as those in which a verbal warning was 
issued but no official notation was made in the personnel file or to which a superior 
turned a blind eye, are not included in official records (Hickman, Piquero, & Greene, 
2000; Manning, 2009). Official records of police departments, specifically, are also 
extremely disorganized and vigorously protected from external dissemination, usually 
leading to limited research findings because of the conflicting interests of researchers 
and department officials and/or politicians (Kane, 2007). 
The final method for measuring misconduct is citizen complaints, in which the 
presence of complaints (or more complaints) is used as an indicator of misconduct 
(Chappell & Piquero, 2004; Lersch, 1998; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2000; Terrill & 
McCluskey, 2002; Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). While complaints are still official records, as 
they are filed with the police department, they are considered public records and are thus 
easier to obtain. Additionally, the citizen, rather than the organization, files the report, 
which means the determination of what is “misconduct” comes from an external source, 
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thus at least partially addressing the concern of organizational mishandling of 
wrongdoing. 
One criticism of this form of measurement is that citizen complaints are a proxy 
measure for misconduct; thus they do not include acts of misconduct that are 
unobserved by the public or otherwise may not result in a citizen complaint (Kane & 
White, 2013). Examples of this would be instances of perjury, violations of 
administrative regulations, or off-duty crimes in which others are unaware of the 
officer’s affiliation with the police department. Additionally, many citizens do not report 
poor officer behavior for reasons ranging from general distrust of the police or low 
expectations to sheer unwillingness to spend the time filing a report. Citizen complaints, 
then, are contingent upon citizens taking the initiative to file a complaint, which 
introduces considerable sample selection bias (Archbold & Maguire, 2002; Kappeler, 
Sapp, & Carter, 1992; Walker & Bumphus, 1992) and can be highly correlated with such 
unrelated facets as police-community relations and the complexity of a complaint system 
(Lersch, 1998; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2000). Finally, citizen complaints are made from 
the perspective of the citizen, and citizens and police officers vary widely in their 
definitions of what is and is not considered misconduct (officers define misconduct more 
narrowly than do members of the general public) (Lersch, 1998; Lersch and 
Mieczkowski, 2000). Thus, unless only sustained complaints are used, citizen complaints 
may document instances in which a citizen was unhappy with the outcome or with officer 
behavior when in fact the officer had not done anything wrong. 
Information on police misconduct comes from a variety of data sources. To 
overcome some of the issues associated with official data, which are detailed above, some 
researchers have turned to vignettes or scenarios, asking officers what they would do in 
specific situations of misconduct (see, e.g., Chappell & Piquero, 2004; Goodman, 1998; 
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Hickman, Lawton, Piquero, & Greene, 2001; Klockars, Ivkovich, Harver, & Haberfeld, 
1997). These stories allow officers to place themselves in situations and explain what 
they would do in that particular scenario. One of the most useful aspects of vignettes is 
that it allows for the systematic variation of characteristics within the situation, 
providing a quasi-experiment (Alexander & Becker, 1978). Additionally, research has 
shown that individuals’ intentions to offend are strongly correlated with actual offending 
behavior (Green, 1989; Kim & Hunter, 1993; Pogarsky, 2004). It is possible, however, 
that correlations between intentions and actual offending may be different with police 
officers. For example, officers’ intentions on a vignette survey may be truthful at the 
time, but their later behavior may deviate depending on the stimuli presented in the 
actual situation. Criminological studies addressing the relationship between intentions 
and actual behavior (e.g., Green, 1989; Pogarsky, 2004) have focused on minor 
violations, such as driving under the influence of alcohol, and were conducted on 
members of the general public. It is possible that when the deviant behavior is more 
serious (e.g., bribery or assault), and when confounding factors such as the pressure 
exerted through the police subculture and potential external stressors are included, 
officer behavior at Time B may not be consistent with intentions at Time A. 
Similarly, police officers are extremely suspicious of outsiders and thus may not 
give entirely truthful answers regarding misconduct because of a view that the researcher 
“doesn’t get it” or for fear of being misinterpreted (Mastrofski & Parks, 1990). It has also 
been argued that vignettes are unable to accurately reflect real-world scenarios and the 
numerous inputs processed during situational decision-making (see Simpson & Piquero, 
2002). This is especially salient to the discussion of police misconduct, as the decision-
making process for police officers includes more than simply whether or not to commit a 
particular act, but encompasses other strong stimuli such as an extremely persuasive 
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police subculture, department policies, and factors unique to every policing situation 
(e.g., presence of back-up, number of suspects, and whether suspects have or are 
believed to have weapons). Mastrofski and Parks (1990) note that officers use perceptual 
shorthand to make rapid decisions, but they still utilize a decision making process (see 
also Gilsinan, 1989). 
The use of media accounts has been especially useful in studying use of force, 
especially pertaining to conducted electrical devices (CEDs, e.g., the TASER) (see, e.g., 
Ready, White, & Fisher, 2008). Since most citizens have very little contact with police, 
their perceptions about police are typically shaped by the media (print, Internet, and 
visual) (Gaines et al., 2001); unfortunately, previous research has found that media 
portrayals of the police (especially television and movies) is often unrealistic and 
inaccurate, thus distorting public opinion (Hallett, 2007; Manning, 1977, 1997). The use 
of media accounts has not yet been incorporated into broader research on police 
misconduct, most likely because news media only includes the most egregious forms of 
police misconduct (e.g., organized corruption scandals such as Buddy Boys or Serpico, 
excessive use of force incidents such as the 1992 beating of Rodney King, and 
citizen/officer deaths or serious injury such as an officer-involved shooting or citizen 
death as a result of a TASER deployment). Media accounts, however, are important in as 
much as they color the public perception of misconduct and lead citizens to believe that 
it is more prevalent or serious than it actually is. 
Early research on police behavior was qualitative, usually observational or 
ethnographic (e.g., Bittner, 1967; Manning, 1977; Muir, 1977; Skolnick, 1966; Van 
Maanen, 1974). Some of the first qualitative studies were direct, systematic observations 
of police work conducted by Westley (1953), Skolnick (1966), and Reiss (1967, 1968), and 
even more were done in the 1970s and 1980s (Klein, 1983, 1984; Smith, Visher, & 
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Davidson, 1984; Visher, 1983; Worden, 1989; Worden & Pollitz, 1984; Westley, 1970). 
These observational studies addressed the concern among policing researchers that since 
most police work consists of talking (see, e.g., Muir, 1977), quantitative methods were 
insufficient for understanding what police actually do (Mastrofski & Parks, 1990). These 
early observational studies exposed police officers’ cognitive processes and work styles 
based on in-depth interviews and field observations (see, e.g., Bittner, 1967; Manning, 
1977; Muir, 1977; Rubinstein, 1973; Van Maanen, 1974; Westley, 1970). One of the 
criticisms of the use of observational studies, especially in the realm of police 
misconduct, is that of observer interference. The fact that an observer is present in a 
vehicle during a ride-along and at specific incidents means that police may alter their 
behavior (Mastrofski & Parks, 1990). Additionally, the nature of qualitative research is 
that it generally consists of small sample sizes, both in the number of departments 
(ranging from a single department to no more than a handful) and the number of 
individuals, due to time and resource constraints (Mastrofski & Parks, 1990). 
New sources of data are becoming available as technology advances. Video 
footage, such as that captured on vehicle dashboard cameras, provides a glimpse at a 
limited form of misconduct (i.e., misconduct that occurs near the patrol car). This video 
footage allows researchers to immerse themselves in the incident, collecting information 
unavailable through other data sources. Reports and other official records only capture 
what the officer deems appropriate for input; the researcher, however, has different goals 
and priorities than the police officer, and thus may find other information more useful 
than what is included in an officer’s report. The newest technology uses body-worn 
cameras, in which officers carry a small camera on their person during citizen 
encounters (Smart Policing Initiative, 2011). This footage still creates a “dark figure” of 
misconduct, as officers only turn these cameras on during citizen interactions, thus 
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eliminating misconduct that is committed outside of the domain of the citizen encounter 
(White, 2014a). 
What Makes a “Bad Cop”? 
Research has found individual, organizational, and ecological characteristics that 
are either risk or protective factors regarding police officer misconduct. These factors 
have been examined using large samples with only a small percentage of women, so it is 
possible that these factors might change if gender were considered as more than a 
control variable (e.g., data partitioning). 
Risk Factors for Misconduct 
Several individual-level factors serve as risks for misconduct, including 
demographic characteristics, employment factors, and previous problems crime. As 
noted previously, most research on misconduct has used gender as a control variable; as 
such, being male has been found to increase one’s risk for committing misconduct 
(Greene, Piquero, Hickman, & Lawton, 2004; Grennan, 1987; Hickman, Piquero, & 
Greene, 2000; Kane & White, 2009; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996; McElvain & Kposowa, 
2004; Sherman, 1975; for exception, see Kane & White, 2013, in which officer sex was 
found to be statistically insignificant), though later analysis by White and Kane (2013) 
finds that gender is only significant for officers fired between 2 and 10 years into their 
service and does not predict time-to-failure overall. Kane and White (2009) als0 find 
that having children was a risk factor for committing misconduct.  
Being a member of a racial or ethnic minority has been associated with mixed 
results in the literature. Most research has found that minorities (black or Hispanic) are 
more likely to commit misconduct than their white counterparts (Greene et al., 2004; 
Hickman, Piquero, & Piquero, 2004; Kane & White, 2009, 2013; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 
1996; Rojek & Decker, 2009); Chappell & Piquero (2004), however, found no effect and 
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Kane and White (2009) note that this effect may be confounded with other issues such as 
differential assignment or rule enforcement. In a time-to-failure analysis of NYPD 
officers separated for cause between 1975 and 1996, White and Kane (2013) found that 
black and Hispanic officers are also more likely to be fired quickly than white officers, 
but that the ethnicities vary in their specific time periods of statistical significance: Being 
black is a risk factor for officers separated at any point in their careers, whereas being 
Hispanic is a statistically significant risk factor only for officers fired between 2 and 10 
years into their careers. 
Some research has found that the longer officers are with a department (longer 
tenure), the more likely they are to commit misconduct (Chappell & Piquero, 2004; 
Hickman et al., 2004; McElvain & Kposowa, 2004; Micucci & Gomme, 2005; Wolfe & 
Piquero, 2011); however, other scholars have found longer tenure to be a protective or 
nonsignificant influence on misconduct (see Fyfe & Kane, 2005; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 
1996; Kane & White, 2009, 2013; White & Kane, 2013) or to have a nonlinear effect, with 
misconduct more likely in the few years immediately following the probationary period, 
known as the “adolescent phase” (Harris, 2009, 2014; Meredith, 1984; Stinson, 
Liederbach, & Freiburger, 2010). Research has also shown that employment problems 
both prior to and during officers’ time in the department lead to a higher likelihood of 
committing misconduct (Cohen and Chaiken, 1972, 1973; Fyfe & Kane, 2005; Greene et 
al., 2004; Kane & White, 2009, 2013) and a higher likelihood of being fired more quickly 
(White & Kane, 2013). Receiving citizen complaints, and receiving them earlier in one’s 
career, as well as internal complaints from fellow officers, also increase the likelihood of 
committing misconduct and being fired more quickly (Cohen and Chaiken, 1972, 1973; 
Greene et al., 2004; Harris, 2011; Kane & White, 2009, 2013; White & Kane, 2013). 
Having a criminal history (Cohen and Chaiken, 1972, 1973; Fyfe & Kane, 2005; Greene 
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et al., 2004; Kane & White, 2009, 2013; Mollen Commission, 1994) or a history of 
military discipline (Cohen and Chaiken, 1972, 1973) or service (Kane & White, 2009; for 
exception, see Kane & White, 2013, in which prior military service was found to be 
statistically insignificant) are also risk factors for misconduct as well as short time-to-
failure (White & Kane, 2013). A negative recommendation by the department 
background investigator, while a risk factor for misconduct and a predictor of early 
firing, seems to be limited to only to the first two years, after which it is no longer 
significant (Kane & White, 2009; White & Kane, 2013; for exception, see Kane & White, 
2013, in which recommendation of the background investigator was found to be 
statistically insignificant). 
Several organizational characteristics are also risk factors for misconduct. Having 
a high proportion of males (relative to females) or whites (relative to any combination of 
racial/ethnic minorities) both correlate with higher rates of misconduct within the 
organization (Kane & White, 2009). Likewise, the level of priority of pursuing and 
punishing incidents of misconduct (Sherman, 1978) and informal organizational culture 
that is tolerant of street-level violence and deviance (Chevigny, 1969; Skolnick and Fyfe, 
1993) affect rates of misconduct. Organizational justice - composed of distributive, 
procedural, and interactional justice - is also relevant in studies of police misconduct. 
Distributive justice, or the perceived fairness of outcomes within an organization, affects 
the quantity and quality of employees’ work (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, 
Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Hg, 2001). Procedural justice emphasizes that fair outcomes 
alone are not enough; the process by which these outcomes are achieved must also be 
fair (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2006). Thus, even in the face of unfavorable outcomes, 
such as pay cuts or a disciplinary action, employees retain favorable views of the 
organization if the process was fair. Interactional justice suggests that employees have 
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more favorable views of the organization when supervisors are polite, honest, and 
respectful in their interactions with subordinates (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). 
Taken together, organizationally just police departments generally have lower rates of 
misconduct and a greater willingness among officers’ to report others’ misconduct 
(Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007; Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). Conversely, organizationally unjust 
departments may experience retaliation from officers or perceptions of internal 
illegitimacy, which can manifest in the form of police misconduct (French & Raven, 
1959; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2006). 
There are also ecological characteristics that affect police misconduct. Ecological 
explanations for crime and deviance, including police misconduct, are rooted in the 
social disorganization tradition (Kane, 2002; Reiss, 1986). Manning (1978) explains that 
formal social control mechanisms, like the police, are used to control communities where 
informal social control is lacking. When police activities are linked with community 
factors, such as socioeconomic status or minority representation, over-deployment can 
result in decreased police legitimacy (Blalock, 1967; Jacobs & Helms, 1997; Kane, 2002). 
Klinger (1997) uses a variation of negotiated order theory to argue that police 
misconduct may be higher in neighborhoods where officers perceive residents to be 
deserving of their victimization due to risky and/or criminal behavior or where officers 
normalize high levels of crime and deviance. This explanation is supported by studies of 
residents in these communities who simultaneously report excessive police presence but 
a lack of police response to their crime problems (Walker, 1992). It is unsurprising, then, 
that disadvantaged communities have higher proportions of police misconduct (Fagan & 
Davies, 2000; Kane, 2002; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993) and more incidents of force (Terrill & 
Reisig, 2003). Likewise, those with higher percentages of minority residents and greater 
population mobility also have higher rates of police misconduct (Kane, 2002). 
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These risk factors are largely consistent with extant research on employee 
deviance in general. The literature reports that men are significantly more likely to 
commit employee deviance, such as theft, than are women, in some cases by as much as 
a factor of two (Harris & Benson, 1998; Hollinger & Clark, 1983; Mangione & Quinn, 
1975; Ruggiero, Greenberger, & Steinberg, 1982). Research on white-collar crime, 
however, finds that men and women are rather similar in the propensity to commit 
employee crime, though men’s offenses tend to be more serious than do women’s (see, 
e.g., Daly, 1989; Holtfreter, 2005, 2008, 2013). Likewise, age is correlated with 
workplace misconduct, with misconduct being less likely as workers get older (Hollinger, 
1986; Mangione & Quinn, 1975; Robin, 1969). Since age and job tenure affect job 
satisfaction and other indicators of the quality of employment, it is unsurprising that 
new, young workers are more likely to engage in workplace deviance (Hollinger, 1986; 
Hollinger and Clark, 1983; Mangione & Quinn, 1975; Quinn & Staines, 1979). Similarly, 
it is predictable that new, young police officers, anxious to impress and be accepted by 
their peers and superiors, would engage in workplace deviance as well. 
Protective Factors for Misconduct 
Several individual-level characteristics serve to decrease the likelihood of 
committing misconduct. Consistent with life-course literature and sociological studies, 
marriage leads to a lower likelihood of committing misconduct (Kane & White, 2009; 
for exception, see Chappell & Piquero, 2004). Being married with children (what is 
termed the conventional family dimension) protects against early employment 
termination for cause (White & Kane, 2013). Likewise, officers who got married during 
their NYPD tenure were less likely to be fired from the NYPD early in their careers 
(White & Kane, 2013). While divorce is not a protective factor, the combination of 
divorce and active enrollment in school creates a second start that seems to protect 
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against misconduct (Kane & White, 2009). These findings regarding family influences 
are consistent with Sampson and Laub’s (1993; see also Laub & Sampson, 2003) findings 
using a life-course theoretical framework. 
Having education higher than a high school diploma (including some college not 
culminating in a degree) prior to appointment has been found to decrease the likelihood 
of officer misconduct (Kane & White, 2009, 2013; Kappeler et al., 1992; for exception, 
see Truxillo, Bennett, & Collins, 1998). Interestingly, White and Kane (2013) find that 
only a college degree is protective in a time-to-failure analysis of NYPD officers, 
indicating that those with college degrees are less likely to be fired early.  
In terms of age, being older both decreases an officer’s likelihood of committing 
misconduct (Greene et al., 2004; McElvain & Kposowa, 2004; Kane & White, 2009, 
2013; Wolfe & Piquero, 2011) and protects against early firing (White & Kane, 2013). 
Finally, obtaining higher rank decreases officers’ likelihood for committing misconduct 
(Hickman et al., 2004; Kane & White, 2009, 2013) and protects against being fired 
quickly for misconduct (White & Kane, 2013). Having no citizen complaints is protective 
only for officers fired between 2 and 10 years of service (White & Kane, 2013). 
These risk and protective factors help explain why some officers commit police 
misconduct and others do not. Equally as important, however, is and understanding of 
the historical and organizational contexts in which the officers operate. Characteristics of 
the city and department in which officers work, and the citizens officers serve and 
protect, are vital to understanding how and why some officers find themselves in 
situations conducive to misconduct. For this research, that means an understanding of 
New York City and its police department will place the findings of this study in 
perspective.  
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Theoretical Framework 
Though research on police work is largely atheoretical in nature (Kane & White, 
2009), scholars have used a variety of theories to explain police officer misconduct. 
Theoretical interpretations have addressed police opportunity for misconduct (Alpert & 
Dunham, 1996; Kappeler et al., 1998), police personality typifications such as the 
authoritarian personality (Neiderhoffer, 1967), individual deviance explanations such as 
impulsivity (Pogarsky & Piquero, 2003), sociological effects of neighborhoods (Kane, 
2002; Klinger, 1997), and reduced deterrence (Pogarsky & Piquero, 2003). In terms of 
mainstream criminological theories, however, the two most commonly used theories are 
strain theory (particularly Agnew’s general strain theory [GST]) and social learning 
theory. 
Misconduct as a Result of Rotten Apples, Pockets, and Barrels 
Early explanations of police misconduct centered on corruption. While other 
forms of police misconduct were present, corruption seemed to be the root of the 
problem. Sherman (1974) argues that corrupt acts serve personal rather than 
organizational purposes. He notes that corruption within an organization is different 
than organizational corruption, creating a typology consisting of three categories of 
corruption within organizations: Rotten apples or pockets, pervasive disorganized 
corruption, and systematic organized corruption. 
Most police departments believe that they fall into Sherman’s (1974) first type of 
corruption, which is rotten apples or pockets; he argues, however, that this is not 
generally the case. Administrators assert that most police are honest, but there are a few 
lone “rotten apples,” usually in the uniformed patrol unit (e.g., officers who take bribes 
for not issuing minor traffic tickets). “Rotten pockets,” on the other hand, are usually 
found in plainclothes units such as detective and vice squads. These are small groups of 
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officers who have normalized corruption, typically through the use of informants 
(Sherman, 1974). The Buddy Boys and “Dirty Thirty” scandals are examples of “rotten 
pockets” corruption (and other misconduct, such as police crime) because it was not 
pervasive throughout the department, but was limited to only one precinct (the 77th and 
30th, respectively) (McAlary, 1987).  
Sherman’s (1974) second type of police corruption is pervasive, unorganized 
corruption. Departments in this category have widespread (i.e., a majority of personnel), 
but not systematic (i.e., disorganized), corruption. He describes these departments as 
ones in which rookie officers are told by others in the department how to “supplement 
income,” and then encouraged to do so, keeping whatever they get. In this way, it is an 
“entrepreneurial graft” (Sherman, 1974, p. 11). Sherman (1974) notes that this kind of 
corruption is most common in developing countries and the Mediterranean, where it is 
present throughout the political system. 
The final type of corruption in Sherman’s (1974) typology is pervasive, organized 
corruption, or that which is “organized in a hierarchical, authoritarian fashion” (p. 10). 
In many cases, this kind of corruption extends beyond the police department to include 
local politicians and criminal justice officials (e.g., local magistrates), and usually 
involves organized crime syndicates. He describes this kind of corruption as that in 
which rookie officers are told where to pick up bribes (e.g., brothels and casinos) and 
how much to distribute to each person involved in the scheme. This form of corruption 
was rampant in the NYPD during the mid- to late-1960s until Frank Serpico and others 
brought it to the attention of the public through the media (Levitt, 2009). 
Sherman (1974) describes six factors that make corruption possible, or at least 
easier to commit. The first is the discretion involved in police work. Officers with more 
discretion (e.g., patrol units or specialized units removed from supervision) are more 
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likely to engage in corruption. Second, and related, low managerial visibility contributes 
to corruption. Officers (or groups) who are removed from supervisory oversight – or are 
often out of sight of supervisors, as are specialized units or patrol officers – are able to 
engage in corrupt behavior without fear of being discovered. Third, officers tend to have 
low public visibility. Most officers engage in corrupt behavior away from the eyes of the 
public. This can be both literal – officers accept bribes away from public view – and 
figurative – officers accept bribes from drug dealers or operators of vice establishments 
(casinos, brothels), most of whom are considered the “underbelly” of society.  
Fourth, there is often peer group secrecy. When individuals, small groups, or 
even whole departments (e.g., the blue wall of silence) have the guarantee of peer silence, 
corruption is able to flourish, as was evident in both the Serpico and Buddy Boys 
scandals at the NYPD. Fifth, there typically is managerial secrecy. In instances where 
supervisors are made aware of the corrupt activities, and the supervisors do not take 
appropriate action to thwart the behavior, corruption will thrive. For example, Frank 
Serpico took his concerns to his superiors, and their superiors, but nothing was done (in 
fact, he was told that “such accusations could result in his being found in the East River”) 
(Sherman, 1978, p. xxvii). Finally, status problems lead to a proliferation of corruption. 
Police officers have long considered themselves underpaid (and much of society would 
likely agree), both monetarily and in terms of social status, especially in relation to their 
power and authority. The disconnect between pay and prestige can lead to a social 
acceptance within the policing profession that profit-motivated corruption is simply 
supplemental “reimbursement” for services rendered (Sherman, 1974). 
In discussing corruption, especially in police departments, Sherman (1978) notes 
that “it is important to distinguish deviance committed by organizations from deviance 
committed in organizations” (p. 4; see also Sherman, 1974). Deviance committed by 
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organizations is collective in nature and aids in attaining organizational goals. 
Alternatively, deviance committed in an organization does not further organizational 
goals – or is harmful to them – and can be either individual or collective (Sherman, 
1978). This is an important distinction because nearly all organizations (including police 
departments) have deviance in them, but it is the organizations that are themselves 
deviant that cause scandal and usually lead to massive reform efforts. In the police 
context, deviant departments have such systematic corruption that “criminals can 
purchase immunity from arrest,” which is clearly a violation of any definition of the role 
of the police (Sherman, 1978, p. 4).  
A clear example of this would be the Serpico-era NYPD with widespread 
corruption that routinely used pads, or organized payments by criminals to police 
officials in exchange for continued protection from arrest. This form of corruption was so 
entrenched within the department that it has been estimated that nearly one-third of the 
department was involved (Levitt, 2009), requiring the police commissioner’s 
resignation, followed by the implementation of the Knapp Commission and the 
appointment of reformist police commissioner Patrick Murphy, to begin to change the 
culture of corruption within the NYPD (Sherman, 1978). This example is a good 
reminder, however, that individual officers vary significantly in the degree to which they 
take advantage of opportunities for corruption, from completely honest (only one-third 
of the department was involved in the organized corruption), to the “passive ‘grass-
eaters’” taking advantage of opportunities as they were presented, to the “extortionist 
‘meat-eaters’” aggressively seeking out opportunities (Sherman, 1978, p. 41). 
Organizations become deviant either by adopting deviant organizational goals or 
by legitimizing the use of deviant means to achieve non-deviant organizational goals 
(Sherman, 1978). Regarding the first method, police agencies routinely face both internal 
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and external opposition regarding the adoption of goals. The legal system, advocacy 
groups, politicians, police administrators, and factions within departments (e.g., the 
patrol officers’ union versus the supervisors’ union) all have differing perspectives 
regarding the role of the police and the goals in implementing that role (Sherman, 1978). 
The second method can be seen in the film Dirty Harry, what has been termed “noble-
cause corruption.” Klockars (1980) explains the Dirty Harry problem as “when and to 
what extent […] the morally good end warrant[s] or justif[ies] an ethically, politically, or 
legally dangerous means to its achievement” (p. 35). This form of corruption is indicative 
of attitudes that “imply that corruption is consistent with the formal police goal of 
fighting crime, and that a corrupt police department is merely accommodating the tastes 
of the community it serves” (Sherman, 1978, p. 33; see also Cooper, 2012; Klockars, 
1980). Caldero and Crank (2004) argue that officers are ethically predisposed to noble-
cause corruption and view their work through this pre-existing lens. More recent 
findings, however, show that officers contextualize their commitment to noble-cause 
corruption based on their circumstances and the “dirty” behaviors being utilized (Crank, 
Flaherty, & Giacomazzi, 2007). 
Misconduct as a Result of Strain 
Agnew’s (1985, 1992, 2006) revised general strain theory stems from traditional 
anomie theory (Merton, 1938), which states that crime or deviance results when a person 
is unable to achieve monetary success through legitimate means, also referred to as the 
goals/means conflict. Agnew (1985) extended anomie to include any goal one might have 
(including those unrelated to monetary success) and multiple legitimate means of 
attaining those goals. Similar to Merton, Agnew argues that delinquency, or 
“innovation,” is one of many responses to this conflict. Unlike Merton, however, Agnew 
(1992, 2006) extends and broadens the goals/means conflict to include three specific 
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types of stress, or strain: 1) The inability to achieve a positively valued goal, 2) the 
presence of noxious stimuli, and 3) the removal of positive stimuli. These three strains 
then induce a series of negative emotions (e.g., depression, anger, and anxiety) that are 
corrected through either legitimate or illegitimate coping mechanisms. Deviance – in 
this case, police officer misconduct – is one such illegitimate coping mechanism (Agnew, 
1992; Agnew, Brezina, Wright, & Cullen, 2002).  
Strain theory is commonly applied to policing because of the inherently stressful 
nature of police work due to its dangerousness and unpredictability (Manning, 1995; 
Paoline, 2004; Skolnick, 1966; Terrill, Paoline, & Manning, 2003; Westley, 1970). 
Research has demonstrated that officers with high levels of stress are more likely to 
display anger or engage in negative coping mechanisms such as gambling or excessive 
drinking (Gershon, 2000; Roberts & Levenson, 2001). Additional negative effects of 
stress, which are compounded in police officers, include poor health, drug abuse, and 
even suicide (Anshel, 2000). Haarr and Morash (1999) address the issue of occupational 
stress when they note that it is “a matter of both theoretical and practical concern 
because of the possible physical, emotional, and/or job performance consequences for an 
individual” (p. 306; see also Morash & Haarr, 1995). Negative effects of occupational 
stress include job dissatisfaction, absenteeism, burnout, and other performance 
problems (Brown, Cooper, & Kirkcaldy, 1996; Crank, Regoli, & Culbertson, 1995; Wright 
& Saylor, 1991), all of which may contribute to misconduct. 
Misconduct as a Result of Socialization 
Social learning theory as posited by Akers (1998) is an extension of Sutherland’s 
(1940) differential association theory of crime. Akers (1998) theorized that favorable 
attitudes towards deviance are learned through social interactions, and these attitudes 
are strengthened through four mechanisms: Differential association, differential 
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reinforcement, definitions, and modeling. Differential association, or the influence of 
those with whom one interacts, is presumed to be the strongest of the four mechanisms. 
In policing, differential association is seen in the police subculture, as it is the primary 
method by which officers learn the ways of policing (Chappell & Piquero, 2004; 
Sherman, 1978). Early work on the police subculture originated in studies of routine 
police work that discovered a series of occupational norms and values steeped in the 
rigid hierarchy of police organizations (Cain, 1973; Chan, 1996; Manning, 1977, 1995). 
Stoddard’s (1968) early sociological study of police wrongdoing, or what he termed 
“blue-coat crime,” argued that misconduct was socially prescribed through an informal 
code rather than individual deviation from the law. 
The police subculture is based on solidarity, secrecy, and a distrust of the public 
(Bittner, 1974; Stoddard, 1968; Van Maanen, 1980; Westley, 1970). This solidarity and 
secrecy is seen in the commonly referenced “blue wall of silence,” wherein it is informally 
prohibited that officers “rat out” one another. This code of silence is present in nearly 
every police department, both domestically and abroad (Knapp Commission, 1972; 
Mollen Commission, 1994; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a/b; Skolnick, 2002, 2005). 
Research has demonstrated that strict adherence to the code results in a higher 
likelihood of officers using excessive force, engaging in corruption, or committing 
perjury (Knapp Commission, 1972; Micuccui & Gomme, 2005; Mollen Commission, 
1994; Skolnick, 2005). There is some evidence, however, that this wall of silence can be 
breached in the face of external investigation (Punch, 1985).  
Distrust of the public is articulated clearly in Van Maanen’s (1978) discussion of 
police views of the public, in which people are either classified as assholes, suspicious 
persons, or know-nothings – none of whom are to be trusted. This subculture, combined 
with long and irregular hours and a social orientation that places officers at odds with 
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nearly every citizen they encounter, creates an intense “us vs. them” mentality, also 
referred to as a “siege mentality” (Alpert & Dunham, 1996; Bittner, 1974; Kappeler et al., 
1998; Rubinstein, 1973; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1996; Van Maanen, 1978; Westley, 1970). In 
fact, an NYPD Internal Affairs Division captain told the Knapp Commission, “cops 
viewed themselves as surrounded by hostile forces that wanted to destroy the 
department” (Levitt, 2009, p. 9).  
The subculture has also been described in terms of normative orders, drawing on 
similar constructs such as the norms of safety, adventure/machismo, and bureaucratic 
control (Herbert, 1998; see also Kappeler et al., 1998; Reiner, 1992; Skolnick, 1966). The 
social and occupational role of a police officer immediately confers authority and status; 
this formal group membership in the police profession brings with it intense solidarity, 
loyalty, and trustworthiness (Barton, 2003; Bittner, 1974; Brown & Sargent, 1995). This 
camaraderie is the vehicle through which the shared norms, values and beliefs of the 
police subculture teach, reinforce, and perpetuate deviance because it allows officers to 
justify and rationalize misconduct in order to be viewed as “good” by their peers (Alpert 
& Dunham, 1996; Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). As officers’ social isolation increases by 
socializing with one another both on- and off-duty (and not socializing with non-police 
friends and family members), they retreat further into the subculture for moral support 
(Chappell & Piquero, 2004; Kappeler et al., 1998). 
Kappeler and colleagues (1998) use an anthropological description of the 
subculture to explain police misconduct. This explanation emphasizes the interaction of 
socialization and culture. In particular, they argue that police departments engrain 
officers with an “us vs. them” mentality, pitting officers against the public, creating a 
confrontational culture. This begins in the selection process, in which officer recruits are 
chosen based on how well they will fit into the established subculture, and continuing 
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through the academy and field training, where the subculture is further established. 
Because the culture and socialization process is top-down, a subculture that both 
perpetuates and protects misconduct is bred, trickling down from top-brass to the rank-
and-file (Kappeler et al., 1998; see also Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). 
Misconduct as a Result of Organizational Context 
Although many individual characteristics are correlated with police misconduct, 
it is ultimately the police agency that is often blamed for instances of misconduct 
(Ivkovic, 2005a). This is because social context is intrinsically intertwined with 
individual officer behavior (Smith, 1986). Other scholars, however, argue that studying 
the organizational contexts and correlates unfairly blames police supervisors and 
organizations for the misconduct of individual officers (Manning, 2009).  
Research in organizational theory has found that when employees view their 
organizations as just and fair, they are less likely to commit workplace deviance 
(Greenberg, 1993). Likewise, fair and just supervisors are more likely to garner support 
from their employees and inculcate norms and values of the organization (French & 
Raven, 1959; Schein, 1993). Specific to policing, supervisors and administrators who do 
not abide by the tenets of organizational justice are more likely to experience a 
legitimization of deviant behavior or decreased ability and authority to punish and deter 
deviance, which can lead to situations of invocation of the code of silence or reliance on 
noble-cause corruption (also known as the “Dirty Harry” problem, see Klockars, 1980) 
(Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). Police officers in an organization that is procedurally just are 
also likely to experience greater willingness among the rank-and-file to report 
misconduct (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007).  
Recently, Wolfe and Piquero (2011) found that officers in the Philadelphia Police 
Department were less likely to commit misconduct if they “viewed the [department] as 
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distributing decisions fairly, engaging in procedurally just managerial actions, and 
interacting in a polite and courteous manner toward subordinates” (p. 346). Though they 
do not discuss organizational justice, Kane and White (2009) explain that organizational 
context is important in a department’s handling of misconduct incidents. Two major 
commissions (the Knapp Commission in 1972 and the Mollen Commission in 1994) 
bookended the 22-year period of their study of the New York Police Department. The 
prolonged period of time that the department was able to remain free of scandal allowed 
the department more latitude in determining sanctions for misconduct, as it had greater 
freedom from external scrutiny (Kane & White, 2009; see also Baker, 1996; Black, 1972). 
Theoretical Explanations Through the Lens of Gender 
While research has shown that there are a number of individual and 
organizational traits that correlate with police misconduct, it is likely that some 
characteristics alter the effects of the traits in substantively important ways. Strain 
theory, social learning theory, and organizational theory provide direction for 
understanding how the predictors of police officer misconduct differ by gender. 
Gender and strain theory. Explanations for the “gender gap” using strain 
theory center on the fact that men and women are socialized differently based on gender 
norms, which create an oppressive social environment for women, or strain (Irwin & 
Adler, 2012). Most criminological theories do not consider social hierarchies, and thus 
do not encompass the gender stratification in which women live (Chesney-Lind, 1989). 
Strain theory encompasses the feminist notion of social oppression (Broidy & Agnew, 
1997; Katz, 2000); in fact, Agnew (2001) finds that certain strains, including prejudice 
and discrimination, are particularly conducive to deviance. These strains result in 
emotions like anger and frustration, yet women are not socialized to express these in the 
conventional ways (e.g., through aggression) (Brown & Chesney-Lind, 2005; Irwin & 
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Adler, 2012). In fact, women experience as much or more strain than men (Broidy & 
Agnew, 1997) and are as likely, or more likely, than men to experience anger as a result 
of strain (Broidy & Agnew, 1997; Jennings, Piquero, Gover, & Perez, 2009; Piquero & 
Sealock, 2004), though anger is often one of a barrage of emotions felt by women 
(including guilt and shame), leading to non-criminal maladaptive coping mechanisms 
such as eating disorders, many of which are not studied by criminologists (Kaufman, 
2009; Sharp et al., 2001, 2005). 
Additionally, women’s experiences are qualitatively different from those of men 
(Agnew & Brezina, 1997; Belknap & Holsinger, 2006; Broidy & Agnew, 1997; Daly, 1992; 
Eitle, 2002; Piquero & Sealock, 2004). Specifically, men and women differ in their 
fairness conceptions and the value placed on different kinds of goals (Broidy & Agnew, 
1997; Kaufman, 2009). Where men value fair distribution, women are more concerned 
with fairness of procedures. Likewise, men place higher value on material goals whereas 
women highly value personal relationships. They also experience different types of 
strains, such as high levels of gender-based discrimination (Eitle, 2002), behavior 
restrictions (e.g., curfew) (Bottcher, 1995), sex-based criminal victimization (e.g., sexual 
abuse, sexual assault, and rape) (Kruttschnitt & Macmillan, 2006; Tjaden & Thoennes, 
2000, 2006), and interpersonal relationship problems (Turner, Wheaton, & Lloyd, 
1995). 
Strain theory has long been used to explain the gender gap in criminal offending 
(Agnew, 2006; Broidy, 2001; Broidy & Agnew, 1997; Piquero & Sealock, 2004); as such, 
it should also be able to explain gender differences in the predictors of police misconduct 
as a form of occupational deviance. Female officers experience as much or more strain 
than male officers, consistent with strain literature for the general population (Dowler, 
2005; Haarr & Morash, 1999; Poteyeva & Sun, 2009). Alternative coping mechanisms 
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could also be present in policing, including adapting to one’s surroundings (role 
acceptance) or leaving the profession (avoidance). For example, a qualitative study of the 
harassment coping strategies of female police officers conducted by Haarr and Morash 
(1999) found that women engage in escape (e.g., suffer in silence or endure harassment) 
more often than do men. Additionally, because women are taught not to be aggressive 
and to moderate their anger and stress, they are better able to outwardly manage those 
emotions and impulses (Brown & Chesney-Lind, 2005). 
Organizationally speaking, research indicates that strains stemming from 
workplace problems (especially features of the work organization) are more salient than 
other kinds of stressors for police officers, and are particularly relevant for women and 
racial minorities (Haarr & Morash, 1999; Morash and Haarr 1995; Wexler and Logan 
1983). Additionally, female officers often are victims of many forms of gender 
discrimination, which is highly conducive to deviant behavior (e.g., misconduct) (Agnew, 
2001; Broidy & Agnew, 1997; Jennings et al., 2009). They may also experience informal 
discrimination by virtue of administrative or organizational policies in the form of 
maternity leave policies, promotion and performance review criteria which favor 
assignments or tasks disproportionately given to male officers, and training 
opportunities (Garcia, 2003; Martin, 1983; Seklecki & Paynich, 2007; Wexler & Logan, 
1983). 
Difficulty assimilating into the police subculture and a lack of acceptance by male 
counterparts can also lead to strain. In fact, one of the primary causes of stress for female 
officers is not being accepted by their fellow male officers (Belknap & Shelley, 1992; 
Hunt, 1990; Martin, 1983; Remmington, 1983; Wexler & Logan, 1983), stemming from 
the belief that female officers are not fit to do the job, either by competency or physical 
fitness (Balkin, 1988; Charles, 1981; Remmington, 1983; Seklecki & Paynich, 2007). 
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Much of this is due to the fact that a large number of male police officers still subscribe 
to gender stereotypes in which women are physically and emotionally weaker, difficult to 
supervise, and emotional (Belknap & Shelley, 1992). In many respects, it is a catch-22 for 
female officers; women who attempt to assimilate are labeled “dykes” or “butch,” 
whereas women who fail to do so are viewed as inept (Rabe-Hemp, 2008). 
Gender and social learning theory. The police subculture is characterized by 
its masculinity (specifically, Anglo masculinity), so much so that it is part of its very 
identity (Haarr & Morash, 1999; Herbert, 1998; Hunt, 1990; Reiner, 1992). This is 
demonstrated in that the subculture “accepts violence as a means of resolving disputes, 
promotes competition to establish formal and informal hierarchies of authority and 
dominance, and supports displays of masculinity, sexism, and racism” (Haarr, 1997, p. 
55; see also Felkenes & Schroedel, 1993; Hunt, 1990; Kraska & Kappeler, 1995; Rabe-
Hemp, 2009). Male police officers typically self-select into their chosen profession (i.e., 
they choose policing because of the danger, masculinity, etc. present in the job), though 
the subculture is also self-perpetuating because the all-male (or nearly all-male) peer 
group supports the subculture’s myths and values (Franklin, 2007; see also Schwartz & 
DeKeseredy, 1997). Thus, it is incredibly difficult for women to assimilate into the 
subculture (Chu & Sun, 2007; Reiner, 1992) because of the social isolation and high 
visibility of women’s status as “token females” (Kanter, 1977) and because female 
officers’ attitudes and behaviors are not aligned with the hyper-masculinity of the 
policing culture’s values of aggression, cynicism, and authoritarianism, leading to a lack 
of male acceptance (Belknap & Shelley, 1992). Worden (1993) posits that male officers’ 
disinclination to accept females and welcome them into the subculture could actually 
further the rift by causing female officers to question or even reject traditional “crime-
fighter” role assignments and make them more critical of their environment. 
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The masculinity of the police subculture is similar to the corporate business 
culture, and women are treated in much the same fashion in both worlds. Just as women 
have difficulty assimilating into the police subculture, women in business often find that 
they are excluded from the corporate subculture. Research on white-collar crime has 
found that even when women are in high-ranking positions, they are excluded from the 
informal networks within their organizations or industries (Daly, 1989; Gorman & Kmec, 
2009; Kanter, 1977). This lack of access to informal social networks limits their 
opportunity to collude with others in criminal schemes (Steffensmeier et al., 2013). This 
explanation for gender differences in white-collar crime, also referred to as “occupational 
marginality” (Chapman, 1980; Daly, 1989; Messerschmidt, 1986), closely aligns with the 
subcultural justifications for the gender gap in police officer misconduct. 
The social isolation of female officers and their place at the periphery of the 
police subculture could also explain their lower rates of misconduct. Women may be 
excluded from opportunities for organized group misconduct because of mistrust. 
Female police officers also may not “buy in” to the police subculture and its perpetuation 
of deviance, as evidenced by research demonstrating that females observe unethical 
behavior more often than their male counterparts (Alley, Waugh, & Ede, 1996; for 
exception, see Felkenes, 1991). Additionally, remaining on the edge of the subculture 
means that women are free to use the characteristics that make them effective police 
officers, such as sympathetic responses to victims, lower rates of use of force, better 
communication and interpersonal skills, and reliance on de-escalation tactics rather than 
violent aggression – thus also reducing their likelihood of committing misconduct (Alley 
et al., 1996; Belknap & Shelley, 1992; Bloch & Anderson, 1974; Sherman, 1973). It is 
possible, however, that women may have different patterns of the types of misconduct 
they commit, especially career-ending misconduct. For example, supervisors may 
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terminate female officers for minor administrative violations, over which they have 
extensive discretion, in order to remove female officers they view to be in violation of the 
informal code or a danger to the social group (Stoddard, 1968). 
Gender and organizational theory. Little research has linked organizational 
theory to police misconduct from a gender perspective. There is, however, research that 
has highlighted the orientation of women within police departments and the 
organizational contexts that affect their experiences within the department. Balkin 
(1988) and Fielding (1994) both note that the police department is perhaps the most 
gendered of all social institutions because of the sheer percentage of men consistently 
present throughout the ranks. Fielding (1994) uses the uniformity of gendered role 
regulation and task assignments as further evidence of the gendered nature of police.  
The police department is also a perfect example of Acker’s (1992) notion of a 
gendered institution because its processes, practices, images, ideologies, and distribution 
of power are all heavily influenced by gender. For example, masculine traits are used as 
part of the rubric of success (e.g., competitiveness, aggression, and emotional 
detachment) (Garcia, 2003), the power structure and day-to-day protocols are 
paramilitary in nature (Kappeler et al., 1998), and police officers themselves are known 
as a “brotherhood” or the “boys in blue.” The perception of females as tokens is 
reinforced, as female officers view the promotion of women as public relations stunts or 
an attempt to fill a quota (Gau et al., 2012). One woman’s failure becomes associated 
with all members of her gender, creating immense pressure not only for themselves but 
also for future female officers (Leger, 1997).  
Additionally, the femininity that is inevitably introduced into policing when 
women enter the profession changes what it means to “do police work” (Franklin, 2007), 
thus threatening the “cult of masculinity” (Waddington, 1999) of the police subculture. 
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The institutional response to this attempt to introduce femininity is to preserve the 
status quo by reducing the introduction of change, thus women are unable to engage 
fully in the job of policing. These organizational factors influence women’s experiences in 
departments, and subsequently affect the predictors of misconduct along gender lines. 
The position of women within departments is also salient to the discussion of 
police misconduct from an organizational perspective. Women make up a small 
percentage of police departments, but their distribution throughout the ranks is far from 
equitable (National Center for Women and Policing, 2001). The literature on white-collar 
crime emphasizes that organizational position colors criminal opportunities (Holtfreter, 
2014). For example, women in police departments are more likely to be in lower ranks, 
similar to their positions in the private sector; thus, their organizational position within 
the department determines the opportunities available to them to commit misconduct 
much as women’s occupations in business organizations (i.e., largely clerical or low-
ranking management positions) affects their involvement in white-collar crime (Daly, 
1989; Steffensmeier et al., 2013). 
This study advances the literature on police misconduct by drawing from the 
mainstream criminological theories of strain and social learning, organizational theory, 
police theories of deviance like rotten apples and police subculture, and feminist 
pathways theory to provide a more holistic framework for addressing the lack of 
attention paid to women in policing scholarship in general, and police misconduct 
research in particular. 
The Current Study 
Using a large sample (N=3,085) of male and female police officers fired from the 
NYPD for misconduct, this study addresses two issues that remain unanswered in the 
extant policing literature: 1) Do predictors of police misconduct operate in sex-specific 
	  58 
ways, and 2) What is the “predictor landscape” for women regarding police misconduct? 
First, the full sample will be used to assess the generality of predictors of misconduct. Do 
some predictors operate as risk factors for men but as protective factors for women, or 
vice versa? Are some predictors that are thought to predict misconduct, either positively 
or negatively, statistically insignificant for women? Second, the female-only sample 
(N=435) is used to determine what predictors are relevant for women. Of specific 
interest is whether certain combinations of predictors consistent with general strain 
theory (for example, change in marital status and the presence of children) affect 
women. Given the socialization and social stratification of women, especially in a 
masculine profession like policing, it is likely that some predictors of misconduct will be 
more salient for female officers.  
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODS 
The Research Setting: The New York City Police Department 
Misconduct, especially corruption, can arguably be found in every large police 
department in the United States (Sherman, 1978). The New York City Police Department 
(NYPD), however, has a particular history of misconduct and corruption, beginning from 
colonial times and continuing until the twentieth century and beyond (Sherman, 1978). 
Specifically, public corruption scandals seem to occur in regular intervals, approximately 
every 20 years: the Lexow Committee (1890s), the Wickersham Commission and the 
Seabury investigation (both in the 1930s), the Harry Gross gambling investigation 
(1950s), the Knapp Commission (1970s), and the Mollen Commission (1990s) (Johnson, 
2003; Lardner & Reppetto, 2000; Sherman, 1978). Many of these corruption scandals 
were also linked with public outcry over excessive police brutality (Johnson, 2003). 
Indeed, continuing beyond the 1990s, the stop-question-and-frisk “scandal” in the 
2000s and early 2010s could arguably be included in this cycle, as it included 
widespread, organized abuse of authority (Center for Constitutional Rights, 2011; Floyd 
v. City of New York, 2013). The reasons for the cyclical nature of police misconduct in 
the NYPD go back to its formation in the mid-nineteenth century. 
The Early Years of the NYPD 
The NYPD was formally created in 1845 and was intended to be modeled after the 
recently formed London Metropolitan Police Department under the leadership of Sir 
Robert Peel (Lardner, 1996; Worrall, 2014). In reality, however, the NYPD looked very 
different from the London “bobbies” – as different as London itself was from New York 
City (Walker, 1976). London was largely homogeneous in terms of racial, ethnic, and 
religious composition. The police enforced laws that had generally broad support among 
the populace, they were created to be independent from the local politics by making 
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them civil servants rather than political appointees, and they wore distinctive uniforms 
(a dark blue uniform that earned them the nickname “bluebottles”) so as to be easily 
identified by citizens requesting assistance (Lardner, 1996; Miller, 1975).  
In New York, the model reflected the American individualism and pride of local 
popular democracy: Police officers were appointed by local aldermen and had to be re-
appointed at regular intervals to ensure loyalty to their political patrons (Lardner, 1996; 
Johnson, 2003; Walker, 1976). Additionally, the population of New York City was 
growing rapidly – it grew by more than one-third between 1845 and 1855 – and soon 
had a foreign-born immigrant majority. This ethnic amalgamation made enforcing laws, 
which were enacted by conservative, nativist legislatures in northern New York, difficult. 
Officers resorted to bribery and other forms of corruption in order to reconcile the 
nativist laws (such as Sabbath laws and gambling prohibitions) with an immigrant 
population who enjoyed such vice as drinking, gambling, and prostitution (Lardner, 
1996; Miller, 1975). The political and ethnic tensions present in New York City made 
police officers walking targets, especially in neighborhoods whose politics or ethnic 
nationalism did not match the reigning political power of the moment; thus, officers 
were permitted to wear plainclothes, allowing them to better fit in and make themselves 
less distinctive (Lardner, 1996).  
The close link between politics and policing, which would continue into the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, made police brutality an ever-present concern 
among the citizenry and created a “self-perpetuating culture of violence” in which 
officers commanded respect through a nightstick or baton (Johnson, 2003, p. 15; see 
also Haller, 1976; Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). Tensions grew as police clashed with labor 
groups in the late nineteenth century into the 1920s, as employers often retained the 
“services” of the police department to break up strikes and unionizing efforts in return 
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for a large donation to the police officer pension fund. Elite native-born New Yorkers 
viewed organized labor and immigrants as the source of public disorder in the city and 
approved of any and all measures invoked by the police as necessary and proper 
(Johnson, 2003; Lardner & Reppetto, 2000; Miller, 1975).  
During this time, however, some in the NYPD made strides towards a more 
professional police department well before the professional era of policing took hold. In 
1880, Thomas Byrnes was the inspector in command of the Detective Bureau (Lardner & 
Reppetto, 2000). He transformed it from an auxiliary function of patrol to the mold for 
modern detective work through the institution of meticulous intelligence gathering and 
initiating a record-keeping system of criminal information, including photographs 
(Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). The Detective Bureau also tracked arrests and “sentence-
years,” or the number of years to which criminals were sentenced upon conviction, which 
was the common practice for tracking police effectiveness prior to the use of clearance 
rates in the Uniform Crime Report starting in the 1930s (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). It 
was during Byrnes’s tenure that detective work began to specialize, with units assigned to 
robberies, homicides, and other serious crimes. 
Tamanny Hall, the infamous political machine, used police officers as graft-
collectors, involving “coppers” in political corruption from the beginning (Haller, 1976; 
Lardner & Reppetto, 2000; Worrall, 2014). Rather than merit promotions, ranks were 
sold, often for sums upwards of $15,000 for a lucrative captain’s position (Lardner, 1996; 
Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). Police reformers were usually linked to anti-Tamanny Hall 
activists, and they finally succeeded in removing the political clout of the political 
machine in 1895 when the Lexow Committee released its report about NYPD corruption 
and brutality under the direction of Tamanny Hall. Specifically, former U.S. Senator 
Thomas Platt, head of the state Republican Party, targeted Tamanny Hall for not sharing 
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its political patronage by mounting the committee’s investigation, led by chief counsel 
John W. Goff, which centered on police-led voting fraud (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000).  
Following this incident, the people of New York City chose a tough Republican 
mayor, William Strong, and the state legislature created a bipartisan board of four 
commissioners, two each from the major political parties. The Republicans were 
Theodore Roosevelt and Col. Fred Grant (son of Ulysses S. Grant) and the Democrats 
were Avery Andrews and Andrew Parker, with Roosevelt as the president of the board 
and the most outspoken of the commissioners (Johnson, 2003; Lardner, 1996; Lardner 
& Reppetto, 2000). Under Roosevelt’s direction, officers were expected to use aggressive 
tactics when needed; it was said that “under his leadership, police were to walk softly and 
courteously among respectable citizens but carry a big stick to deal with criminals and 
thugs” (Johnson, 2003, p. 90), thus police brutality continued for those deemed 
“problematic.” Roosevelt also reformed the department’s recruitment, expanding the 
geographical restrictions so that officers could reside anywhere in New York State to 
draw more educated men from outside the city, and standardized the armament and 
training of officers, requiring that every officer be issued a .32-caliber revolver with a 
four-inch barrel and have training in its proper use from the newly-appointed firearms 
instructor (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). 
William Gaynor was elected mayor of New York City in 1910 and was a true police 
reformer, concerned with police corruption and brutality (Johnson, 2003). He instituted 
a new use of force policy in the NYPD requiring captains or lieutenants on duty to hear 
citizen complaints of problematic police behavior and send a report to headquarters by 
the end of shift, or face dismissal. He also preferred to charge officers involved in brutal 
tactics, resulting in 10 officers being dismissed for brutality in the first few months of the 
policy. While his preferences met with disapproval from police officers and politicians 
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alike, he was the first New York City mayor to tackle police brutality in a committed 
fashion (Johnson, 2003; Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). Gaynor also recognized that vice 
and crime were out of control in the city, but his methods were misguided: Police were 
ordered to leave alone vice establishments that were orderly, declaring a virtual open 
season for gangsters and gamblers (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). This invited rampant 
graft throughout the ranks. Also during Gaynor’s tenure, the NYPD’s first black police 
officer, Samuel Battle, was appointed as a patrolman. But the progressiveness of this 
move was slow to catch on; by 1916, the NYPD had only 15 black officers, all of whom 
were patrolmen, whereas, in comparison, the Chicago Police Department, at half the 
number of total officers, had 131 black officers including one lieutenant and 10 sergeants 
(Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). The racial homogeneity of the NYPD was a characteristic 
that would plague the department for nearly a century. 
During World War I, the NYPD became a hotbed of military counterintelligence 
efforts. The department instituted “intelligence police” consisting of city cops with the 
military rank of sergeant and the department-title of inspector (Lardner & Reppetto, 
2000). Several top police leaders were well-educated socialites who had impressive 
military credentials, further linking the military and police department and creating the 
beginning of the military-police complex. Social and antiwar activists, such as the 
International Workers of World, or Wobblies, and the National Civil Liberties Bureau, 
were common targets of the military-police cooperative (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). 
The “military-intelligence police apparatus” extended so far as to enforce draft laws, 
randomly searching otherwise-law abiding men for draft registration documents and 
arresting them on the spot if they did not have them on their person (Lardner & 
Reppetto, 2000, p. 186). It was during this time, also, that the department developed a 
working “confidential squad,” or internal affairs unit (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). 
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During Prohibition in the 1920s, violent tactics, including “the third degree,” 
became commonplace in the pursuit of shutting down bootleggers and speakeasies. 
Inspector Thomas Byrnes created the third degree in New York in the 1890s. It consisted 
of a number of police interrogation practices, including “physical violence and torture, 
prolonged grilling, food and sleep deprivation, and psychological coercion” (Johnson, 
2003, p. 122). These practices were effective in that they brought in substantial numbers 
of criminals under the Mullan-Gage Act of 1921 (New York’s state version of the Volstead 
Act, which codified execution of the Eighteenth Amendment), swelling court dockets ten-
fold and resulting in a severe shortage of jurors to hear cases (Johnson, 2003). Mullen-
Gage was repealed in 1923, but the NYPD continued to make liquor raids, especially 
under the direction of Police Commissioner Grover Whalen, whose special prohibition 
enforcement unit was called “Whalen’s Whackers” (Johnson, 2003; Lardner & Reppetto, 
2000). Prohibition also created extensive opportunities for police graft (i.e., officers took 
payments to ensure that liquor operations were undisturbed) and organized crime 
(Johnson, 2003; Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). 
In 1929, President Herbert Hoover created the National Commission on Law 
Observance and Enforcement, better known as the Wickersham Commission, as a 
response to concerns from the public centering on police actions surrounding 
prohibition and an increasing fear of crime (Johnson, 2003). The commission was 
headed by former federal judge George Wickersham and conducted a survey of 15 cities 
in the United States. Its findings were issued through 14 different reports, but Report 
Number 11, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, was devoted to police brutality concerns, 
especially the third degree. It ranked the NYPD the third-most egregious third degree 
offender and began to treat the third degree as a civil rights issue in and of itself 
(Johnson, 2003). 
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Civil Rights and the NYPD 
The 1940s and 1950s were rife with police brutality targeting blacks (Johnson, 
2003). Organized labor, especially the International Workers of the World, was often 
tied to communism, as were calls from the black community for civil rights. As such, all 
three groups were often equated with one another and police violence was linked to anti-
radicalism (i.e., anti-Communist) reforms (Johnson, 2003). Blacks joined the ranks of 
the Communists because of their acknowledgement of racial tensions, though 
Communists approached the problem from a class-based, rather than race-based, 
perspective. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
filed several complaints with the Department of Justice during these decades on behalf 
of the black community, and Communist rhetoric was used by police groups to block 
investigation of the claims, tying the NAACP to radical Communists (Johnson, 2003). In 
1959, the department created the Tactical Patrol Force (TPF), an early predecessor of the 
SWAT unit (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). The TPF was composed of officers specially 
trained in martial arts with the express purpose of crime and civil unrest suppression. 
Since riots in the 1950s and 1960s were largely due to racial tensions, the TPF often 
targeted the city’s black communities, foreshadowing the aggressive tactics used by the 
NYPD in black communities in the 1990s and 2000s (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). 
In the 1950s and 1960s, while civil rights activities were raging in Southern cities, 
the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) targeted northern cities, especially New York 
City with its large black populations in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant (Lardner & 
Reppetto, 2000). These demonstrations and marches usually resulted in police violence 
against black participants, adding fuel to the fire of racial tensions in the city. The most 
explosive of these occurred in 1964, after a white police officer, Thomas Gilligan, shot 
and killed a black teenager, James Powell, in an upper-class white neighborhood while 
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Powell was returning home from a summer school program at the neighborhood’s school 
(Johnson, 2003; Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). This led to six days of violence, known as 
the Harlem race riot, the first of the 1960s’ urban ghetto uprisings. These racial tensions 
between police and the city’s black population are unsurprising, as the department’s 
racial make-up was never on par with the city’s demographics. In 1950, the NYPD had 
368 black officers, or less than 2% of the entire force, which was vastly smaller than the 
concentration of blacks in the city after the northern migration of blacks out of the Jim 
Crow south (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). It was not until 1953 that the department had 
its first black civil service captain; by contrast, Chicago had appointed a black captain in 
1940 (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). 
While the racial and political events embroiling the NYPD and its constituents 
was often the front-page news of the day, police corruption continued during the civil 
rights era. William O’Dwyer was elected mayor in 1945, at the same time that Arthur 
Wallander took over as police commissioner (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). Whereas the 
previous two police commissioners had kept corruption at a minimum, Wallander was 
much weaker and politicians and police officers alike worked around him. O’Dwyer, a 
detective named Jimmy Reardon, and gambler Harry Gross facilitated extensive graft 
within the department (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). When these activities came to the 
attention of District Attorney Miles MacDonald, O’Dwyer saw the writing on the wall and 
attempted to have the department dismiss Reardon, who ultimately resigned instead, 
and left to be ambassador to Mexico, leaving commissioner William O’Brien - successor 
to Wallander upon retirement - to answer for the corruption scandal (Lardner & 
Reppetto, 2000). In 1950, Harry Gross was indicted for running an illegal gambling ring, 
worth nearly $20 million per year, with Reardon also facing indictment  (Lardner, 1996; 
Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). Reardon refused to name others implicated in the graft 
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scheme, but Gross ultimately implicated 200 police officers of varying ranks in grafts, 21 
of whom were indicted and 57 others were named co-conspirators. Gross spent $1 
million per year on police pay-offs to avoid arrest (Lardner, 1996; Lardner & Reppetto, 
2000). By the end of the ordeal, 47 officers were fired over the course of three years, 
including Commissioner O’Brien, and another 150 officers either resigned or retired over 
implications of involvement (Lardner, 1996). 
Though police grafts, also known as pads or payoffs, were brought to the public’s 
attention with Gross’s arrest and prosecution, the practice continued. By the 1960s, it 
was rampant throughout the NYPD, with both criminals and the elite paying off police 
officers, sometimes for something as mundane as parking violations (Lardner, 1996). 
The department’s response to corruption was to target individual, rank-and-file officers, 
rather than look for patterns or any indication of organization. It was well known 
throughout the department, however, that gratuities and payoffs “thrived with the active 
or tacit support of much of the hierarchy” (Lardner, 1996, p. 56; see also Lardner & 
Reppetto, 2000). The department’s personnel and disciplinary policies caused immense 
cynicism among the rank-and-file, with many officers resorting to “curbside justice” to 
stay out of trouble with top brass (Lardner, 1996). 
Serpico and the Knapp Commission 
With the social tensions and departmental history of corruption as the backdrop, 
one of the most famous cases of corruption gripped the NYPD. Most people believe that 
Frank Serpico was the key figure in the NYPD corruption scandal of the 1970s, but there 
were in fact two people at the center of the unfolding drama: Serpico, a plainclothes 
detective, and Detective Sergeant David Durk (Lardner, 1996; Lardner & Reppetto, 
2000). Serpico met Durk in 1966 at an in-service training at the police academy and they 
became friends, both disillusioned with the practices of the NYPD. That same year, 
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Serpico was invited to join a gambling “pad,” or a “group of officers in a plainclothes 
gambling squad who were paid off by a gambler,” but he declined to participate 
(Sherman, 1978, p. xxvi). Serpico, a gifted undercover operative, refused to engage in the 
customary corruption practices – specifically, accepting payoffs, falsifying reports, and 
giving false testimony (i.e., committing perjury) in prostitution cases. A consummate 
idealist, Serpico took the advice of his friend Durk and brought his concerns about 
corruption to First Deputy John Walsh. Serpico asked to be transferred from his unit, 
but Walsh asked him to stay and be Walsh’s eyes and ears in the unit while he conducted 
an investigation (Lardner, 1996).  
After six months of no communication from Walsh, both Serpico and Durk began 
to think Walsh had never begun an investigation; Durk insisted they go higher up the 
ladder and they took their complaints to Jay Kreigel, chief of staff for Mayor John 
Lindsay. Because Serpico was still refusing to take payoffs, his fellow officers were 
growing suspicious of him, so Serpico asked Kriegel to go to the mayor and initiate an 
investigation, or transfer him out of the South Bronx precinct because he feared for his 
safety (Lardner, 1996). It is unclear whether Kriegel told the mayor all of Serpico’s 
allegations of corruption, but regardless, Serpico’s complaints fell on deaf ears (either 
Kriegel’s or Lindsay’s). Independent of Serpico, Durk told his friend and mentor Arnold 
Fraiman in the Department of Investigations – a city-level unit separate from the police 
department – about the allegations, but Fraiman would not move forward with an 
investigation after Serpico refused to wear a wire (Knapp Commission, 1972; Lardner, 
1996). 
These three failed attempts were echoed in Durk’s attempts to get his complaints 
of corruption in the Narcotics Division heard (Lardner, 1996). When it was clear that no 
one was taking action regarding these claims of corruption in two different areas of the 
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NYPD (the 7th Precinct-South Bronx and the Narcotics Division), Durk approached 
Serpico about going to the media with the story (Lardner, 1996; Lardner & Reppetto, 
2000). They told David Burnham, reporter at The New York Times, about their story and 
told him to print it if anything should happen to them. At the urging of Burnham’s 
editor, Arthur Gelb, Serpico and Durk brought four other officers (Paul Delise and three 
still-unnamed officers: A captain, lieutenant, and detective) to the table to tell their 
stories. Gelb and Burnham wrote the story, which appeared on the front page of The 
New York Times on April 25, 1970 (Burnham, 1970; Lardner, 1996; Lardner & Reppetto, 
2000; Levitt, 2009). 
The revelation of widespread corruption in the NYPD prompted Mayor Lindsay 
to create the Knapp Commission, formally called the Blue Ribbon Commission to 
Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the City’s Anti-Corruption Procedures, 
in 1970, chaired by former Assistant District Attorney Whitman Knapp (Levitt, 2009; 
Sherman, 1978). The commission used Bob Leuci as an informant in the Narcotics 
Division during its investigation, who was later replaced by William Phelps because 
Leuci’s complicity in the corruption was too entrenched (Lardner, 1996). The 
commission held its first hearings in the fall of 1971 and testimony soon “destroyed the 
police union’s argument that police corruption was confined to a few ‘rotten apples’ in an 
otherwise healthy barrel” (Sherman, 1978, p. xxviii). 
The Knapp Commission’s report (1972) determined that corruption within the 
department was widespread; top brass were not only aware of the systemic nature of the 
corruption, but sometimes aided in its continuation (Levitt, 2009). It divided police 
officers into categories of culpability: “Grass-eaters,” or those cops who engaged in 
minor forms of corruption as opportunities presented themselves, and “meat-eaters,” or 
those who engaged in major forms of corruption, often aggressively pursuing 
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opportunities (Sherman, 1978). Levitt (2009) notes that the commission’s hearings and 
report “would change the dynamic between the police department and the outside 
world” by making “police corruption part of the city’s political dialogue” (p. 81). The 
report also recommended that the department create a special prosecutor’s office for 
corruption cases; the NYPD became the only department in the United States to have a 
special anti-corruption prosecutor (Sherman, 1978). 
In October 1970, Mayor Lindsay (who had been spared the humiliation of being 
indicted in his own commission) appointed a new police commissioner, Patrick Murphy, 
just as the Knapp Commission was getting underway (Lardner, 1996; Lardner & 
Reppetto, 2000; Sherman, 1978). Murphy’s no-nonsense approach to reform led him to 
fire nearly all of the previous administration’s top brass and replace them with new 
people (sometimes several ranks down on the ladder), demote hundreds of plainclothes 
detectives (those most culpable in the corruption scandal), and hold commanders 
personally responsible for corruption within their units, even if they were not involved in 
any way (Lardner, 1996). He also instituted several reforms aimed at reducing 
opportunities or need for corrupt activities or brutal tactics, such as lifting the ban on 
“moonlighting” (i.e., off-duty employment), evaluating officers based on how many cases 
went to prosecution rather than simply the number of arrests, encouraging merit-based 
promotion in the Detectives Bureau, and replacing the Plainclothes Division (gambling 
enforcement unit) with the Organized Crime Control Bureau (Dombrink, 1988; White, 
2014b). In 1963, Officer Felicia Spritzer sued for the right to take promotional 
examinations; by 1971, Murphy had promoted 13 women - three lieutenants and 10 
sergeants - and there were 327 women in the department. In 1978, Gertrude Schimmel 
became the first woman in the NYPD to be named deputy chief, and in 1976, Captain 
Victoria Renzullo was the first female precinct commander (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). 
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Organizationally speaking, the Serpico corruption scandal and the Knapp 
Commission had several unintended consequences. The department decentralized 
authority, which created two cultures: That of the management cop at headquarters and 
that of the street cop (Reuss-Ianni, 1983; see also Dombrink, 1988; White, 2014b). Prior 
to the Knapp Commission’s findings, police departments across the country, and 
especially the NYPD, operated under a shared ethos of the street cop culture. This 
interdependence created fertile ground for the secrecy that permitted the corruption and 
graft that became endemic (Reuss-Ianni, 1983). The Knapp Commission occurred at a 
time of- social accountability and increased attention to the rights of minorities, thus 
both internal and external pressures led to the separation of the previously-shared 
culture. The new management cop culture valued efficiency maximization, cost-
effectiveness, rationality, and accountability (Reuss-Ianni, 1983). While both cultures 
valued the same goals - fighting crime and ensuring a safe city - their approaches to these 
abstractions widely varied, which created friction and animosity between the two. The 
management cop valued rules and procedures, measurable outcomes such as arrests or 
clearance rates, and predetermined solutions to general problems; alternatively, the 
street cop valued on-the-job experience in identifying both people and situations that 
require their intervention and expects all cops to abide by the socialized code of loyalty 
(Reuss-Ianni, 1983).  
An example of the new management cop model can be seen in the citywide 
management-by-objectives plan in 1977. This was a top-down reform, instituted by the 
mayor and requiring several layers of cooperation within the department. This required 
measurable objectives at each level of the department, which was perfectly in keeping 
with the management cop model; it was completely contrary, however, to how street 
cops do their jobs, and most could not see the usefulness of it (Reuss-Ianni, 1983). The 
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NYPD also initiated a series of proactive procedures for investigating police deviance, 
including a field associate program that used recent academy graduates as internal 
affairs investigators in undercover operations and an early warning system that 
identified problem officers using a series of criteria (Dombrink, 1988; Murphy & Plate, 
1977; White, 2014b).  
The 1980s and the “Buddy Boys” 
In June of 1975, New York City faced a severe financial crisis; the city laid off 
50,000 people, including nearly all officers hired in the post-Knapp era (Lardner & 
Reppetto, 2000; White, 2014b). For the police department alone, this meant a loss of 
11,000 officers, or 34% of total sworn personnel, while serious crime increased 40% 
(White, 2014b). This was a significant staffing decision, as policing in New York City had 
long been considered an occupation with near-absolute job security – even during the 
Great Depression, the NYPD had not resorted to layoffs (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). 
The result of this decision was a severe shortage of police officers, such that when the 
financial crisis ended in 1980, the NYPD was in dire need of cops on the street. In four 
years (1980-1984), the NYPD hired more than 12,000 officers at a rate that far surpassed 
the ability of the Personnel Division to conduct background investigations (White, 
2014b). Thus, many officers were hired who would otherwise not have been due to 
serious problems in their employment or criminal histories, leading to continued 
concerns of corruption and other police deviance. 
It was during this time of fiscal crisis and overwhelming growth that the 75th and 
77th Precincts were thrust into corruption scandals. In 1979, four officers in the 75th 
Precinct’s Anticrime Unit began robbing drug dealers, burglarizing apartments, and 
stealing money from bodies. The state initiated an investigation into the matter and 
recruited Dennis Caufield to wear a wire to obtain evidence of the officers’ wrongdoing. 
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All four officers were indicted and either pled guilty or were found guilty at trial 
(McAlary, 1987). Henry Winter, the brother-in-law of Dennis Caufield, was then sent to 
the 77th Precinct in Bedford-Stuyvesant, a predominantly black neighborhood with a 
serious drug problem (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000).  
Winter became embroiled in a police graft operation with his partner, Tony 
Magno, and a number of other officers in the precinct. Specifically, Magno and Winter 
took payoffs from drug dealers, sometimes shaking them down for drugs or additional 
cash as well (McAlary, 1987). Throughout the precinct, officers were also doing drugs, 
especially with people they met on their beats. Magno and Winter were identified as 
corrupt cops by a drug dealer; the district attorney turned the case over to special 
prosecutor Charles Hynes, who recruited Magno and Winter to be informants (McAlary, 
1987). They turned in hundreds of hours of tape, implicating multiple cops and 
continuing to engage in the corrupt activities (stealing drugs and drug dealing). After 
several leaks – including one by Hynes himself – officers in the 77th Precinct began to 
suspect Winter of being a rat because of his association with Caufield. 
In October 1986, 13 officers were presented with grand jury indictments for 
“conduct unbecoming an officer” (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000; McAlary, 1987). The same 
day, Commissioner Benjamin Ward announced an anticorruption plan that required 
20% of the NYPD’s 27,000 officers to rotate to new precincts every year. Ward gave up 
the plan after the police union demanded his resignation and city cops went on “strike” 
for one week, refusing to issue any citations or summonses (McAlary, 1987).  Magno and 
Winter were reassigned to Internal Affairs, and in December 1986, 25 more officers were 
indicted. Eventually, all 205 officers – including the honest cops – were transferred to 
new precincts (McAlary, 1987). 
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The Mollen Commission 
The late 1980s and early 1990s were plagued by a crime wave during which drug 
sales and homicides skyrocketed (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). David Dinkins, the city’s 
first black mayor, was elected in 1989, narrowly beating Rudolph Giuliani. One of his 
first orders of business was to appoint Lee Patrick Brown as police commissioner. Brown 
was a beat cop in San Jose, California, then earned his doctorate in criminology at the 
University of California, Berkeley (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). He later went on to be 
sheriff of Multnomah County, Oregon, and chief of police in Atlanta and then Houston 
before landing in New York. Under his predecessor, Benjamin Ward, the NYPD had 
begun a community-policing program, with a team of one sergeant and 10 to 12 officers 
in 64 of the city’s 75 precincts (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). Brown sought to build on 
that beginning and convert the entire department to a community-policing approach, 
requiring 5,000 new officers. Originally opposed to the plan, Mayor Dinkins changed his 
mind when faced with the peaking crack epidemic and a string of high-profile homicides 
in the summer of 1990. In a program called Safe Streets, Dinkins signed off on the 5,000 
new officers and implemented new counseling, education, employment, and drug-
intervention programs (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). But in 1991, the crime problem 
began to subside and two days of rioting in Crown Heights, a neighborhood in which 
Lubovitcher Jews and blacks often clashed, caused chaos for Dinkins and Brown. Later 
that year, Brown resigned and Raymond Kelly was appointed commissioner (Lardner & 
Reppetto, 2000). 
In 1992, Mayor David Dinkins appointed Judge Milton Mollen to investigate 
police corruption in The City of New York Commission to Investigate Allegations of 
Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department, also 
known as the Mollen Commission (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000; Levitt, 2009). The 
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commission continued its investigations for several years, often using extraordinary 
tactics. One such tactic – allowing known corrupt cops to continue wearing their 
weapons and wear a wire to trap other cops – came to a head in what is now known as 
the “Dirty Thirty” incident. 
The Dirty Thirty scandal was rooted in professional rivalry between Manhattan 
District Attorney Morgenthau and the investigators of the Mollen Commission (and the 
U.S. District Attorney’s Office) (Levitt, 2009). Between 1992 and 1994, both 
Morgenthau’s office and the Mollen Commission investigators turned officers in the 30th 
Precinct into informants – Jorge Alvarez for Morgenthau and Joseph Walsh for the 
federal investigators. Several groups of officers – one of the most famous was Nannery’s 
Raiders, eight officers who stole money, guns, and drugs from drug dealers – engaged in 
drug-related offenses of varying degrees, but the informants were the worst offenders. 
This is unsurprising, as the investigators likely had the most evidence against the leaders 
of the groups, but it meant that the officers most culpable for the corruption received 
more lenient sentences and were sent back into the precinct to catch other cops in lesser, 
more trivial violations (Levitt, 2009). Ultimately, 33 officers were convicted of 
corruption (one-sixth of the officers in the precinct), with the informants receiving only 
probation while other officers received jail time of over one year (Levitt, 2009). 
The Mollen Commission released its scathing report in July 1994, at which point 
Rudolph Giuliani was mayor and Kelly had been replaced by William Bratton as police 
commissioner (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000; Levitt, 2009). It argued that the department 
fostered a “police culture that valued loyalty over integrity” (Levitt, 2009, p. 36) and that 
the corruption of the 1970s was fundamentally different from the corruption facing the 
NYPD in the 1990s: 
Today's corruption is not the corruption of Knapp Commission days. 
Corruption then was largely a corruption of accommodation, of criminals 
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and police officers giving and taking bribes, buying and selling protection. 
Corruption was, in its essence, consensual. Today's corruption is 
characterized by brutality, theft, abuse of authority and active police 
criminality. (Mollen Commission, 1994) 
 
The report went on to make two main recommendations: The establishment of an 
independent, external permanent corruption monitor and that the monitor should have 
subpoena power to investigate police corruption on its own (Levitt, 2009). Giuliani 
rejected both, and for the next 16 years (eight years under Giuliani and eight years under 
Michael Bloomberg), the NYPD was left to police itself except for the Citizen Complaint 
Review Board (CCRB).  
At the same time the Mollen Commission was investigating the NYPD for 
corruption and other forms of police misconduct, Mayor Dinkins made a drastic change 
to the Citizen Complaint Review Board by requiring that all of the board’s members be 
civilians (New York City Citizen Complaint Review Board [NYC CCRB], 2013). The board 
was created in 1953 and its members were all police officers who reported to the 
commissioner (Johnson, 2003). In the 1960s and 1980s, the board had some civilians, 
but the Patrolman’s Benevolence Association (PBA) protested civilian members, arguing 
that it was inappropriate to give civilians the authority to evaluate the actions of police 
officers (NYC CCRB, 2013). The board was given the power to “receive, investigate, hear, 
make findings and recommend action upon complaints by members of the public against 
members of the police department that allege misconduct involving excessive use of 
force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, or use of offensive language” (New York City 
Charter, n.d.). The board was also permitted to compel witnesses to be present at 
proceedings and require the department to produce documentation needed in the 
investigation of complaints (New York City Charter, n.d.). The New York City CCRB is 
the largest civilian oversight board in the country, overseeing a city agency with an 
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annual budget of $10 million (NYC CCRB, 2013). Civilian oversight is argued to make the 
complaints process more “objective, thorough, and transparent” (Willis, 2014, p. 18). 
While most police agencies in the United States with citizen oversight have some sort of 
oversight board, the NYPD’s civilian board is the more pure form of oversight, which is 
rare. Other agencies, rather than using an oversight board, have civilian oversight in the 
form of an ombudsman system in which an independent office has autonomous staff that 
conduct investigations, make disciplinary recommendations, and are easily accessed by 
the public (Willis, 2014). 
The Era of Order-Maintenance Policing 
William Bratton came to New York City as the commissioner of the New York 
City Transit Police in the 1980s, then returned to Boston Police Department before 
coming back to New York City as the police commissioner of the NYPD in 1993 (Lardner 
& Reppetto, 2000; White, 2014b; Willis, 2014). Bratton’s hallmark initiative was to 
pursue broken-windows policing, a strategy born out of research in the 1970s and 1980s 
showing that residents’	  fear of crime was not always correlated with their risk of 
victimization; rather, residents were concerned about urban disorder and quality of life 
(Taylor, 2006; Thacher, 2014; Willis, 2014). Likewise, foot patrol experiments of the 
time indicated that while foot patrol may not reduce crime, it does quell fears of 
residents and increase police-citizen relations (Kelling et al., 1978; Skogan & Roth, 2004; 
Willis, 2014). The most ardent advocates of order-maintenance policing were James Q. 
Wilson and George Kelling (1982), authors of the broken windows perspective: When 
neighborhoods are allowed to fall into decay and disorder, crime soon follows. Disorder 
can be social in nature, like rowdy teenagers, aggressive panhandlers, or loitering, or 
physical, such as litter, graffiti, and buildings left in disrepair (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). 
Neighborhood disorder cues to criminal offenders that residents of the neighborhood 
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have low levels of informal social control, and therefore crime is able to flourish (Kelling 
& Coles, 1996; Wilson & Kelling, 1982).  
Bratton aggressively pursued quality-of-life offenses, such as “fare-jumping”	  
(avoiding subway fares by jumping over the turnstiles) and “squeegee people”	  (people 
who approached stopped motorists and pedaled cleaning services), first in New York’s 
subway system and then on the city’s streets (Joanes, 2000; Thacher, 2014; White, 
2014b; Willis, 2014). Many, including Giuliani and Bratton, attributed the resulting drop 
in serious crime throughout the 1990s as an indicator of the effectiveness of order-
maintenance policing, though research has cast doubt on the strategy’s true effects on 
crime reduction (Eck & Maguire, 2000; Weisburd, Mastrofski, Willis, & Greenspan, 
2005; Weisburd, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis, 2003; White, 2014b). In addition to the 
disorder aspect of broken windows, Bratton focused on two other policy initiatives: The 
removal of guns from the streets of New York City and the elimination of open-air drug 
markets in the city (New York City Police Department, 1994a/b; White, 2014b).  
The stark contrast between Brown’s community policing initiative and Bratton’s 
order-maintenance policing strategy can be seen in the arrest, beating, and torturing of 
Abner Louima in 1997 (Manning, 2001). Louima was a black Haitian immigrant arrested 
outside of a nightclub, beaten, and then sodomized in a precinct bathroom using the 
handle of a toilet plunger, eventually hospitalized for multiple injuries, including damage 
to his small intestine and bladder (Kocieniewski, 1997). Justin Volpe, who received a 30-
year prison sentence for the crime, reportedly told Louima, “This is Giuliani time, not 
Dinkins time”	  (Fried, 1999; Manning, 2001). In 2001, Louima received an $8.6 million 
settlement from the city (The New York Times, 2001). This incident emphasized the 
difference in tactics between community policing, which was intended to bridge the gap  
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between minority communities and the police, and order-maintenance policing, which 
often targeted minority communities for heightened police activities. 
Two key unintended consequences of these initiatives, however, were the 
increased use of Terry stops, or stop-question-frisks (SQFs), and racial 
disproportionality in arrests bordering on racial profiling (Golub, Johnson, & Dunlap, 
2007; White, 2014b). Terry stops in particular have heightened tensions between police 
and minority communities as evidenced by the increase in both civil rights legal claims of 
abuse (75%) and citizen complaints (60%) (Greene, 1999). During the 15-month period 
of January 1998 to March 1999, blacks and Hispanics were three times more likely than 
whites to be stopped and frisked on weapons or violent crime suspicions, and the use of 
SQFs increased three-fold between 2003 and 2009 (Fagan, Geller, Davies, & West, 2010; 
Jones-Brown, Stoudt, Johnston, & Moran, 2013).  
Two major lawsuits resulted from the NYPD’s use of SQF and the racial 
discrimination that resulted from it. The first, filed in 1999 by the Center for 
Constitutional Rights (CCR), was a class-action lawsuit alleging racial profiling in the 
NYPD’s SQF tactics. The lawsuit, Daniels et al. v. City of New York (2001), was settled in 
2003, with the NYPD agreeing to “maintain a written anti-racial profiling policy, to audit 
officers’ stops to insure their adherence to both department policy and the law, and to 
provide the results of those audits to the CCR on a quarterly basis” (White, 2014b, p. 85). 
Five years later, however, the CCR alleged that the NYPD engaged in “significant non-
compliance” with the Daniels settlement, and “after new information released publicly 
by the City showed a remarkable increase in stop-and-frisks from 2002-2006,” the CCR 
filed a second class-action lawsuit, Floyd et al. v. City of New York (2013) (Center for 
Constitutional Rights, 2014). In 2013, the U.S. District Court for Southern New York 
“found the New York City Police Department (NYPD) liable for a pattern and practice of 
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racial profiling and unconstitutional stop-and-frisks” and ordered joint remediation 
(Center for Constitutional Rights, 2014; see also court ruling Floyd et al. v. City of New 
York, 2013). In January 2014, the City of New York dropped its appeal and agreed to 
participate in the court-ordered remediation process. 
Also during the 1990s and 2000s, the NYPD incorporated Compstat, an 
innovative management system focused on “timely and accurate information, rapid 
deployment of resources, effective tactics, follow-up, and assessment (White, 2014b, p. 
81). This system was the hallmark of Bratton’s tenure at the NYPD and included several 
reforms within the department. Drawing from organizational theory, Bratton looked to 
middle managers – the precinct commander position – to establish institutional change 
by making them responsible for the crime reduction in their precincts (White, 2014b). 
Twice-weekly Compstat meetings, whereby precinct commanders were to report their 
results to Headquarters staff, establishing institutional accountability, offset this 
decentralization.  
The primary unintended consequence of Compstat, however, was the massive 
internal pressures it created among precinct commanders. Two-thirds of precinct 
commanders were removed from their duties in the first year of Compstat’s 
implementation, theoretically removing incompetent supervisors, yet the trend 
continued beyond the incompetent commanders as a result of the pressure to produce 
results (Eterno & Silverman, 2005; Thibault, Lynch, and McBride, 2011). Compstat 
created an environment in which precinct commanders were required to continually 
lower crime rates, leading some to manufacture the needed results; organizationally, 
commanders began to rely on aggressive tactics and official sanctions, reinforcing low 
morale and occupational deviance (Eterno & Silverman, 2005, 2010; Flynn, 2000; 
Rashbaum, 2003; White, 2014b). 
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One positive outcome of the Compstat model, however, was the use of crime 
mapping to facilitate the hot spots policing strategy (White, 2014b; Willis, 2014). Hot 
spots policing is a strategy based on randomized controlled-trial experiments in multiple 
cities in the United States. These experiments demonstrated that, when focused on small 
spaces such as blocks or street corners, concentrated levels of police patrol significantly 
reduce crime calls-for-service (Sherman & Weisburd, 1995; Braga, 2008; Ratcliffe, 
Taniguchi, Groff, & Wood, 2011). The NYPD used a system that tracks calls-for-service, 
allowing the police department to adjust deployment of services on a real-time basis and 
conduct follow-up and assessment (White, 2014b). 
This overview of the history of the New York City Police Department provides 
valuable context for the time period of this study (1975-1996). The next section details 
the collection and coding of the data used in the study. 
Data 
This project uses secondary data originally collected over three years, 1997-1999, 
as a part of a grant from the National Institute of Justice obtained by Dr. James Fyfe and 
his former graduate student, Robert Kane (for more information regarding data 
collection, see Fyfe & Kane, 2006; Kane, 2002; Kane & White, 2009, 2013). These data 
were collected from official administrative records at the NYPD and involved several 
steps. The first step was to identify officers who were separated from the department for 
reasons of misconduct between 1975 and 1996. The NYPD did not retain central records 
for separated officers at the time of the study, so the researchers built the list of 
separated officers through a manual review of personnel orders, which are disseminated 
several times per week and report any employee change in status (i.e., appointment, 
promotion, transfer, change in designation, resignation, retirement, vesting, dismissal, 
termination, or death) of sworn and non-sworn NYPD personnel (Kane & White, 2009). 
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The first group of officers included in the study included those officers separated 
from the department by dismissal. Officers who are dismissed from the department are 
tenured officers who have completed probation and generally enjoy extensive due 
process benefits (Fyfe & Kane, 2006). Dismissals resulted from conviction for felonies 
(and some misdemeanors) and are typically handled simply through written notification 
of “termination by discretion” from the Police Commissioner. Some dismissals required 
that the department formally file charges against the officer resulting in a military-like 
trial prosecuted by the Department Advocate (or lawyer from the Advocate’s office) and 
presided over by the Deputy Commissioner for Trials (Fyfe & Kane, 2006). Both types of 
dismissals were reported in personnel orders, so dismissed officers were found during 
the overview of these orders. These orders also indicated terminations of probationary 
officers, but these officers’ files had to be reviewed to ensure that only those who were 
terminated for misconduct were included in the study (Fyfe & Kane, 2006). 
The second group of officers included in the study was more difficult to find: 
Officers who resigned or retired rather than face formal charges (or who resigned as part 
of negotiations in turning state’s evidence against other officers) (Fyfe & Kane, 2006). 
The researchers inquired with internal affairs and Trial Room personnel and upon their 
recommendations of such cases, carefully reviewed the files of officers whose 
resignations indicated that they had resigned or retired for less-than-honorable reasons. 
Specifically, the researchers looked for resignations without the Police Commissioner’s 
permission, a key indicator that the officer had been in trouble upon resignation (Fyfe & 
Kane, 2006). They also looked for single resignations on any given personnel order, as 
they typically came in batches as groups of younger officers transitioned to other 
government jobs such as the fire department (Fyfe & Kane, 2006). 
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Through this process, researchers created a list of 1,542 officers who had been 
involuntarily separated from the NYPD between 1975 and 1996 (who were classified as 
“bad cops”). Each officer in the list was then matched (random selection) with an officer 
from his or her police academy class who was not involuntarily separated for misconduct 
as of 1996. The matched officers created a comparison group of 1,543 officers, for a total 
dataset of 3,085 officers. Of this, 435 officers are female, fairly equally divided between 
bad cops (N=232) and comparison cops (N=203)1. 
To collect information that may predict misconduct, researchers also accessed 
personnel files from the Personnel Records Unit. The personnel file, known as the PA-15, 
including an extensive application form completed by candidates for police officer 
positions that is used as the starting point for pre-appointment background 
investigations. Additional information was obtained from files that contained recruit 
training performance appraisals; annual performance evaluations; disciplinary reports; 
changes in marital status or education; task assignments; sick leave and injuries; and 
other departmental points of note, such as letters of commendation or recognition, 
serious vehicle accidents, and line-0f-duty injuries (Kane & White, 2009). Lastly, 
researchers obtained access to and coded data from the Central Personnel Index, 
Management Information Systems Division, Internal Affairs Bureau, and the 
Department Advocate (the prosecutor in serious internal disciplinary actions) (Kane & 
White, 2009). 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable used in this study is a dichotomous variable representing 
whether the officer committed career-ending misconduct, where 1 signals that the officer 
                                                
1 Officers were matched on academy class only, not sex. As a result, there was initially concern 
that female study officers and comparison officers may not compare in terms of time of 
employment due to hiring practices within the NYPD during the study time. Subsequent 
diagnostics determined that the female officers were relatively comparable across the two groups.	  
	  84 
committed career-ending misconduct and 0 represents otherwise. In other words, the 
variable represents whether the officer belongs in the “bad cops” group or the 
comparison group. There are 1,542 “bad cops” and 1,543 comparison officers in the 
sample. There are 232 female “bad cops” and 203 female comparison officers. 
Independent Variables 
The primary independent variable of interest is sex. A dichotomous variable 
female (1=female) was used in the full sample models to assess the main effect of sex, 
consistent with previous literature that uses sex as a control variable which predicts 
direct effects only. The variable was coded 1 for female as opposed to 1 for male because 
the interest in this study is the differential effect of predictors for women. The sex 
variable was not needed in the second portion of the analysis because split-sample 
analysis was used, which splits the sample by sex into a male portion and female portion. 
The same analyses were then conducted separately on each portion of the sample and the 
coefficients were compared using z-scores. This will be explained in more detail in the 
Analytical Strategy portion of this chapter. 
In addition to sex, five groups of individual characteristics are used as 
independent predictors of misconduct. Traditionally these variables are used as control 
variables when testing other relationships with misconduct, such as the relationship 
between sex and misconduct when sex is used as a dichotomous predictor. This study 
aims to determine if each of these control variables have different effects for men and 
women. In this way, these variables are each treated as a predictor, or independent 
variable, in their own right. In the first set of models, these variables are interacted with 
sex to determine if their effects are moderated by sex; in the second set of analyses, they 
are each used to predict misconduct for the female subsample. These variables were 
chosen based on previous research that has found each of them to be significant 
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predictors of police misconduct (see Chapter 2, “What Makes a Bad Cop?” for additional 
literature supporting each predictor). 
Individual characteristics can be broken into five categories. The first is 
race/ethnicity (white = 1 [reference], black = 2, Hispanic = 3). This coding is consistent 
with prior research using this dataset (see, e.g., Kane & White, 2009, 2013; White & 
Kane, 2013). Previous literature demonstrates that being nonwhite contributes to a 
higher likelihood of committing misconduct (Greene et al., 2004; Hickman, Piquero, & 
Piquero, 2004; Kane & White, 2009, 2013; Rojek & Decker, 2009). It is possible, 
however, that the predictive effect of these characteristics may be different for men and 
women. For example, being a racial or ethnic minority and being female may have a 
multiplicative effect, such that both minority statuses within policing create a strain on 
officers because they have more difficulty assimilating into the police subculture due to 
their double-token status (see Kanter, 1977). Additionally, research has demonstrated 
that workplace stressors can be especially salient for women and racial/ethnic minorities 
(Haarr & Morash, 1999; Morash and Haarr 1995; Wexler & Logan 1983), further 
emphasizing the importance of these demographic factors. 
Second, officers’ family life circumstances are captured: Marital status 
(single/never married = 1 [reference], married/cohabitating = 2, divorced/widowed/ 
separated = 3), change in marital status while in the department (no change = 1 
[reference], got married = 2, got divorced/separated/ widowed = 3), and whether the 
officer had children when starting with the department (no children = 0, 1 or more 
children = 1). This coding is consistent with prior research using this dataset (see, e.g., 
Kane & White, 2009, 2013; White & Kane, 2013). 
These characteristics can create strains for officers that may incentivize police 
misconduct. For example, having children or getting divorced may create a financial 
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hardship on officers, such that they feel that misconduct (especially profit-motivated 
misconduct) may be their only option. Family stresses for criminal activity are well 
documented in white-collar crime literature (see, e.g., Klenowski, Copes, & Mullins, 
2011; Willott, Griffin, & Torrance, 2001), so it is logical for that motivation to cross over 
into other instances of workplace deviance, such as police misconduct. Some white-collar 
crime literature (see Zietz, 1981) has found that the family motivation is more common 
among women than men, thus these factors may be especially salient for female police 
officers. 
It is also likely that the same family characteristic may contribute to different 
responses by men and women. Strain literature has shown that women and men respond 
to strain in qualitatively different ways (Broidy & Agnew, 1997; Jennings, Piquero, 
Gover, & Perez, 2009; Piquero & Sealock, 2004), with women much less likely to 
respond to strains through criminal coping mechanisms. This is also true for female 
officers relative to male officers (Dowler, 2005; Haarr & Morash, 1999; Poteyeva & Sun, 
2009). Likewise, the presence of what might be considered a “negative” strain could in 
fact be a positive event, or vice versa. For example, getting a divorce may be a positive 
change if the officer is removing him or herself from a problematic partner. While life-
course literature shows divorce to be positively related with criminal behavior (Laub & 
Sampson, 2003; Sampson & Laub, 1993), these studies are largely based on male 
delinquency and may be substantially different for women.  
Third, several variables detail officers’ employment history. These variables came 
primarily from background investigation reports and include: Whether the recruit had 
ever been fired from previous jobs (never fired = 0), the presence of negative comments 
from previous employers (no negative comments = 0), whether the background 
investigator recommended hire (recommended hire = 0), whether an officer had any 
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below standard performance evaluations (no below standard evaluations = 0), and 
number of periods of unemployment greater than 30 days (0-5 or greater periods of 
unemployment greater than 30 days). Prior police experience (no experience = 0) and 
prior military experience (no experience = 0) were also included. 
Employment history has been demonstrated to provide significant risk factors for 
misconduct (Cohen & Chaiken, 1972, 1973; Greene et al., 2004; Kane & White, 2009, 
2013), but is important for several theoretical reasons as well. First, police misconduct is 
a form of occupational deviance, so previous instances of occupational problems may 
signal a higher likelihood of deviance in the workplace setting of policing. Second, the 
inability to obtain and maintain steady employment is a demonstration of low stakes in 
conformity (Hirschi, 1969), so officers with these characteristics in their past may have 
difficulty conforming to conventional norms, especially those within the rigid and 
hierarchical police department.  
Sex differences related to employment history may manifest themselves in 
officers’ perceptions of their jobs. While most research finds that there is no significant 
sex differences in motivations for becoming an officer (see, e.g., Flavin & Bennett, 2001; 
Charles, 1982; Raganella & White, 2004), it is possible that men and women view their 
occupation differently. Huiras, Uggen, and McMorris (2000) explain that some jobs are 
marginal or “survival jobs,” such as the fast food industry, whereas other jobs have 
greater opportunities for advancement and become “career jobs.” It is possible that 
women’s social isolation within the police department and lack of opportunities for 
advancement may compound previous employment problems to make them view police 
jobs as “survival jobs,” thus lowering their stakes in occupational goals and potentially 
increasing their likelihood for misconduct. 
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The policing occupation and the military are very similar (e.g., hierarchical 
structure, high numbers of administrative regulations, and ranks), thus previous 
experience in either may expedite one’s acceptance into the police subculture. The police 
subculture values many of the same things that the military subculture does, including 
secrecy and camaraderie (Bittner, 1974; Van Maanen, 1980; Westley, 1970). The police 
subculture promotes and perpetuates deviance (Knapp Commission, 1972; Micuccui & 
Gomme, 2005; Mollen Commission, 1994; Skolnick, 2005), so it is possible that those 
with previous police or military experience will more easily fall into deviance. In terms of 
sex, women have difficulty assimilating into the subculture (Belknap & Shelley, 1992; 
Chu & Sun, 2007; Reiner, 1992). This is true regardless of how they “do gender,” creating 
a catch-22: If they retain their femininity, they are viewed as weak and incompetent, but 
if they attempt to take on a more masculine outlook, they are viewed as “dykes” or 
“butch” (Rabe-Hemp, 2008). Thus it is important to address prior military and police 
service from a gendered perspective to see if women’s experiences are qualitatively 
different. 
Fourth, officers’ criminal history at the time of the background investigation is 
included using a dichotomous variable (no criminal history = 0). The criminal history 
variable was created using three variables illustrative of a criminal record: Arrests for 
violent crimes, arrests for property crimes, and convictions for misdemeanor offenses. 
The presence of any of the three types of criminal behavior yielded a 1 for criminal 
history; a lack of all three types of criminal behavior yielded a 0 for criminal history. 
Previous research has used a criminal history score, but when principal component 
analysis was conducted on the three component variables, there was not enough 
correlation between them to warrant using a score (violent arrests and property arrests  
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were correlated 0.22, violent arrests and misdemeanor convictions were correlated 0.07, 
and property arrests and misdemeanor convictions were correlated 0.07). 
Criminal history has consistently been identified as a risk factor for misconduct 
(Cohen and Chaiken, 1972, 1973; Greene et al., 2004; Kane & White, 2009, 2013; Mollen 
Commission, 1994). Substantial research has demonstrated that women are less likely to 
commit street crime than men (with the exception of shoplifting and prostitution; see 
Smith & Paternoster, 1989; Steffensmeier & Allan, 1996; Steffensmeier, Schwartz, 
Zhong, & Acker, 2005), but the effects of prior offending on female police officer 
behavior (especially misconduct) has never been studied. So while women are less likely 
to offend overall, we do not know how those who do have a history of criminal behavior 
adapt to their role as a police officer. It is possible that criminal history makes them 
more likely to commit misconduct, especially if their criminal pasts give them an 
advantage in assimilating into the subculture, but it is just as plausible that the prospect 
of a stable job could increase the likelihood of desistance, as supported by life-course 
literature (Laub & Sampson, 2003; Sampson & Laub, 1993), and motivate women to end 
their criminal tendencies to support their families. 
Feminist pathways research has argued that the same set of risks do not apply to 
men and women (Belknap, 2001; Chesney-Lind, 1989; Daly & Chesney-Lind, 1988; 
Simpson, 1989). For example, abuse (physical, emotional, and sexual) and substance 
abuse are common risk factors for criminal behavior among women (Daly, 1992; 
Hubbard & Pratt, 2002; Owen, 1998; Owen & Bloom, 1995). Poverty affects women’s 
likelihood of recidivism, and recidivism risk varies by one’s pathway to criminal activity 
(Holtfreter, Reisig, & Morash, 2004; Reisig, Holtfreter, & Morash, 2006); thus, women 
who obtain a job with the relatively high job security that comes with policing may find 
themselves loathe to jeopardize that by engaging in misconduct. Criminal history has not 
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been explored in a gendered context, thus bolstering the need for a gendered model to 
better delve into these particular questions. 
Finally, job-specific characteristics of officers’ time at the department are 
available2. Specifically, rank (probationary officer = 1 [reference], patrol officer = 2, 
detective = 3, sergeant or higher = 4), command (patrol = 1 [reference], special 
unit/proactive investigation = 2, staff assignment = 3, police academy/field training = 
4)3, whether an officer’s father was in the NYPD (no NYPD father = 0), and the amount 
of time before an officer first received a citizen complaint (no complaints = 0, complaint 
from prior police service = 1, within one year = 2, more than one year = 3) are included 
in the analyses. 
These variables address two main theoretical perspectives. First, these variables 
address the ability of officers to resist the pressures of the police subculture. Officers 
with a family history of NYPD service, for example, likely have a familial obligation to 
honor and respect the badge by not engaging in misconduct that would bring shame 
upon themselves and their entire families. Thus, a family history of NYPD service may 
provide necessary resistance to the peer pressure of the police subculture, as research 
has shown that officers with a family history in the NYPD are less likely to commit 
misconduct (Kane & White, 2009, 2013). This relationship may be different for women, 
however, who experience different pressures relative to the police subculture. Because 
                                                
2 Promotion was initially included, but further analysis determined that promotion was too 
closely connected to gender and race to include in the analysis conducted here. This provides 
support for the contention that the gendered (and racial) distribution of work assignments likely 
affected women’s (and racial minorities’) likelihood of promotion (see Kane & White, 2013). 
3 The patrol portion of the command variable was originally divided into three categories 
corresponding to the rank of the commanding officer of the precinct (captain, deputy inspector, or 
inspector), for a six-category command variable. It was hypothesized that the rank of the 
commander could be used as a proxy for police activity in the neighborhood (see Kane & White, 
2013). Separating patrol within the command variable, however, did not yield significant 
differences between the precinct levels in any of the three models (full sample, male subsample, 
or female subsample) so the distinction between commanding officer ranks was removed to allow 
for better comparisons to the patrol command as a whole. 
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women are not part of the “good ole boys’ club,” it’s possible that the family element may 
be nonsignificant in their resistance to the subculture. It is also possible that exposure to 
the police subculture from a young age, and the realities of life on the force for women, 
may strengthen female officers’ resolve against the subculture. Alternatively, a father 
well versed in the department’s subculture may teach his daughter to “do gender” in a 
police context, thus making them more susceptible to the influences of the subculture. If 
it comes down to taking a bribe while a probationary officer or disappointing their 
family, female officers may be more apt to choose the former. 
Variables like rank and command address the level of one’s opportunity for 
misconduct. While everyone is at risk for losing one’s badge (an administrative violation 
eligible for dismissal), higher-rank officers and officers in commands other than patrol 
or special investigation units (e.g., narcotics or homicide) have limited opportunities to 
commit misconduct (Hickman et al., 2004; Kane & White, 2009, 2013; White & Kane, 
2013). Additionally, how these effects interact with sex is unknown. Female officers in 
special investigation units like narcotics may be less likely to commit misconduct than 
men due to their social position on the periphery of the police subculture (Belknap & 
Shelley, 1992; Chu & Sun, 2007; Felkenes & Schroedel, 1993; Haarr, 1997; Hunt, 1990; 
Kraska & Kappeler, 1995; Rabe-Hemp, 2009; Reiner, 1992), leading them to be left out 
of organized opportunities for misconduct (e.g., organized corruption). These effects are 
lost in gender-neutral models (i.e., models with sex as a control), thus demonstrating 
why gender-specific models are imperative for truly understanding how these risk and 
protective factors work for both men and women. 
Control Variables 
This study also includes two sets of control variables. First, the political era of the 
department during the time of the officer’s separation from the NYPD is included in the 
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analysis. The sample is divided into three political eras: 1975-1989, 1990-1993, and 1994-
1996. The 1975-1989 era includes two mayors (Abraham Beame and Edward Koch) and 
covers the period of layoffs between 1975 and 1980 as a result of the city’s fiscal crisis 
and subsequent rehires between 1980 and 1984. This also includes the beginning of 
departmental changes as a result of the Knapp Commission. The period of 1990-1993 
covers the mayoralty of David Dinkins, the continuation of community policing, and the 
start of a two-decade (and continuing) crime decline. The era of 1994-1996 covers the 
first three years of Rudolph Giuliani’s tenure as mayor of New York City (the only 
Republican during the study period), the installation of William Bratton as Police 
Commissioner and the implementation of order-maintenance policing, and the creation 
of Compstat. This last time period also provides a control for the 1994 Violent Crime 
Control Act, which put over 100,000 additional officers on streets across the country. 
This variable separates the officers into meaningful eras of time that can account for 
time-dependent variations in propensities, especially those related to employment 
practices (i.e., hiring and firing practices) or organizational changes. Factors such as 
command assignments and promotion possibility could be tied to the policy priorities of 
mayors (and their police commissioners) or to the changing social environment due to 
the passing of time. Prior research using this dataset has indicated that time is salient to 
understanding the story of misconduct; specifically, misconduct increased nonlinearly 
until hitting a peak, then decreased nonlinearly (Kane, 2002). 
 The second set is a series of control variables that are known correlates of police 
officer misconduct. Both education level (high school diploma or less = 0, at least some 
college = 1) and active enrollment in school at the time of appointment (yes = 1) are used. 
Previous research has shown that having education higher than a high school diploma 
(including some college not culminating in a degree) decreases the likelihood of officer 
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misconduct (Kane & White, 2009, 2013; Kappeler et al., 1992). Additionally, age in years 
(grand mean centered) is included in the analysis. Research has demonstrated that being 
older both decreases an officer’s likelihood of committing misconduct (Greene et al., 
2004; McElvain & Kposowa, 2004; Kane & White, 2009, 2013; Wolfe & Piquero, 2011) 
and protects against early firing (White & Kane, 2013). 
Research Questions 
Do Predictors of Misconduct Vary Between Men and Women? 
Police literature has identified, rather extensively, the predictors of police 
misconduct, with variables serving as both protective and risk factors in an officer’s 
decision to commit misconduct. However, as Chapters 1 and 2 explain, these studies use 
sex as a predictor along with other officer characteristics, thus losing nuance. Qualitative 
studies that focus on female officers lose the benefit of male comparison samples as well 
as statistical power from small sample sizes. This leads to the first set of research 
questions: 
Research Question 1: Do predictors of misconduct affect men and 
women the same way?  
Research Question 2: Do some predictors serve as risk factors for men 
but protective factors for women, or vice versa? 
Clearly there is a gender effect for police misconduct; the fact that being male is a 
risk factor indicates as much. But there is limited understanding as to how this gender 
effect manifests itself in misconduct decision-making. Current research does not allow us 
to understand the intricacies of how risk and protective factors truly operate within this 
decision-making mechanism. Multiple factors may interact with one another to create a 
delicate web of risks and protections that is not as straightforward as some research has 
implied. Indeed, Kane & White (2013) note that the effect of race and ethnicity may be 
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confounded by other factors, such as differential assignments or evaluation criteria. 
These confounding effects are likely present for women as well, thus indicating the need 
for a gendered model to begin to unravel the web of predictors of police misconduct. 
The “Big Picture” of Female Police Officer Misconduct 
Previous literature that has focused on female police officers has typically been 
qualitative in nature, obtaining information from interviews and surveys. Sophisticated 
quantitative analyses are rare because of the low statistical power associated with small 
sample sizes. Likewise, a long line of previous quantitative literature has demonstrated 
the predictors of misconduct for large samples, but as demonstrated above, the effects 
for women are masked due to their small numbers. The field is therefore left with 
unanswered questions regarding the factors that predict misconduct among women, 
leading to the final research question: 
Research Question 3: What risk factors predict women’s commission 
of career-ending misconduct? 
This question further underscores the need for gender-specific theoretical 
explanations of crime, including occupational deviance in the form of police misconduct. 
Theoretical perspectives such as strain and social learning were developed on the basis of 
male delinquency (Daly, 1992; Daly & Chesney-Lind, 1988; Smith & Paternoster, 1989), 
thus they are limited in their explanation of female offending. It is likely they are unable, 
on their own, to explain other forms of female deviance, such as police misconduct. Just 
as women’s pathways to deviance are gendered (e.g., Burgess-Proctor, 2012; Reisig, 
Holtfreter, & Morash, 2006), so too are their risk factors (Belknap & Holsinger, 2006), 
and these pathways need to be accounted for in explanations of police misconduct. 
Analytical Strategy 
The data analysis proceeds in two phases. The first phase addresses the first two 
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research questions and is a set of analyses of the full sample, known as the “add gender 
and stir” approach, consistent with most previous literature in policing and allows us to 
get an understanding of the correlates of police misconduct using the standard method 
in policing literature. In this first stage of analyses, a logistic regression is used on the 
full sample (N=3,085) of officers.  
The second phase addresses the third research question and uses a split-sample 
approach, as is the preferred method among feminist scholars (see, e.g., Belknap & 
Holsinger, 2006). This method divides the full sample by sex, creating a male portion 
(N= 2,650) and a female portion (N=435). The same logistic analyses are then conducted 
on both samples. The equality of coefficients is then compared using z-scores as outlined 
in Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, & Piquero (1998).  The split-sample approach provides 
context for how strain and subculture affect both men and women’s misconduct 
decision-making to determine if certain predictors apply to only one sex. Alternatively, 
some factors may vary in their predictive power (i.e., be stronger or weaker for one sex) 
or may predict misconduct in opposite ways (e.g., be a risk factor for men but a 
protective factor for women). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Full Sample 
The full-sample descriptive statistics by sex can be found in Table 1. Similar 
percentages of men and women committed career-ending misconduct (49.43% and 
53.33%, respectively), and unsurprisingly, this difference was not statistically 
significant4. The number of male and female study officers fired each year for 
misconduct is represented visually in Figure 1. There is a similar pattern for both men 
and women, but the pattern is much less marked for women than for men.  
Figure 1. Male and Female Study Officers Separated from the NYPD, by Year 
 
The racial/ethnic breakdown for men and women, however, is notably different. 
Nearly three-quarters of the men in the sample are white (72.86%), which is 
representative of police officers in general, whereas women were more evenly divided 
                                                
4 Statistical significance for the difference between male and female descriptive statistics was 
determined using the ttest command in Stata13. 
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racially (43.32% white, 41.01% black, and 15.67% Hispanic). These differences are all 
statistically significant (p<0.01). A smaller percentage of women than men were married 
at the time of appointment (18.25% and 33.04%, respectively, p<0.01) and a larger 
percentage of women than men were divorced at the time of appointment (8.06% and 
2.58%, respectively, p<0.01). More women had no change in their marital status than 
men (74.25% and 67.02%, respectively, p<0.01), thus more men either got married 
(27.89% compared to 22.53%, p<0.05) or got divorced (5.09% compared to 3.22%, 
p<0.10) than women. 
Fewer women in the sample had a criminal record when joining the police 
department (5.39%, compared to 9.98% for men, p<0.01). This is unsurprising, since 
women typically commit less crime than men overall (Smith & Paternoster, 1989; 
Steffensmeier & Allan, 1996; Steffensmeier, Schwartz, Zhong, & Acker, 2005). In terms 
of employment history, a small percentage of both men and women had prior police 
experience (4.04% and 2.07%, respectively, p<0.05), though roughly one-third of men 
(38.69%) and one-quarter of women (23.24%) had prior military experience (p<0.01). It 
was uncommon for the background investigator to not recommend hiring an officer 
(10.49% of men and 6.44% of women, p<0.05) or for the background investigator to 
receive derogatory comments about the recruit from previous employers (7.15% of men 
and 7.59% of women, not a statistically significant difference). Men had an average 1.27 
periods of unemployment lasting longer than 30 days, and women had an average 1.54 
periods, a statistically significant difference (p<0.01). Women and men were statistically 
similar in whether they had been fired from previous jobs (13.43% and 10.96%, 
respectively), though a higher percentage of women received below standard 
performance evaluations in previous jobs (10.44%, compared to 7.30% of men, p<0.05).  
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Table 1 
Full Sample Descriptive Statistics, by Sex (N=3,085) 
Variable 
Men Women 
N Percent N Percent 
Dependent Variable         
Misconduct         
     Yes 1,310 49.43 232 53.33 
     No 1,340 50.57 203 46.67 
Independent Variables         
Race         
     Race         
          White** 1,901 72.86 188 43.32 
          Black** 448 17.17 178 41.01 
          Hispanic** 260 9.97 68 15.67 
Family Life         
     Marital Status         
          Never Married** 1,621 64.38 311 73.70 
          Married** 832 33.04 77 18.25 
          Divorced** 65 2.58 34 8.06 
     Change in Marital Status         
          No Change** 1,776 67.02 323 74.25 
          Got Married* 739 27.89 98 22.53 
          Got Divorced+ 135 5.09 14 3.22 
     Children+         
          Yes 546 22.57 105 26.38 
          No 1,873 77.43 293 73.62 
Criminal History         
     Criminal History**         
          Yes 248 9.98 22 5.39 
          No 2,238 90.02 386 94.61 
Employment History         
     Prior Police Experience*         
          Yes 107 4.04 9 2.07 
          No 2,543 95.96 426 97.93 
     Prior Military Service**         
          Yes 975 38.69 96 23.24 
          No 1,545 61.31 317 76.76 
     Background Invest. Recommended Disapproval*         
          Yes 278 10.49 28 6.44 
          No 2,372 89.51 407 93.56 
     Periods of Unemployment >30 days (mean)** 1.27 SD=1.44 1.54 SD=1.67 
     Fired from Previous Jobs         
          Yes 269 10.96 54 13.43 
          No 2,186 89.04 348 88.69 
     Below Standard Performance Evaluations*         
          Yes 173 7.30 40 10.44 
          No 2,198 92.70 343 89.56 
     Derogatory Comments from Previous Employers         
          Yes 172 7.15 30 7.59 
          No 2,232 92.85 365 92.41 
Employment at NYPD         
     Rank         
          Probationary Officer** 704 26.57 184 42.30 
          Patrol** 1479 55.81 200 45.98 
          Detective* 177 6.68 18 4.14 
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Table 1 continued     
     
          Sergeant or Higher* 290 10.94 33 7.59 
     Command         
          Patrol** 1,608 60.68 218 50.11 
          Staff Assignment+ 371 14.00 46 10.57 
          Proactive Investigation/Special Unit 237 8.94 49 11.26 
          Police Academy/Field Training** 434 16.38 122 28.05 
     Father was in the NYPD         
          Yes 179 6.75 28 6.44 
          No 2,471 93.25 407 93.56 
     Time to First Citizen Complaint         
          No Complaints 1,284 48.45 220 50.57 
          Complaints from Prior Police Service* 165 6.23 39 8.97 
          Within 1 Year* 200 7.55 47 10.80 
          More than 1 Year** 1,001 37.77 129 29.66 
Control         
     Education         
          High School Diploma or Less** 1,392 55.70 164 40.00 
          Some College (No Degree)** 860 34.41 182 44.39 
          Associate Degree or Higher** 247 9.88 64 15.61 
     Active Enrollment in School*         
          Yes 183 7.63 48 12.47 
          No 2,216 92.37 337 87.53 
     Age (mean)* 24.3 SD=3.16 23.9 SD=3.19 
     Political Era         
          1975-1989** 1,746 72.75 271 62.30 
          1990-1993* 319 13.29 78 17.93 
          1994-1996** 335 13.96 86 19.77 
Note. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 (two-tailed test). 
 
In looking at officers’ experience at the NYPD, there are several marked sex 
differences. All four categories of officer rank and three of four categories of command 
were significantly different between men and women. Nearly 90% of women were 
probationary or patrol officers at the time of separation, divided rather evenly (42.30% 
and 45.98%, respectively, both statistically significant at p<0.01), whereas only about 
three-quarters of men were probationary or patrol officers (26.57% and 55.81%, 
respectively). A larger percentage of men were both detectives (6.68%, compared to 
4.14% of women, p<0.05) and sergeants or higher (10.94%, compared to 7.59% of 
women, p<0.05). More men than women had patrol assignments (60.68% and 50.11%, 
respectively, p<0.01) or staff assignments (14.00% and 10.57%, respectively, p<0.10), 
and substantially more women than men (28.05% and 16.38%, respectively, p<0.01) 
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were assigned to the police academy or as field training officers. Statistically similar 
percentages of men and women had no complaints during their time at the NYPD, but 
more women received their first complaint within the first year (44.39%, compared to 
34.41% of men, p<0.05) whereas more men received their first complaint after the first 
year (37.77%, compared to 29.66% of women, p<0.01). More women also had 
complaints that carried with them from prior police service (8.97%, compared to 6.23% 
of men, p<0.05). 
Organizationally speaking, there were more men than women in this sample who 
were separated or voluntarily left the department between 1975 and 1989 (72.75% and 
62.30%, respectively). Higher percentages of women were dismissed in the 1990s; the 
period of 1990-1996 also saw larger numbers of women being added to the ranks of the 
NYPD, however, so it is somewhat unsurprising that they would leave in larger 
percentages as well (for reasons related and unrelated to misconduct).5 
The average age (23.9 for men and 24.3 for women), while seemingly similar, was 
statistically different (p<0.05). Finally, the sample significantly differs by sex in terms of 
education. A higher percentage of women (60%) than men (44.3%) had some college or a 
degree (44.39% and 15.61%, respectively, for women and 34.41% and 9.88%, 
respectively, for men, both significant p<0.01). A higher percentage of women were also 
actively enrolled in school at their time of appointment (12.47%, compared to 7.63% of 
men, p<0.05). 
Split-Sample Components 
This section describes the sample when split into its two component subsamples, 
male and female. Each subsample will be described comparing those in the study group  
                                                
5 Rates, rather than percentages, are used here because of incomplete information about the 
number of officers who joined and left the NYPD during the study years. This information is 
obtained from LEMAS, which started collecting data in 1986. Thus, there is no information 
regarding the number of males and females at the NYPD for study years 1975-1985. 
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Table 2 
Male Subsample Descriptive Statistics, by Misconduct (N=2,650) 
Variable 
Study Group Comparison Group 
N Percent N Percent 
Race         
     Race         
          White** 803 62.01 1,098 83.56 
          Black** 343 26.49 105 7.99 
          Hispanic** 149 11.51 111 8.45 
Family Life         
     Marital Status         
          Never Married 770 63.06 851 65.61 
          Married 405 33.17 427 32.92 
          Divorced** 46 3.77 19 1.46 
     Change in Marital Status         
          No Change** 1,011 77.18 765 57.09 
          Got Married** 218 16.64 521 38.88 
          Got Divorced* 81 6.18 54 4.03 
     Children**         
          Yes 289 25.20 257 20.20 
          No 858 74.80 1,015 79.80 
Criminal History         
     Criminal History**         
          Yes 161 13.64 87 6.66 
          No 1,019 86.36 1,219 93.34 
Employment History         
     Prior Police Experience         
          Yes 46 3.51 61 4.55 
          No 1,264 96.49 1,279 95.45 
     Prior Military Service**         
          Yes 508 42.05 467 35.59 
          No 700 57.95 845 64.41 
     Background Invest. Recommended Disapproval**         
          Yes 185 14.12 93 6.94 
          No 1,125 85.88 1,247 93.06 
     Periods of Unemployment >30 days (mean)* 1.34 SD = 1.49 1.21 SD = 1.41 
     Fired from Previous Jobs**         
          Yes 172 14.88 97 7.47 
          No 984 85.12 1,202 92.53 
     Below Standard Performance Evaluations**         
          Yes 134 12.30 39 3.04 
          No 955 87.70 1,243 96.96 
     Derogatory Comments from Previous Employers**         
          Yes 110 9.70 62 4.88 
          No 1,024 90.30 1,208 95.12 
Employment at NYPD         
     Rank         
          Probationary Officer* 377 28.78 327 24.40 
          Patrol** 786 60.00 693 51.72 
          Detective** 58 4.43 119 8.88 
          Sergeant or Higher** 89 6.79 201 15.00 
     Command         
          Patrol** 856 65.34 752 56.12 
          Staff Assignment** 127 9.69 244 18.21 
          Proactive Investigation/Special Unit** 84 6.41 153 11.42 
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Table 2 continued     
     
          Police Academy/Field Training** 243 18.55 191 14.25 
     Father was in the NYPD**         
          Yes 68 5.19 111 8.28 
          No 1,242 94.81 1,229 91.72 
     Time to First Citizen Complaint         
          No Complaints** 585 44.58 700 52.24 
          Complaints from Prior Police Service** 127 9.69 38 2.84 
          Within 1 Year* 116 8.85 84 6.27 
          More than 1 Year 483 36.87 518 38.66 
Control         
     Education         
          High School Diploma or Less** 732 61.05 660 50.77 
          Some College (No Degree) 394 32.86 466 35.85 
          Associate Degree or Higher** 73 6.09 174 13.38 
     Active Enrollment in School         
          Yes 75 6.59 108 8.56 
          No 1,063 93.41 1,153 91.44 
     Age (mean) 24 SD = 3.29 24 SD = 3.03 
     Political Era 	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
          1975-1989 874 73.82 872 71.71 
          1990-1993 154 13.01 165 13.57 
          1994-1996 156 13.18 179 14.72 
Note. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 (two-tailed test). 
 
(the “bad cops”) and those in the comparison group. There are 2,650 men and 435 
women in the sample; the descriptive statistics for the male subsample can be found in 
Table 2, and the descriptive statistics for the female subsample can be found in Table 3. 
Male subsample. The racial and ethnic composition of the male subsample is 
somewhat surprising. Similar to the racial and ethnic makeup of the overall sample, 
white men constitute the largest percentage of both groups, but there are substantially 
more whites in the comparison group than in the study group (83.56% and 62.01%, 
respectively, p<0.01). The study group has more than three times as many blacks 
compared to the comparison group (26.49% and 7.99%, respectively, p<0.01) and nearly 
50% more Hispanics (11.51% and 8.45%, respectively, p<0.01).  
In looking at family life characteristics, never married and married men are 
statistically similar across the two groups, but just over twice as many divorced men are 
in the study group compared to the comparison group (3.77% and 1.46%, respectively, 
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p<0.01). Changes in officers’ marital status, however, were statistically different in all 
three categories. The percentage of males in the study group who had no change in their 
marital status was significantly higher than that of men in the comparison group (77.18% 
and 57.09%, respectively, p<0.01). Conversely, the percentage of men who got married 
was much higher in the comparison group (38.88%, compared to 16.64% in the study 
group, p<0.01). Slightly more men in the study group got divorced during their time in 
the NYPD than in the comparison group (6.18% and 4.03%, respectively group, p<0.05). 
A higher percentage of men in the study group had children than in the comparison 
group (25.2% and 20.2%, respectively group, p<0.01). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, twice as many men in the study group had a criminal 
record compared to the comparison group (13.64% and 6.66%, respectively, p<0.01). 
Men did not differ significantly on prior police experience, but did so on military 
experience: 42.04% of study officers compared to 35.59% of comparison officers had 
prior military experience (p<0.01). Men in the study group also had higher percentages 
of a negative background investigator recommendation (14.12%, compared to 6.94% of 
comparison group, p<0.01), below standard performance evaluations (12.30%, 
compared to 3.04% of comparison group, p<0.01), derogatory comments from previous 
employers (9.70%, compared to 4.88% of comparison group, p<0.01), and having been 
fired from previous jobs (14.88%, compared to 7.47% of comparison group, p<0.01). 
Men in the study group had a slightly higher average number of periods of 
unemployment greater than 30 days (1.34, compared to 1.21 for the comparison group, 
p<0.05). 
Nearly 90% of male officers in the study group were probationary officers or 
patrol officers (28.78%, p<0.05, and 60.00%, p<0.01, respectively), whereas only about 
three-fourths of comparison officers were in the lower ranks (24.40% probationary 
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officers and 51.72% patrol officers). Conversely, the comparison group had nearly twice 
the percentages of detectives (8.88%, compared to 4.43% of the study group, p<0.01) 
and sergeants or higher (15%, compared to 6.59% of the study group, p<0.01). A larger 
percentage of study officers were assigned to patrol (65.34%, compared to 56.12% of 
comparison officers, p<0.01) and the police academy or field training (18.55%, compared 
to 14.25% of comparison officers, p<0.01). Conversely, more comparison officers were 
assigned to staff units (18.21%, compared to 9.69% of study officers, p<0.01) and 
proactive investigation or special units (11.42%, compared to 6.41% of study officers, 
p<0.01). 
A statistically significantly larger percentage of comparison officers had a family 
legacy in the NYPD (8.28%, compared to 5.19% of study officers, p<0.01). In terms of 
citizen complaints, a statistically significantly larger percentage of comparison officers 
had no complaints (52.24%, compared to 44.58% of study officers, p<0.01). Conversely, 
comparison officers had both a statistically significantly lower percentage of prior 
complaints than study officers (2.84% and 9.69%, respectively, p<0.01) and a 
statistically significantly lower percentage of officers who received their first complaint 
within the first year relative to study officers (6.27% and 8.85%, respectively, p<0.05).  
Finally, the only control variable with statistically significant differences between 
male study and comparison officers was educational attainment. A significantly higher 
percentage of study officers had a high school education (61.05%, compared to 50.77% of 
comparison officers, p<0.01), whereas comparison officers had a significantly higher 
percentage of college graduates (13.38%, compared to 6.09% of study officers, p<0.01). 
Female subsample. One of the most striking differences within the female 
sample is the racial and ethnic composition. Similar to the full sample, the comparison 
group of female officers is 55.67% white, 27.09% black, and 17.24% Hispanic; the study  
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Table 3 
Female Subsample Descriptive Statistics, by Misconduct (N=435) 
Variable 
Study Group Comparison Group 
N Percent N Percent 
Race         
     Race         
          White** 75 32.47 113 55.67 
          Black** 123 53.25 55 27.09 
          Hispanic 33 14.29 35 17.24 
Family Life         
     Marital Status         
          Never Married+ 155 69.82 156 78.00 
          Married 46 20.72 31 15.50 
          Divorced 21 9.46 13 6.50 
     Change in Marital Status         
          No Change** 200 86.21 123 60.59 
          Got Married** 27 11.64 71 34.98 
          Got Divorced 5 2.16 9 4.43 
     Children**         
          Yes 64 32.00 41 20.71 
          No 136 68.00 157 79.29 
Criminal History         
     Criminal History**         
          Yes 17 8.25 5 2.48 
          No 189 91.75 197 97.52 
Employment History         
     Prior Police Experience         
          Yes 4 1.72 5 2.46 
          No 228 98.28 198 97.54 
     Prior Military Service**         
          Yes 70 33.18 26 12.87 
          No 141 66.82 176 87.13 
     Background Invest. Recommended Disapproval         
          Yes 16 6.90 12 5.91 
          No 216 93.10 191 94.09 
     Periods of Unemployment >30 days (mean)* 1.75 SD = 1.78 1.34 SD = 1.52 
     Fired from Previous Jobs**         
          Yes 36 17.91 18 8.96 
          No 165 82.09 183 91.04 
     Below Standard Performance Evaluations**         
          Yes 33 17.65 7 3.57 
          No 154 82.35 189 96.43 
     Derogatory Comments from Previous Employers**         
          Yes 23 11.62 7 3.55 
          No 175 88.38 190 96.45 
Employment at NYPD         
     Rank         
          Probationary Officer 97 41.81 87 42.86 
          Patrol* 120 51.72 80 39.41 
          Detective+ 6 2.59 12 5.91 
          Sergeant or Higher** 9 3.88 24 11.82 
     Command         
          Patrol* 129 55.60 89 43.84 
          Staff Assignment 22 9.48 24 11.82 
          Proactive Investigation/Special Unit** 14 6.03 35 17.24 
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Table 3 continued     
     
          Police Academy/Field Training 67 28.88 55 27.09 
     Father was in the NYPD+         
          Yes 10 4.31 18 8.87 
          No 222 95.69 185 91.13 
     Time to First Citizen Complaint         
          No Complaints 110 47.41 110 54.19 
          Complaints from Prior Police Service* 28 12.07 11 5.42 
          Within 1 Year 23 9.91 24 11.82 
          More than 1 Year 71 30.60 58 28.57 
Control         
     Education         
          High School Diploma or Less** 99 46.92 65 32.66 
          Some College (No Degree) 94 44.55 88 44.22 
          Associate Degree or Higher** 18 8.53 46 23.12 
     Active Enrollment in School         
          Yes 21 11.05 27 13.85 
          No 169 88.95 168 86.15 
     Age (mean) 24.35 SD = 3.02 24.26 SD = 3.37 
     Political Era         
          1975-1989* 132 56.90 139 68.47 
          1990-1993 46 19.83 32 15.76 
          1994-1996* 54 23.28 32 15.76 
Note. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 (two-tailed test). 
females, conversely, are almost completely opposite in their white and black 
composition, with 32.47% white (p<0.01), 53.25% black (p<0.01), and 14.29% Hispanic 
(difference was not statistically significant).  
Differences in family status within the female sample are also notable. First, a 
much higher percentage of women were never married in the comparison group (78%) 
compared to the study group (69.82%, p<0.10). Conversely, a higher percentage of 
women were married in the study group (20.72%) than in the comparison group (15.5%), 
but this difference was not statistically significant. A higher percentage of women in the 
comparison group got married during their time in the NYPD (34.98%, compared to 
11.64% of the study group, p<0.10); instead, women in the study group were more likely 
to have had no change in their marital status (86.21%, compared to 60.59% in the 
comparison group, p<0.01). In terms of children, a higher percentage of women in the 
study group had children (32%) than in the comparison group (20.71%, p<0.01). 
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 In terms of employment history, there are some key differences between study 
and comparison female officers. First, female officers in the study group had, on average, 
more periods of unemployment (1.75 for the study group and 1.34 for the comparison 
group, p<0.05). Women in the comparison group had a substantially lower percentage of 
officers who had received below standard performance evaluations in previous jobs 
(3.57%, compared to 17.65% of the study group, p<0.01). Likewise, a markedly higher 
percentage of women in the study group received derogatory comments from employers 
(11.62% and 3.55%, respectively, p<0.01). 
Study and comparison female officers also have key differences in their 
experiences at the NYPD. First, a higher percentage of officers in the study group were at 
the rank of patrol officer (51.72%) than in the comparison group (39.41%, p<0.05). 
Conversely, a higher percentage of comparison officers were either detective (5.91%, 
compared to 2.59% of study officers, p<0.10) or sergeant or higher (11.82%, compared to 
3.88% of the study group, p<0.01). In terms of command, a higher percentage of study 
officers were assigned to patrol (55.6%, compared to 43.84% of the comparison group, 
p<0.05), whereas a higher percentage of comparison officers were assigned to proactive 
investigation or special units (17.24%, compared to 6.03% of the study group, p<0.01). 
Twice the percentage of comparison officers had fathers in the NYPD (8.87%, compared 
to 4.31% of the study group, p<0.10). Unsurprisingly, the study group had a higher 
percentage of officers with complaints from prior police service (12.07%, compared to 
5.42% of the comparison group, p<0.05). 
The study and comparison groups also differ along several control variables. 
First, a higher percentage of study officers received only their high school diploma or less 
(46.92%, compared to 32.66% of comparison officers, p<0.01), whereas more officers in 
the comparison group achieved a college degree (23.12%, compared to 8.53% in the 
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study group). Slightly more comparison officers were actively enrolled in school at the 
time of appointment to the NYPD (13.85%, compared to 11.05% in the study group, 
p<0.01). Finally, a higher percentage of officers in the comparison group left the NYPD 
during the period of 1975-1989 (68.47%, compared to 56.9% in the study group, 
p<0.05), whereas higher percentages of study officers were dismissed during the 1990-
1993 and 1994-1996 periods (19.83% and 23.28%, respectively, compared to 15.76% for 
each period in the comparison group, p<0.05). 
Bivariate Correlations 
Model Diagnostics 
The bivariate associations (Pearson’s r) for all variables included in the 
multivariate models can be found in Table 4. For ease of interpretation, categorical 
variables were separated into dummy variables. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all 
variables were less than 1.53 (average VIF = 1.15), below the standard threshold of 10 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) and tolerance tests for all variables were above 0.65. 
Additionally, condition indices for all variables were less than 21.62, below the 
traditional limit of 30 (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980; Mason & Perreault, 1991). All 
bivariate correlations were less than 0.66, below the traditional level of absolute value 
0.70 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Thus, collinearity is not a concern for these analyses. 
Dependent Variable Associations 
Many key variables are associated with misconduct, as expected6. In terms of race 
and ethnicity, being white (-0.240, p<0.05) is weakly and negatively associated with 
misconduct, whereas being black (0.247, p<0.05) and Hispanic (0.037, p<0.05) are both 
weakly and positively associated with misconduct. Family status variables also act in  
                                                
6 In order to conduct bivariate correlations with categorical variables, the individual categories 
were separated out as dummy variables. This was done using the STB-25 sg36 add-on in Stata13. 
The tab(var1), gen(var2) command was then used to generate dummy variables for each 
category. 
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Table 4 
Bivariate Correlations with Dummy Variables 
 Misc. X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 
Female (X1) 0.027 1.00       
White (X2) -0.240* -0.223* 1.00      
Black (X3) 0.247* 0.206* -0.753* 1.00     
Hispanic (X4) 0.037* 0.064* -0.514* -0.177* 1.00    
Single (X5) -0.033 0.069* 0.092* -0.047* -0.077* 1.00   
Married (X6) 0.007 -0.112* -0.052* 0.018 0.056* -0.926* 1.00  
Divorced (X7) 0.069* 0.106* -0.109* 0.078* 0.061* -0.258* -0.125* 1.00 
No Change (X8) 0.225* 0.054* -0.098* 0.067* 0.059* -0.226* 0.235* -0.006 
Got Married (X9) -0.253* -0.042* 0.129* -0.087* -0.079* 0.394* -0.415* 0.027 
Got Divorced (X10) 0.035 -0.031 -0.054* 0.035 0.034 -0.320* 0.345* -0.043* 
Kids (X11) 0.070* 0.032 -0.218* 0.172* 0.103 -0.560* 0.516* 0.150* 
Prior Police Exp. (X12) -0.027 -0.036* 0.031 -0.033 -0.003 -0.018 0.022 -0.009* 
Prior Military Exp. (X13) 0.085* -0.112* -0.063* 0.125* -0.070* -0.171* 0.153* 0.058* 
Derogatory Comments (X14) 0.112* 0.006 -0.070* 0.068* 0.016 0.019 -0.023 0.010 
Below Standard Perf. Evals (X15) 0.186* 0.041* -0.106* 0.109* 0.017 0.019 -0.031 0.029 
Fired from Jobs (X16) 0.121* 0.027 -0.089* 0.119* -0.022 -0.009 -0.003 0.032 
Periods of Unemp. (X17) 0.056* 0.063* -0.098* 0.079* 0.045* -0.023 -0.019 0.108* 
Criminal History (X18) 0.116* -0.055* -0.035 0.042* -0.003 -0.038* 0.034 0.014 
Probationary Officer (X19) 0.043* 0.121* -0.014 -0.038* 0.071* 0.147* -0.152* 0.002 
Patrol Officer (X20) 0.087* -0.069* -0.023 0.053* -0.035 -0.119* 0.116* 0.017 
Detective (X21) -0.089* -0.036* 0.008 0.007 -0.021 -0.039* 0.041* -0.003 
Sergeant or Higher (X22) -0.134* -0.038* 0.055* -0.037* -0.033 0.005 0.007 -0.031 
Patrol (X23) 0.096* -0.075* -0.030 0.046* -0.016 -0.047* 0.037* 0.029 
Staff Assignment (X24) -0.113* -0.035 0.024 -0.003 -0.033 -0.042* 0.048* -0.009 
Proactive Investigation (X25) -0.101* 0.028 0.005 -0.008 0.003 -0.032 0.039* -0.014 
PA/Field Training (X26) 0.054* 0.106* 0.012 -0.051* 0.048* 0.121* -0.117* -0.017 
No Complaints (X27) -0.075* 0.015 0.046* -0.104* 0.066* 0.087* -0.096* 0.019 
Prior Complaint (X28) 0.138* 0.0438* -0.017 0.029 -0.013 0.036 -0.034 -0.006 
Within 1 Year (X29) 0.037* 0.042* -0.031 0.031 0.006 0.028 -0.047* 0.047* 
More than 1 Year (X30) -0.015 -0.059* -0.022 0.074* -0.065* -0.124* 0.144* -0.043* 
NYPD Father (X31) -0.066* -0.004 0.120* -0.082* -0.073* 0.098* -0.098* -0.006 
BG Invest. Recommend. (X32) 0.104* -0.047* -0.099* 0.103* 0.014 -0.095* 0.077* 0.054* 
Age (X33) -0.002 0.039* -0.143* 0.113* 0.067* -0.366* 0.307* 0.176* 
High School or Less (X34) 0.106* -0.110* 0.019 0.017 -0.051* -0.174* 0.181* -0.005 
Some College (X35) -0.025 0.072* -0.045* -0.001 0.070* 0.119* -0.130* 0.022 
College Degree (X36) -0.133* 0.065* 0.040* -0.026 -0.026 0.097* -0.089* -0.027 
Active Enrollment (X37) -0.037 0.061* -0.017 0.010 0.012 0.1217* -0.109* -0.028 
1975-1989 (X38) -0.002 -0.083* 0.089* -0.065* -0.047* -0.066* 0.068* 0.003 
1990-1993 (X39) 0.004 0.048* -0.041* 0.022 0.033 0.049* -0.057* 0.018 
1994-1996 (X40) -0.001 0.059* -0.073* 0.062* 0.028 0.036 -0.030 -0.019 
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Table 4 continued 
 
 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 
No Change (X8) 1.00        
Got Married (X9) -0.890* 1.00       
Got Divorced (X10) -0.329* -0.138* 1.00      
Kids (X11) 0.153* -0.240* 0.168* 1.00     
Prior Police Exp. (X12) 0.0003 0.002 -0.005 -0.010 1.00    
Prior Military Exp. (X13) -0.039* 0.005 0.073* 0.113* -0.020 1.00   
Derogatory Comments (X14) 0.029 -0.032 0.005 0.019 0.029 0.036 1.00  
Below Standard Perf. Evals (X15) 0.040* -0.045* 0.008 0.023 -0.017 0.066* 0.098* 1.00 
Fired from Jobs (X16) 0.040* -0.048* 0.013 0.041* -0.004 0.028 0.408* 0.112* 
Periods of Unemp. (X17) 0.026 -0.037 0.020 0.036 0.011 0.018 0.124* 0.070* 
Criminal History (X18) 0.061* -0.062* -0.003 0.051* 0.003 0.036 0.005 0.034 
Probationary Officer (X19) 0.083* -0.066* -0.043* -0.086* -0.028 -0.225* -0.003 -0.028 
Patrol Officer (X20) -0.044* 0.011 0.073* 0.079* 0.017 0.137* 0.032 0.081* 
Detective (X21) -0.076* 0.084* -0.009 0.020 0.019 0.089* -0.042* -0.063* 
Sergeant or Higher (X22) 0.010 0.013 -0.047* -0.019 -0.001 0.041* -0.014* -0.042* 
Patrol (X23) -0.001 -0.011 0.024 0.045* 0.025 0.052* 0.045* 0.070* 
Staff Assignment (X24) -0.067* 0.074* -0.010 0.009 0.007 0.077* -0.066* -0.070* 
Proactive Investigation (X25) -0.025 0.021 0.011 0.014 -0.004 0.014 -0.001 0.009 
PA/Field Training (X26) 0.079* -0.068* -0.031 -0.077* -0.035 -0.147* 0.004 -0.034 
No Complaints (X27) 0.029 -0.019 -0.023 -0.073* -0.022 -0.173* -0.027 -0.046* 
Prior Complaint (X28) 0.082* -0.089* 0.007 -0.012 0.037* -0.015 0.027 0.014 
Within 1 Year (X29) 0.056* -0.051* -0.016 -0.007 -0.014 -0.029 0.009 0.019 
More than 1 Year (X30) -0.104* 0.094* 0.030 0.085* 0.012 0.202* 0.009 0.029 
NYPD Father (X31) -0.039* 0.049* -0.018 -0.099* -0.019 -0.095* -0.029 -0.030 
BG Invest. Recommend. (X32) 0.016 -0.027 0.021 0.116* -0.009 0.086* 0.195* 0.037 
Age (X33) 0.118* -0.152* 0.059* 0.334* 0.034 0.140* 0.034 -0.016 
High School or Less (X34) 0.010 -0.043* 0.068* 0.148* -0.007 0.205* 0.035 0.025 
Some College (X35) 0.005 0.014 -0.039* -0.107* 0.022 -0.124* -0.022 0.002 
College Degree (X36) -0.024 0.049* -0.049* -0.073* -0.023 -0.138* -0.022 -0.044* 
Active Enrollment (X37) -0.017 0.038* -0.041* -0.098* -0.013 -0.093* -0.032 0.005 
1975-1989 (X38) 0.012 -0.013 0.0003 -0.010 0.001 -0.066* 0.015 -0.020 
1990-1993 (X39) -0.005 0.009 -0.007 -0.012 -0.009 0.059* -0.032 0.029 
1994-1996 (X40) -0.010 0.008 0.007 0.024 0.007 0.026 0.012 0.003 
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Table 4 continued 
 
 X16 X17 X18 X19 X20 X21 X22 X23 
Fired from Jobs (X16) 1.00        
Periods of Unemp. (X17) 0.148* 1.00       
Criminal History (X18) 0.053* 0.029 1.00      
Probationary Officer (X19) 0.038* 0.062* 0.034 1.00     
Patrol Officer (X20) 0.003 -0.034 0.010 -0.695* 1.00    
Detective (X21) -0.048* -0.025 -0.043* -0.165* -0.284* 1.00   
Sergeant or Higher (X22) -0.023 -0.017 -0.034 -0.217* -0.374* -0.089* 1.00  
Patrol (X23) 0.038* 0.013 0.006 -0.289* 0.313* -0.210* 0.086* 1.00 
Staff Assignment (X24) -0.063* -0.015 -0.004 -0.178* -0.015 0.419* -0.045* -0.476* 
Proactive Investigation (X25) -0.012 -0.021 -0.011 -0.142* 0.075* 0.013 0.077* -0.385* 
PA/Field Training (X26) 0.018 0.013 0.005 0.635* -0.443* -0.115* -0.127* -0.565* 
No Complaints (X27) 0.003 -0.010 -0.035 0.132* -0.154* -0.014 0.067* -0.065* 
Prior Complaint (X28) 0.011 -0.026 0.057* 0.142* -0.089* -0.048* -0.027 -0.084* 
Within 1 Year (X29) 0.003 0.023 0.016 0.100* -0.042* -0.047* -0.042* 0.041* 
More than 1 Year (X30) -0.010 0.011 -0.003 -0.266* 0.230* 0.065* -0.031 0.088* 
NYPD Father (X31) -0.048* -0.027 0.026 0.041* -0.010 -0.006 -0.041* -0.044* 
BG Invest. Recommend. (X32) 0.160* 0.135* 0.165* -0.012 0.051* -0.010 -0.057* 0.040* 
Age (X33) 0.050* 0.132* 0.060* -0.016 0.028 0.007 -0.016 -0.018 
High School or Less (X34) 0.016 -0.056* 0.033 -0.159* 0.157* 0.019 -0.038* 0.100* 
Some College (X35) -0.005 0.051* -0.011 0.135* -0.108* -0.023 -0.006 -0.079* 
College Degree (X36) -0.017 0.011 -0.036 0.047* -0.086* 0.005 0.070* -0.040* 
Active Enrollment (X37) -0.028 -0.047* -0.042* 0.017 -0.044* 0.007 0.043* -0.043* 
1975-1989 (X38) -0.026 -0.075* 0.001 -0.005 0.012 -0.019 0.003 -0.018 
1990-1993 (X39) 0.008 0.055* -0.005 0.043* -0.016 -0.022 -0.023 0.008 
1994-1996 (X40) 0.026 0.042* 0.004 -0.036 0.001 0.045* 0.018 0.016 
 
 
Table 4 continued 
 
 X24 X25 X26 X27 X28 X29 X30 X31 
Staff Assignment (X24) 1.00        
Proactive Investigation (X25) -0.126* 1.00       
PA/Field Training (X26) -0.185* -0.150* 1.00      
No Complaints (X27) -0.029 -0.032 0.133* 1.00     
Prior Complaint (X28) -0.021 -0.022 0.143* -0.260* 1.00    
Within 1 Year (X29) -0.050* -0.020 0.008 -0.288* -0.079* 1.00   
More than 1 Year (X30) 0.069* 0.056* -0.216* -0.741* -0.202* -0.224* 1.00  
NYPD Father (X31) 0.0001 -0.005 0.060* 0.031* -0.009 0.026 -0.043* 1.00 
BG Invest. Recommend. (X32) -0.004 -0.031 -0.023 -0.091* 0.030 0.002 0.079* -0.015 
Age (X33) 0.030 0.025 -0.022 -0.001 0.014 -0.013 0.002 -0.094* 
High School or Less (X34) -0.015 0.005 -0.118* -0.072* -0.033 -0.030 0.107* -0.035 
Some College (X35) 0.022 -0.025 0.100* 0.020 0.038* 0.028 -0.056* 0.016 
College Degree (X36) -0.009 0.030 0.035 0.085* -0.006 0.005 -0.087* 0.032 
Active Enrollment (X37) 0.001 0.064* 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.008 -0.012 0.025 
1975-1989 (X38) -0.081* 0.009 0.086* -0.115* 0.067* 0.035 0.065* 0.088* 
1990-1993 (X39) -0.018 -0.005 0.009 0.106* -0.044* -0.032 -0.069* -0.044* 
1994-1996 (X40) 0.121* -0.006 -0.118* 0.044* -0.042* -0.014 -0.015 -0.069* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  112 
Table 4 continued 
 
 X32 X33 X34 X35 X36 X37 X38 X39 
BG Invest. Recommend. (X32) 1.00        
Age (X33) 0.111* 1.00       
High School or Less (X34) 0.115* 0.044* 1.00      
Some College (X35) -0.080* -0.090* -0.801* 1.00     
College Degree (X36) -0.063* 0.068* -0.371* -0.259* 1.00    
Active Enrollment (X37) -0.057* -0.137* -0.223* 0.209* 0.036 1.00   
1975-1989 (X38) 0.038* -0.028 0.056* -0.037 -0.031 -0.007 1.00  
1990-1993 (X39) -0.018 -0.002 -0.023 0.016 0.012 -0.002 -0.634* 1.00 
1994-1996 (X40) -0.032 0.037* -0.049* 0.032 0.028 0.011 -0.656* -0.169* 
Note. * p<0.05 (two-tailed test). 
expected fashions. Being single or married is not significantly correlated with 
misconduct, but being divorced is weakly and positively associated with misconduct 
(0.069, p<0.05). Having no change in marital status is weakly and positively correlated 
with misconduct (0.225, p<0.05), but getting married is weakly associated misconduct in 
the negative direction (-0.253, p<0.05). Having children is weakly and positively 
correlated with misconduct (0.070, p<0.05).  
Many work history variables are also correlated with misconduct in the expected 
direction. First, having prior military experience is weakly and positively associated with 
misconduct (0.085, p<0.05). Additionally, indicators of employment problems such as 
receiving derogatory comments from prior employers (0.112, p<0.05), having below 
standard performance evaluations (0.186, p<0.05), having been fired from previous jobs 
(0.121, p<0.05), and having greater numbers of periods of unemployment greater than 
30 days (0.056, p<0.05) are all weakly associated misconduct in the positive direction. 
Having a criminal history is weakly and positively correlated with misconduct (0.116, 
p<0.05). 
Variables related to officers’ experiences while in the NYPD are also related to 
misconduct. Being a probationary officer (0.043, p<0.05) or a patrol officer (0.087, 
p<0.05) are both weakly and positively associated with misconduct. Conversely, being a 
detective (-0.089, p<0.05) or a sergeant or higher (-0.134, p<0.05) are weakly and 
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negatively correlated with misconduct. Being assigned to a patrol command (0.096, 
p<0.05) or the police academy or field training (0.054, p<0.05) are weakly correlated 
with misconduct in the positive direction, whereas being assigned to a staff assignment  
(-0.113, p<0.05) or a proactive investigation or special unit (-0.101, p<0.05) are weakly 
and negatively associated with misconduct.  
Having no citizen complaints is, unsurprisingly, weakly and negatively correlated 
with misconduct (-0.075, p<0.05). Having citizen complaints from prior police jobs 
(0.138, p<0.05) or receiving a complaint within the first year (0.037, p<0.05) both have 
a weak, positive relationship with misconduct. Having one’s father in the NYPD is weakly 
and negatively associated with misconduct (-0.066, p<0.05). Finally, receiving a 
negative background investigator recommendation (or the background investigator 
recommending not to hire the officer) weakly and positively correlates misconduct 
(0.104, p<0.05). 
The only control variable significantly correlated with misconduct is education. 
Having a high school diploma or less is weakly and positively associated with misconduct 
(0.106, p<0.05) whereas having a college degree has a weak, negative relationship with 
misconduct (-0.133, p<0.05). 
Primary Independent Variable Correlations 
The bivariate correlations are also useful for gaining an understanding of the 
make-up of the females in the sample. First, being female is weakly and positively 
correlated with being black (0.206, p<0.05), Hispanic (0.064, p<0.05), single (0.069, 
p<0.05), or divorced (0.106, p<0.05). Being female is also weakly correlated in the 
positive direction with having no change in marital status while working at the NYPD 
(0.054, p<0.05) and in the negative direction with getting married (-0.042, p<0.05). 
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In relation to employment factors, being female is weakly and negatively 
associated with having prior police (-0,036, p<0.05) or military (-0.112, p<0.05) 
experience. Conversely, being female is weakly and positively correlated with having 
below standard performance evaluations (0.041, p<0.05) and having more periods of 
unemployment greater than 30 days (0.063, p<0.05). Unsurprisingly, being female is 
negatively correlated with criminal history, albeit weakly (-0.055, p<0.05).  
In the NYPD, being female is weakly and positively correlated with being a 
probationary officer (0.121, p<0.05) and weakly and negatively associated with being a 
patrol officer (-0.069, p<0.05), detective (-0.036, p<0.05), or a sergeant or higher  
(-0.038, p<0.05). Being female is weakly and positively associated with being assigned to 
the police academy or field training (0.106, p<0.05) and weakly and negatively 
correlated with being assigned to patrol (-0.075, p<0.05). Being female is weakly and 
positively correlated with receiving the first citizen complaint in prior policing jobs 
(0.044, p<0.05) or within the first year on the job with the NYPD (0.042, p<0.05), but is 
weakly correlated with receiving the first complaint after the first year in the negative 
direction (-0.059, p<0.05). Being female is also weakly and negatively correlated with 
receiving a negative background investigator recommendation (or a recommendation 
not to be hired; -0.047, p<0.05). 
Finally, key control variables are significantly correlated with being female. Being 
female was weakly and positively correlated with being older than average (0.039, 
p<0.05) and having a college degree (0.065, p<0.05), but is weakly and negatively 
associated with having a high school diploma or less (-0.110, p<0.05). Being female was 
also weakly and positively correlated with being actively enrolled in school while working 
at the NYPD (0.061, p<0.05). Finally, being female was weakly and negatively correlated 
with leaving the department during 1975-1989 (-0.083, p<0.05), but weakly and 
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positively correlated with being separated either during 1990-1993 (0.048, p<0.05) or 
1994-1996 (0.059, p<0.05). 
Full Sample Predictors of Misconduct 
The full sample logistic regression for misconduct (see Table 5) is conducted in 
the same way most policing research is done, with sex as a control variable, known as the 
“add gender and stir” approach. In this model, sex operates as expected; female officers 
are 26.5% less likely than male officers to commit misconduct. There are several other 
notable findings in each of the predictor categories. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) for 
the model were less than 2.99 (average VIF = 1.49) and tolerance levels for the model 
ranged from 0.33 to 0.95. Nagelkerke’s R-squared for the model was 0.326 and the 
model chi-square was significant (p<0.001). 
Race and Ethnicity 
The main effects for race/ethnicity are notable in their own right. Blacks were 
321.7% more likely to commit misconduct than whites, and Hispanics were 42% more 
likely to commit misconduct than whites. While both minority statuses are statistically 
significant risk factors, this model demonstrates the importance of parsing out race 
beyond a white/nonwhite dichotomy, as the size of the effects are substantially different.  
Family Life 
The second set of predictors – those of an officer’s family life – continues to show 
expected relationships. Consistent with previous research, marriage is a protective factor 
and divorce is a risk factor for officer misconduct. Married officers were 42.4% less likely 
to commit misconduct, whereas divorced officers were 71.9% more likely to commit 
misconduct than never married officers. Likewise, getting married while employed by 
the NYPD is a protective factor, as expected; officers who got married were 72.7% less 
likely to commit misconduct than officers with no change in marital status.  
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Table 5 
Full Sample Logistic Regression Likelihood of Misconduct (N=2,215) 
Variables Odds Ratio SE 
   
Female 0.735* (0.109) 
Race (reference: White)     
     Black 4.217** (0.585) 
     Hispanic 1.420* (0.224) 
Marital Status (reference: Never Married)     
     Married 0.576** (0.087) 
     Divorced 1.719+ (0.518) 
Change in Marital Status (reference: No Change)     
     Got Married 0.273** (0.034) 
     Got Divorced 1.020 (0.246) 
Kids 0.951 (0.139) 
Prior Police Experience 1.002 (0.252) 
Prior Military Experience 1.390** (0.154) 
Number of Jobs Fired 1.292 (0.235) 
Periods of Unemployment 0.985 (0.035) 
Derogatory Comments from Prior Employer 1.349 (0.301) 
Below Standard Performance Evaluations 3.070** (0.675) 
Criminal History 1.703** (0.309) 
Officer Rank (reference: Probationary Officer)     
     Patrol Officer 1.657** (0.231) 
     Detective 1.050 (0.283) 
     Sergeant or Higher 0.370** (0.091) 
Command (reference: Patrol)     
     Staff Assignment 0.622** (0.106) 
     Proactive Investigation/Special Unit 0.515** (0.092) 
     Field Training/Police Academy 0.841 (0.139) 
Father in the NYPD 0.817 (0.162) 
Time to First Complaint (reference: No Complaints)     
     Complaint from Prior Police Service+ 4.228** (0.927) 
     Within 1 Year 1.464* (0.255) 
     More than 1 Year 1.293* (0.145) 
Background Investigator Did Not Recommend Hire 1.433* (0.260) 
Age 0.962* (0.017) 
Education (reference: High School)     
     Some College (No Degree) 0.749** (0.082) 
     College Degree (Associate/Bachelor/Graduate) 0.429** (0.081) 
Actively Enrolled in School 0.929 (0.179) 
Political Era (reference: 1975-1989)     
     1990-1993 (Community Policing) 0.789 (0.119) 
     1994-1996 (Order Maintenance Policing 0.924 (0.131) 
Constant 0.734+ (0.129) 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 (two-tailed test). 
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These findings are consistent both with previous studies in policing as well as 
life-course and other longitudinal research findings that show marriage to have a 
stabilizing effect on people, whereas divorce can create a chaotic environment that 
manifests in criminal or otherwise deviant behavior. 
Employment History 
Employment history has consistently been found to be relevant for predicting 
misconduct, yet here there is little in officers’ employment history that is significant. 
Officers with prior military experience are 39% more likely to commit misconduct, and 
officers with below standard performance evaluations are 207% more likely to commit 
misconduct than those with positive evaluations. The lack of significance of other facets 
of poor employment history is surprising, not only because of the inconsistency with 
previous research but also because one would expect someone who experiences 
employment problems in policing to have had problems in previous jobs as well. This 
could, however, be a matter of masked sex-specific effects, which will be addressed in the 
split-sample results. 
Criminal History 
The main effect of criminal history is a significant risk factor, as would be 
expected. Officers with a criminal records upon entering the police department were 
7.3% more likely to commit misconduct than those without a criminal background. This 
is consistent with previous research; the best predictor of future criminal behavior is 
previous criminal behavior. This finding holds across a variety of contexts, samples, and 
time periods. 
NYPD Employment Experience 
Rather than employment history, it seems that officers’ experiences in the NYPD 
are more salient to their misconduct likelihood. Even from the point of application, some 
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misconduct can be predicted; officers who had a negative recommendation (a 
recommendation not to hire) from the background investigator were 43.3% more likely 
to commit misconduct than those with positive recommendations. 
Consistent with prior literature, an officer’s rank is significantly related to 
misconduct likelihood. Patrol officers are 65.7% more likely to commit misconduct than 
probationary officers, whereas officers at the rank of sergeant or above are 63% less 
likely to commit misconduct than probationary officers. Additionally, being assigned to 
either a staff assignment (37.8% less likely) or a special unit or proactive investigation 
(48.5% less likely) is protective for officer misconduct. Interestingly, being assigned to 
the police academy or field training was statistically similar to patrol assignments. The 
field training aspect could drive this seemingly surprising finding. This finding could be 
tied to the oft-cited statement that senior officers say to rookie officers on the first day of 
training, “Forget everything they taught you in the academy; I’m going to teach you how 
to really do police work.” Part of this training is immersion in the police subculture, so it 
is possible that field-training officers are more likely to commit misconduct in an 
attempt to “show rookies how it’s done” and inculcate the culture of secrecy and fidelity 
to their brothers-in-blue. Alternatively, it is possible that the field training officer 
position was used as a form of informal punishment and was not highly sought after. 
Thus, problematic officers may have been funneled into this position. 
Citizen complaints have long been established as a strong correlate for police 
misconduct, and for good reason: The best predictor of future offending is past 
misbehavior. In this study, the same is true. Having citizen complaints is a risk factor for 
misconduct, especially complaints from previous police service; officers with complaints 
from prior service were 322.8% more likely to commit misconduct than those with no 
complaints. Officers with complaints within the first year 46.4% more likely to commit 
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misconduct than those without complaints, and those with complaints after the first year 
were 29.3% more likely to commit misconduct.  
Controls 
Previous research has shown that as officers get older, they are less likely to 
commit misconduct, consistent with research on offending in general. This study 
supports these findings; as age increases one standard deviation from the average, 
officers are 7.6% less likely to commit misconduct. Surprisingly, there were no 
statistically significant differences in misconduct likelihood between the different 
political eras. 
While enrollment in school during employment with the NYPD is not statistically 
significant, education level at the time of appointment to the NYPD is salient for officers’ 
likelihood of committing misconduct. Compared to officers with only a high school 
education, those with some college (but no degree) were 25.1% less likely to commit 
misconduct and those with a degree (associate or higher) were 57.1% less likely to 
commit misconduct. This is consistent with previous research and could be related to the 
economic aspects related to higher education; officers with some college education or a 
college degree often make more money than their less-educated counterparts and are 
often more attractive for promotions and other accolades that accompany greater 
monetary gains. 
Subsample Differences in Predictors of Misconduct 
The split-sample model (see Table 6) gives a quantitative picture of the correlates 
of misconduct separated by officer sex. The same logistic regression was performed on 
both the male and female subsamples and the equality of the coefficients were tested 
using z-score comparisons. The effects discussed below remained after controlling for 
known correlates of police misconduct, which did not vary by sex. This model shows that 
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some long-standing assumptions of how some variables operate in predicting 
misconduct may require greater nuance when looking separately at males and females.   
For the male subsample model, VIFs for the model were less than 3.20 (average 
VIF = 1.49) and tolerance levels ranged from 0.35 to 0.91. Nagelkerke’s R-squared was 
0.313 and the model chi-square was significant (p<0.001). For the female subsample 
model, VIFs were less than 2.69 (average VIF = 1.67) and tolerance levels for the model 
ranged from 0.37 to 0.88. Nagelkerke’s R-squared for the model was 0.500 and the chi-
square for the model was significant (p<0.001). Notably, the female model has much 
more explanatory power than the male model. 
Race and Ethnicity 
In the full sample findings, race and ethnicity were significant for both blacks and 
Hispanics, with both being risk factors for misconduct. On its face, the split-sample 
model indicates that black males have a higher likelihood of committing misconduct 
relative to their white counterparts than do black females (341.5% more likely for black 
males compared to 252.2% more likely for black females), but the difference is 
statistically insignificant. Additionally, first glance would show that Hispanic women are 
not statistically different from white women, whereas Hispanic men are 48.6% more 
likely to commit misconduct than white men. In this interpretation, Hispanic women’s 
gender overshadowed the risk value of the ethnicity, yet the z-score comparison shows 
that Hispanic men and women are not statistically different from one another. 
Family Life 
Of the three family life variables (marital status, change in marital status, and 
having children), only three categories are statistically different between male and 
female officers. Married female officers are statistically indistinguishable from their non-
married counterparts, but married male officers are 72.9% less likely to commit  
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Table 6 
Logistic Regression Likelihood of Misconduct, Split-Sample Analysis 
  Female (N=338) Male (N=1,884) 
Variables Odds Ratio SE Odds Ratio SE 
         
Race (reference: White)        
     Black 3.522** (1.205) 4.415** (0.707) 
     Hispanic 0.879 (0.400) 1.486* (0.259) 
Marital Status (reference: Never married)        
     Married* 1.456 (0.651) 0.522** (0.086) 
     Divorced 1.241 (0.736) 2.228* (0.837) 
Change in Marital Status (reference: No Change)        
     Got Married 0.214** (0.083) 0.271** (0.036) 
     Got Divorced* 0.177+ (0.157) 1.201 (0.304) 
Kids 0.758 (0.279) 1.017 (0.167) 
Prior Police Experience+ 0.255+ (0.184) 1.072 (0.284) 
Prior Military Experience 2.240* (0.884) 1.296* (0.154) 
Fired from Previous Jobs 1.558 (0.829) 1.326 (0.263) 
Periods of Unemployment 0.990 (0.095) 0.980 (0.038) 
Derogatory Comments from Prior Employer 3.301 (2.630) 1.194 (0.286) 
Below Standard Performance Evaluations 6.033** (3.698) 2.753** (0.661) 
Criminal History 3.206 (2.423) 1.620* (0.305) 
Officer Rank (reference: Probationary Officer)        
     Patrol Officer** 4.735** (1.970) 1.424* (0.215) 
     Detective 1.070 (1.107) 0.977 (0.277) 
     Sergeant or Higher* 1.665 (1.191) 0.313** (0.082) 
Command (reference: Patrol)        
     Staff Assignment 0.406+ (0.221) 0.658* (0.122) 
     Proactive Investigation/Special Unit* 0.194** (0.098) 0.608* (0.119) 
     Field Training/Police Academy 1.302 (0.596) 0.760 (0.136) 
Father in the NYPD 1.727 (0.977) 0.750 (0.161) 
Time to First Complaint (reference: No  
   Complaints)        
     Complaint from Prior Police Service+ 12.316** (7.410) 3.814** (0.925) 
     Within 1 Year 1.912 (1.013) 1.461* (0.279) 
     More than 1 Year 2.158* (0.808) 1.241+ (0.149) 
Background Investigator Did Not Recommend Hire 2.355 (1.399) 1.403+ (0.272) 
Age 1.014 (0.048) 0.959* (0.019) 
Education (reference: High School)        
      Some College (No Degree) 1.278 (0.475) 0.708** (0.083) 
     College Degree (Associate/Bachelor/Graduate) 0.399* (0.178) 0.424** (0.092) 
Actively Enrolled in School 0.637 (0.303) 0.991 (0.216) 
Political Era (reference: 1975-1989)        
     1990-1993 (Community Policing) 1.098 (0.449) 0.722+ (0.121) 
     1994-1996 (Order Maintenance Policing 1.272 (0.519) 0.880 (0.138) 
Constant 0.140** (0.087) 0.902 (0.168) 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 (two-tailed test). 
misconduct than never married men. This difference is significant; the protective aspect 
of marriage, then, is driven by the males in the sample and masks the non-significant 
effect in women. Getting married, however, is a similarly significant protective factor for 
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both men and women; women who got married during their time in the NYPD were 
78.6% less likely to commit misconduct than women who had no change in their marital  
status and men who got married during their time in the NYPD were 72.9% less likely. 
Getting divorced, however, shows a statistical difference between men and women, and 
in a surprising fashion. Men in the sample who got divorced were statistically equivalent 
to men with no change in their marital status. Women who divorced, however, were 
82.3% less likely to commit misconduct than women with no change in marital status.  
This finding has two important implications. First, it demonstrates the 
importance of viewing men and women separately in assessing risk and protection 
factors for various forms of offending. Additionally, this finding shows that some 
stressors may be positive rather than negative. Prior research on general offending and 
desistance has found divorce to have a destabilizing effect, hindering efforts at desistance 
from criminal behavior. These studies, however, have used samples primarily of men; it 
is possible that divorce, for women, can have a stabilizing effect if the woman is 
removing herself from a negative or dangerous situation. The job stability that generally 
accompanies professions like policing could empower women to leave abusive or 
otherwise negative relationships (e.g., drug-addicted or chronically unemployed spouse). 
Thus, rather than divorce being a stressor, the relationship is a stressor and divorce 
removes that stressor. Thus, theoretical explanations for offending may need to be re-
evaluated in light of the differences for men and women. In this instance, strain theory, 
which emphasizes that strains can only be negative, and life-course criminology, which 
specifically notes that divorce is a destabilizing factor in desistance from criminal 
behavior, may need to re-examine their frameworks. 
Employment History 
Like the full sample, few characteristics of employment history seem to salient to 
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predicting misconduct. Prior military experience and below standard performance 
evaluations are significant risk factors for misconduct for both men and women, though 
the sex differences are not significant. Conversely, prior police experience has 
significantly different sex effects. Male officers with previous police experience are not 
statistically different from those without prior experience; for female officers, however, 
prior experience as a police officer is a protective factor for misconduct, as women with 
prior experience were 74.5% less likely to commit misconduct than women without it.  
Criminal History 
The effect of criminal history on misconduct likelihood is not significantly 
different between men and women. This is somewhat surprising, since it is a significant 
risk factor for men but not a statistically significant risk factor for women. The fact that it 
is significant for one and not for the other, yet the difference between them is not 
significant, demonstrates the importance of comparing males and females in the same 
sample. Studies that use samples consisting of only one sex may be drawing incorrect 
conclusions based on incomplete information. 
NYPD Employment Experience 
Several aspects of officers’ experiences in the NYPD differ by sex. First, the only 
command, relative to patrol, that had statistically significant differences by sex was 
proactive investigation or special units, which is a protective factor for both men and 
women but to varying degrees. Women assigned to this command were 80.6% less likely 
than female patrol officers to commit misconduct, whereas male officers assigned to 
proactive investigations or special units were 39.2% less likely than male patrol officers 
to commit misconduct. Being assigned to a staff unit was also a protective factor for both 
men and women, but the difference between the two was insignificant.  
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Second, the amount of time it took for an officer to receive his or her first citizen 
complaint was significant between the sexes. Women with prior complaints were 
1131.6% more likely to commit misconduct than women without any complaints. For 
men, the effect of prior complaints was much smaller, though still significant: Men with 
prior complaints were 281.4% more likely to commit misconduct than their counterparts 
with no complaints. Women and men are statistically similar in the effect of a citizen 
complaint within the first year on their misconduct likelihood, but women who receive 
their first complaint after the first year are 115.8% more likely to commit misconduct 
than women without complaints, whereas men are 24.1% more likely to commit 
misconduct than men without complaints. 
These two effects combined could show that citizen complaints are much more 
accurate at pinpointing female misconduct than male misconduct, especially when a 
female officer entered the NYPD with a complaint from a prior job in policing. This could 
have significant effects on misconduct screening procedures within the department, 
especially early intervention (EI) systems. 
Finally, the effect of officer rank differed by sex for patrol officers and higher 
ranks (sergeant and above). For higher ranks, there was no statistical difference between 
higher ranked women and female probationary officers, but there was a significant 
protective aspect to being a higher ranked male (68.7% less likely to commit misconduct 
than male probationary officers). Given that nearly half of separated women were 
probationary officers, and being a higher rank did not protect women from committing 
misconduct as it did for men, it is possible that higher ranked women feel increased 
pressure to commit misconduct in order to stay in the good graces of their male peers 
and superiors, especially since there were very few females in higher ranks during the 
study period. Likewise, women in supervisory positions, such as sergeants or lieutenants, 
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may feel pressure to commit misconduct to retain authority and control over male 
officers under their purview. 
Female patrol officers were 373.5% more likely to commit misconduct than their 
probationary counterparts, whereas male patrol officers were only 42.4% more likely to 
commit misconduct. In other words, when comparing female study officers to female 
comparison officers, female officers are more likely to make it through probation before 
getting into trouble, and this effect is substantially higher for women than it is for men. 
There are two possible explanations for this finding. The first is that this substantial 
difference could be due to the extreme pressure women often feel to fit into the police 
subculture, especially among line officers. Patrol officers, more than other ranks, must 
rely on their fellow officers for back up in dangerous encounters. When officers become 
problematic or do not assimilate into the culture, they remain on the fringe and may be 
less likely to receive assistance when needed. Female officers already encounter 
resistance from male counterparts because they are believed to be less capable in the 
field; thus, misconduct by female patrol officers may be a form of conforming to the 
subculture in a perceived act of survival. This would especially be true in organized, 
group-level misconduct.  
A deeper look at the probationary period. It is also possible that, in 
looking at it from the opposite way, men were more likely to be fired during the 
probationary period (the first two years) than women, thus it only appears that female 
patrol officers are so much more likely to commit misconduct than female probationary 
officers. As Table 7 indicates, however, this is not the case. Nearly 43% of female study 
officers were fired in the first two years; comparatively, not even 30% of male study 
officers were fired in the first two years. This leads to two possibilities. First, supervisors 
rely on the discretion present during the probationary period to remove female officers 
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Table 7 
Time to Separation, by Sex 
Time to Separation 
Male 
(N=1,310) 
Female 
(N=231) 
Total 
(N=1,541) 
Less than 6 months 92 27 119 
 7.02% 11.69% 7.72% 
6 months to 1 year 120 41 161 
 9.16% 17.75% 10.45% 
1 year to 2 years 170 30 200 
 12.98% 12.99% 12.98% 
2 years to 5 years 203 39 242 
 15.5% 16.88% 15.7% 
5 years to 10 years 318 40 358 
 24.27% 17.32% 23.23% 
10 years to 15 years 249 43 292 
 19.01% 18.61% 18.95% 
15+ years 158 11 169 
 12.06% 4.76% 10.97% 
 
who seem to have difficulty assimilating into the culture. Alternatively, and more 
pessimistically, male supervisors use probation to covertly discriminate against women. 
Yet, when separated by race (see Table 8), a much larger percentage of white 
female study officers than black or Hispanic female study officers were fired during the 
probationary period (60.81% of white women, compared to 29.27% of black women and 
37.69% of Hispanic women). This is counterintuitive to the subcultural explanation, as 
minorities, especially minority women, should be more likely to be fired than white 
officers, thus lending credence to the gender discrimination explanation. There is a 
similar pattern between white and black males (31.89% of white male study officers were 
fired in the probationary period, compared to 22.16% of black male study officers), 
though white and Hispanic males are nearly indistinguishable (31.89% and 28.56%, 
respectively). It is therefore possible that an officer’s minority status was protective 
during the probationary period. The department was under intense public scrutiny 
during the study period and firing minority officers during their probationary periods 
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may have drawn unwelcome attention. The same protection may not have been afforded 
to women because gender parity was not as politically important as was racial parity. 
Table 8 
Time to Separation, by Sex and Race 
 Male (N=1,295) Female (N=230) 
Time to Separation 
White 
(N=803) 
Black 
(N=343) 
Hispanic 
(N=149) 
White 
(N=74) 
Black 
(N=123) 
Hispanic 
(N=33) 
Less than 6 months 61 20 9 9 12 6 
 7.6% 5.83% 6.04% 12.16% 9.76% 18.18% 
6 months to 1 year 81 25 14 23 11 7 
 10.09% 7.29% 9.4% 31.08% 8.94% 21.21% 
1 year to 2 years 114 31 25 13 13 4 
 14.2% 9.04% 16.78% 17.57% 10.57% 12.12% 
2 years to 5 years 120 45 36 12 18 8 
 14.94% 13.12% 24.16% 16.22% 14.63% 24.24% 
5 years to 10 years 168 108 36 11 26 3 
 20.92% 31.49% 24.16% 14.86% 21.14% 9.09% 
10 years to 15 years 150 74 23 3 35 5 
 18.68% 21.57% 15.44% 4.05 28.46 15.15% 
15+ years 109 40 6 3 8 0 
 13.57% 11.66% 4.03% 4.05% 6.5% 0% 
       
Moving beyond simply time to separation, Table 9 describes the type of 
misconduct for which male and female study officers were fired. This table indicates that 
a much higher percentage of men committed crime and serious official misconduct – the 
behavior most people associate with police misconduct (43.41% of male study officers 
compared to 24.09% of female study officers). 
Table 9 
Type of Misconduct, by Sex 
Type of Misconduct 
Male 
(N=1,207) 
Female 
(N=220) 
Total 
(N=1,427) 
Crime & Serious Official Misconduct 524 53 577 
 43.41% 24.09% 40.43% 
Administrative Violations 347 83 430 
 28.75% 37.73% 30.13% 
Drug and Drug Test Failures 336 84 420 
 27.84% 38.18% 29.43% 
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When broken down further by time to separation, there are some clear sex 
differences (see Table 10 for males and Table 11 for females). First, 55.42% of women 
fired for administrative violations were fired during their probationary period (compared 
to 36.89% of males fired for administrative violations). The other two categories of 
misconduct, which have much less discretion, had more similar percentages between 
men and women: 27.68% of men and 32.14% of women fired for drugs and drug test 
failures were fired during their probationary period, and 27.1% of men and 37.73% of 
women fired for crime and serious official misconduct were fired during their 
probationary period.  
Table 10 
Time to Separation, by Type of Misconduct for Males 
 
Crime and Serious 
Official Misconduct 
(N=524) 
Administrative   
Violations 
(N=347) 
Drugs and Drug 
Test Failures 
(N=336) 
Less than 6 Months 26 
4.96% 
17 
4.90% 
47 
13.99% 
6 Months to 1 Year 50 
9.54% 
44 
12.68% 
20 
5.95% 
1 Year to 2 Years 66 
12.60% 
67 
19.31% 
26 
7.74% 
2 Years to 5 Years 78 
14.89% 
48 
13.83% 
54 
16.07% 
5 Years to 10 Years 121 
23.09% 
71 
20.46% 
90 
26.79% 
10 Years to 15 Years 96 
18.32% 
69 
19.88% 
71 
21.13% 
15+ Years 87 
16.60% 
31 
8.93% 
28 
8.33% 
 
These findings raise questions about how the NYPD handled misconduct early in 
an officer’s career. The disproportionately high percentage of female officers fired for 
administrative misconduct during the probationary period is consistent with a sex 
discrimination thesis, though no definitive conclusions can be drawn. The findings of 
this study are nonetheless noteworthy and again raise important questions about the  
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clear distinction in prevalence and type of misconduct across officer sex, and the 
department’s responses to that misbehavior. 
Table 11 
Time to Separation, by Type of Misconduct for Females 
 
Crime and Serious 
Official Misconduct 
(N=53) 
Administrative  
Violations 
(N=83) 
Drugs and Drug 
Test Failures 
(N=84) 
Less than 6 Months 4 
7.55% 
7 
8.43% 
15 
17.86% 
6 Months to 1 Year 9 
16.98% 
21 
25.30% 
7 
8.33% 
1 Year to 2 Years 7 
13.21% 
18 
21.69% 
5 
5.95% 
2 Years to 5 Years 11 
20.75% 
9 
10.84% 
18 
21.43% 
5 Years to 10 Years 7 
13.21% 
17 
20.48% 
11 
13.10% 
10 Years to 15 Years 12 
22.64% 
11 
13.25% 
19 
22.62% 
15+ Years 3 
5.66% 
0 
0.00% 
8 
9.52% 
 
Summary 
This chapter provided bivariate correlations and multivariate logistic regression 
results for known predictors of police misconduct using a sample of 3,085 police officers 
from the New York City Police Department. A single logistic regression using sex as a 
control (known as the “add gender and stir” approach) was performed as a baseline, and 
then the sample was split by sex into male and female subsamples. The same logistic 
regression was then performed on both subsamples and the coefficients from each of the 
subsample models were compared using z-scores (see Belknap & Holsinger, 2006; 
Paternoster et al., 1998).  
The bivariate and multivariate results yielded some key findings. First, it is clear 
that women respond to strain differently than men, especially strains related to 
relationships. Getting divorced while employed by the NYPD was a protective factor for 
women, and the difference between men and women was statistically significant. This 
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calls into question theoretical assumptions, especially those made based on samples that  
are largely (or entirely) male. Conceptualizations of strains need to account for the  
possibility that some factors are stressful yet ultimately positive.  
Second, there are some instances where predictors are salient for men but not 
women, or vice versa. For example, having prior police experience was a statistically 
significant risk factor for women but was not significant for men, whereas being a 
sergeant or higher was a statistically significant protective factor for men was but not 
significant for women. Both of these differences were statistically significant. Thus, it is 
clear that the “add gender and stir” approach common in policing studies misses 
essential nuance in describing what affects the likelihood to commit police misconduct.  
Finally, the split-sample analysis demonstrated the need for male comparison 
samples, which are often missing in small qualitative studies. Being Hispanic, for 
example, was not significant for women, but was significant for men. The difference 
between men and women was not statistically significant, but the significant result from 
the male portion of the sample rendered the predictor significant in the full sample 
model. Thus, a female-only model would miss this key predictor.  
Combined, the implications of this study strongly suggest the need for a gendered 
theory of police misconduct. Long-held assumptions about police misconduct do not 
seem to be true for both men and women. Some factors have effects that are unexpected, 
such as divorce, which is typically viewed to be a risk factor, yet is a protective factor for 
women in this study. Other factors, such as citizen complaints, are more predictive for 
women than they are for men. Further exploration using time to separation and type of 
misconduct exposed potential sex discrimination within the NYPD. The implications of 
these results are discussed in Chapter 5 and limitations and areas for future research are 
provided.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
Policing has been, and in many ways continues to be, a male profession (Martin, 
1980). Women have historically had difficulty breaking into policing; in 2000, only 13% 
of officers in police departments with more than 100 sworn officers were female 
(National Center for Women and Policing, 2001). Though this is a substantial increase 
from 2.9% in 1970 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1976; Martin, 1980) and even 9% in 
1990 (National Center for Women and Policing, 2001), female police officers experience 
resistance from their male counterparts. It is not uncommon for female officers to 
experience sexual harassment, gendered job assignments, skepticism of their capability 
to do the job, and social isolation while on the job (Balkin, 1988; Franklin, 2007; 
Holdaway & Parker, 1998; Hunt, 1990; Poole & Pogrebin, 1988). 
Just as women are a small percentage of police officers in general, they are also a 
minority of officers who commit police misconduct. Kane and White (2009) found that 
of the 2% of officers who committed career-ending misconduct, women were a minority. 
This supports earlier findings that female officers are less likely to commit any kind of 
deviance than male officers, of which misconduct is one form (Lersch, 1998; 
Steffensmeier, 1979; Van Wormer, 1981). These overall offending and police misconduct 
findings differ, however, from some white-collar crime studies, which find that relatively 
similar percentages of men and women commit workplace deviance (see, e.g., Daly, 
1989; Holtfreter 2005, 2013). Because of this, it is understandable that research on 
police misconduct has largely overlooked any notion of a gendered pathway to 
misconduct.  
This study begins to fill this gap in the literature using official records from the 
New York Police Department (NYPD). Fyfe and Kane (2006) created a list of officers 
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separated from the department for misconduct between 1975 and 1996 (N=1,542), then 
matching each officer with a comparison officer from the same academy class who had 
not been separated from the department for misconduct (as of 1996; N=1,543). This 
sample (N=3,085) included 435 female officers. A logistic regression was done on the full 
sample, using sex as a control, to mimic how quantitative analyses are typically done in 
policing research. The sample was then split by sex and separate logistic regressions 
were performed on each subsample. The coefficients of the subsample regressions were 
then compared using z-scores. This study found that the effects of important predictors 
of misconduct do vary by sex.  
This chapter has three main parts. First, the implications of the study will be 
explored. There are several empirical implications of a study of this scope, such as the 
need for large datasets of female police officers. There are also implications for 
theoretical frameworks used to explain police misconduct, such as strain, police 
subculture, organizational theory, and feminist theory. Additionally, the policy 
implications of this study, such as early intervention (EI) systems and hiring practices, 
are discussed. Second, the limitations of the study are outlined and directions for future 
research are provided. The chapter ends with concluding remarks. 
Empirical Implications 
Previous research on police misconduct has approached officer sex in one of two 
ways. The first, and most common, is to conduct quantitative studies on large datasets 
using sex as one of several control variables. This approach does not, however, allow for 
nuances between males and females in how variables predict misconduct. Table 5 shows 
the full sample logistic regression used in this study. Likewise, Table 6 shows the split-
sample comparisons between male and female subsample logistic regressions. There are 
important empirical conclusions that can be drawn from these two tables. 
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The first is that the “add gender and stir” approach common in quantitative 
studies of police misconduct masks some important effects. For example, in Table 5, 
getting divorced is nonsignificant, but this is statistically significant for women, and the 
difference between men and women is significant. In this case, a predictor is important 
for women and not for men, and this significance is lost in the larger, full-sample 
analysis. Alternatively, being a sergeant or higher is a significant protective factor for 
men but not women as seen in Table 6, but is described as an overall protective factor in 
Table 5. In both of these instances, the full sample analysis lacks necessary nuance. The 
second empirical conclusion is that some predictors may be relevant for both sexes, but 
to varying degrees. In Table 6, the effect of being a patrol officer is nearly four times 
greater for women than it is for men, and this difference is statistically significant. In this 
case, the effect for being a patrol officer seen in Table 5 is representative only for men; 
the small number of female officers masks the much larger effect for women. 
The second approach commonly used in police misconduct research, generally by 
feminist policing scholars, is to conduct interviews or other qualitative research using 
small samples (typically less than 100 officers) of female officers. The findings from 
these studies are then often compared to the findings of studies using the method 
outlined above (the “add gender and stir” approach with large samples). The problem 
with this approach is that female-only studies, without a comparison group of male 
officers, may conclude that there are differences that are in fact statistically irrelevant. 
This can be seen in Table 6. For example, being Hispanic is statistically significant for 
men but not for women, yet the difference in the coefficients for males and females is 
nonsignificant. Likewise, having below standard performance evaluations, which has a 
seemingly greater effect for women than men, is not significant when the z-scores for  
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men and women are compared statistically. It is this statistical comparison that is 
essential in making any conclusions about differences across samples. 
In addition to addressing empirical drawbacks of previous methodologies, this 
study demonstrates the need for datasets with larger samples of female officers. The 
dataset used in this study had an appropriately large number of females, but there were 
limitations to the analyses that could be conducted. Several variables had a surprisingly 
small number of female officers. Divorced women, for example, were relatively rare. This 
lack of variation for certain criteria begs the question, do police departments have a very 
narrow viewpoint on what constitutes an acceptable female candidate? Are divorced 
women, for example, rare because they were only a small number of total applicants, or 
because they were outliers of a constricted picture of the acceptable female recruit? 
Organizationally, police departments may have a patriarchal view of what kind of woman 
can be a police officer. Larger sets of female officers are also important for studies that 
seek to go beyond the misconduct dichotomy (yes/no). Studies assessing the type of 
misconduct, for example, need larger pools of female officers from which to draw or else 
cell sizes for variables will get too small for statistical power, as was the case here with 
marital status, background investigator recommendation, and other variables. 
Theoretical Implications 
Three primary theoretical frameworks were used in this study to explain police 
misconduct: General strain (Agnew, 1985, 1992, 2006), police subculture (e.g., Chappell 
& Piquero, 2004; Sherman, 1978), and organizational context (e.g., Wolfe & Piquero, 
2011). This study proved to have implications for each of these three frameworks when 
used in police misconduct research. 
Strain Theory 
As described by both Merton (1938) and Agnew (1985, 1992, 2006), strain (or 
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stress) is negative. It includes the inability to achieve a positively valued goal, the 
presence of noxious stimuli, or the removal of positive stimuli (Agnew, 1992, 2006). 
Strain then evokes a negative emotion (e.g., depression, anger, or anxiety) and is handled 
by one of many coping mechanisms, one of which is deviant behavior (Agnew, 1992; 
Agnew, Brezina, Wright, & Cullen, 2002). Additional research that has either tested the 
theory or used the theory as a framework to explain various types of deviance (such as 
misconduct) has nearly always framed strain in the negative. There is, however, the 
possibility that strain can be positive or have positive implications. For example, the 
break up of a relationship, especially divorce, has generally been explained as a strain as 
it is the removal of a positively valued stimulus (the relationship). But quality, not merely 
presence, of the relationship needs to be evaluated. If the relationship was toxic, then 
divorce could actually prove to be a positive life change. In the case of women, divorcing 
a husband who is a negative influence – such as a drug addicted or chronically 
unemployed spouse – would actually be a freeing, positive change that decreases stress. 
Removing such influences could alleviate the need or compulsion to commit misconduct. 
Alternatively, this finding could indicate the presence of unmeasured coping resources, 
such as social support. Women in the sample who are getting divorced may have access 
to resources that prevent maladaptive coping mechanisms, such as misconduct. 
Feminist strain scholars have long suggested that men and women experience 
and respond to strain differently. Research has found that women experience as much or 
more strain than men and their experiences of strain are qualitatively different from 
those of men (Agnew & Brezina, 1997; Belknap & Holsinger, 2006; Broidy & Agnew, 
1997; Daly, 1992; Eitle, 2002; Piquero & Sealock, 2004) and these findings of the general 
population are also true for female police officers (Dowler, 2005; Haarr & Morash, 1999; 
Poteyeva & Sun, 2009). Specifically, men value fair distribution and place higher value 
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on material goals, whereas women are more concerned with fairness of procedures and 
personal relationships (Broidy & Agnew, 1997; Kaufman, 2009). In general, women 
experience high levels of gender-based discrimination (Eitle, 2002) and behavior 
restrictions (Bottcher, 1995). Similar strains are also present in policing; female officers 
are often victims of both formal and informal gender discrimination in the form of 
administrative and organizational policies regarding family leave policies, promotion 
and performance review criteria, and training opportunities (Garcia, 2003; Martin, 1983; 
Seklecki & Paynich, 2007; Wexler & Logan, 1983). 
Women are also as likely, or more likely, than men to experience anger as a result 
of strain (Broidy & Agnew, 1997; Jennings, Piquero, Gover, & Perez, 2009; Piquero & 
Sealock, 2004). Anger, however, is often felt in combination with other emotions like 
guilt, leading most women to handle their stress via non-criminal maladaptive coping 
mechanisms, many of which are not studied by criminologists (Kaufman, 2009; Sharp et 
al., 2001, 2005). Female police officers also engage in alternative coping mechanisms, 
including adapting to one’s surroundings (role acceptance) and leaving the profession 
(avoidance) (Haarr & Morash, 1999).  
This study supports the idea that women and men cope with stress differently. 
This is evident in Table 6, wherein women who got divorced while in the employ of the 
NYPD were actually 82.3% less likely to commit misconduct than women with no change 
to their relationship. Clearly, women in the study who got divorced viewed their divorce 
with more nuance than scholars generally allow. There are several possibilities for this 
unexpected finding. First, women who get divorced could find themselves in a situation 
where their job is worth more than additional income gained by profit-motivated 
misconduct. This view of policing as a “survival job” may make these women less likely to 
commit misconduct, though their circumstances would indicate otherwise. Alternatively, 
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the divorce separated the officer from a spouse who was a negative influence, as noted 
above. Yet another possibility is that the job stability that accompanied being a police 
officer provided the needed financial security for women to leave a problematic 
relationship. More research is needed, especially using mixed methods, to understand 
the dynamics underlying these changes and the resulting outcomes.  
Alternative methods, such as vignette-based studies or in-person interviews or 
focus groups, may be better able to address the many facets of gendered strains. 
Measuring the quality of relationships, rather than merely the presence or absence of a 
relationship, would also be beneficial. Similarly, studies should investigate the effects of 
officers’ relationships with peers and other family members, such as children, on their 
strategies for and ability to cope with strains. 
Police Subculture 
Subcultural explanations for misconduct are rooted in Akers’s (1998) social 
learning theory, which itself is based on Sutherland’s (1940) differential association 
theory. Akers (1998) theorized that deviant behavior is learned through social 
interactions by way of four mechanisms: Differential association, differential 
reinforcement, definitions, and modeling. Differential association is the influence of 
those with whom one interacts and is suggested to be the strongest mechanism. In 
policing, differential association manifests in the police subculture, the primary method 
by which officers learn how to do the job of policing (Chappell & Piquero, 2004; 
Sherman, 1978). Early studies of routine police work found that there was a series of 
occupational norms and values based on the rigid hierarchy of the police organization, 
and misconduct was unofficially encouraged through this informal code (Cain, 1973; 
Chan, 1996; Manning, 1977, 1995; Stoddard, 1968).  
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The police subculture is based on solidarity, secrecy, and a distrust of the public, 
often referred to as the “blue wall of silence” (Bittner, 1974; Stoddard, 1968; Van 
Maanen, 1980; Westley, 1970). This code of secrecy and solidarity is emphasized in what 
Kappeler and colleagues (1998) describe as an “us versus them mentality,” wherein 
officers are pitted against the general public in a confrontational subculture. In 
particular, this police subculture is characterized by masculinity (Haarr & Morash, 1999; 
Herbert, 1998; Hunt, 1990; Reiner, 1992). It is incredibly difficult for women to break 
into the subculture (Chu & Sun, 2007; Reiner, 1992) because of women’s social isolation 
and status as “token females” (Kanter, 1977) and because male officers do not accept 
women as part of the subculture since female officers’ attitudes and behaviors do not 
support the hyper-masculinity of the subculture’s values of aggression, cynicism, and 
authoritarianism (Belknap & Shelley, 1992). 
As is the case in corporate business culture, women are often left out of unofficial 
social networks even when in high-ranking positions (Daly, 1989; Gorman & Kmec, 
2009; Holtfreter, 2005, 2013, 2014; Kanter, 1977; Steffensmeier, 1983; Steffensmeier et 
al., 2013). Specifically, Daly (1989), Holtfreter (2005, 2013), and Steffensmeier (1983) 
found that women were equally likely to commit some forms of white-collar crime 
compared to men, but it was the types of crimes that women committed that were 
salient. Their occupational marginalization either relegated women to low-ranking 
positions (e.g., bank tellers versus bank managers) or kept women out of deviant peer 
groups and limited their ability to commit group-oriented crimes, such as collusion. 
Thus, women were likely to commit low-level infractions in much smaller dollar 
amounts. 
Likewise, women in policing are often left at the periphery of the police 
subculture. It has been suggested that this placement on the fringes of the subculture 
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could explain women’s lower rates of misconduct. This study supported this contention. 
The small number of women in higher ranks (11.73% were detectives or higher) and the 
large percentage of women who left the profession voluntarily during the probationary 
period (42.9%) indicates that there is likely some measure of social isolation present in 
the NYPD during the study period. 
Organizational Context 
The orientation of women within the police organization and the organizational 
contexts that color their experiences in the profession have predominantly been the key 
focus of research linking organizational context to policing. Balkin (1988) and Fielding 
(1994), for example, argue that the police department is perhaps the most gendered of all 
social institutions because of the sheer percentage of men consistently present 
throughout the ranks. Additionally, only a small percentage of police officers are female, 
but their distribution throughout the ranks is inequitable (National Center for Women 
and Policing, 2001).  
It is difficult, however, “to separate individual police misconduct from the 
organizational context in which it takes place” (Wolfe & Piquero, 2011, p. 1). Scholars 
have long noted that organizations play a role in individual officer misconduct, going so 
far as to argue that the blame for officer misconduct lies with organizations themselves 
(e.g., Ivkovic, 2005). Other scholars, however, argue that researchers need to move past 
merely blaming organizations and work to determine the mechanisms by which the 
organization affects individual misconduct (Manning, 2009). Wolfe and Piquero do so 
using an organizational justice framework, finding that perceptions of fairness and 
justice within organizational management was closely linked to lower likelihoods of 
adherence to the “blue wall of silence” or noble-cause corruption. Additionally, they find 
that these perceptions of organizational justice are also associated with lower levels of 
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police misconduct (Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). While organizational justice is not the only 
framework that could be used to study the effects of organizational context on 
misconduct, it is a promising beginning in this direction. 
This study used the political era of the police department as a proxy for 
organizational context. The eras used were: 1975-1989, which encompassed the period of 
massive layoffs and subsequent rehires; 1990-1993, which includes the start of William 
Bratton’s tenure as police commissioner and the era of community policing in New York 
City; and 1994-1996, which is the beginning of the mayoralty of Rudolph Giuliani and an 
emphasis on order maintenance policing using the concept of broken windows. This 
variable captured not only the necessary element of time, but all organizational changes 
that occurred within the department as a function of time, including changes in the ratio 
of male to female officers. 
Since the number of females in the department grew between 1975 and 1996, 
there were two hypothesized outcomes resulting from the inclusion of this variable. The 
first was that the increased number of women would have a “civilizing effect” regarding 
misconduct, since women are less likely to commit misconduct and would conceivably 
bolster an anti-misconduct element within the subculture. The second possible outcome 
was that an increase in women in the department would normalize femininity within 
policing and they would be brought into the larger subculture, thus potentially increasing 
their likelihood of committing misconduct. Neither of these scenarios seemed to happen 
in this study. It is possible that there is a threshold number of women – a “tipping point,” 
as it were – required for real change to occur to the subculture, and that threshold was 
not reached as of 1996. As noted previously, even in 2000, women composed only 13% of 
police departments with more than 100 sworn officers (National Center for Women and 
Policing, 2001). According to LEMAS, women comprised, in a relatively linear pattern, 
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between 11 and 15% of the NYPD during the study period, consistent with the National 
Center for Women and Policing findings. As more women enter the policing profession, 
future research should pay attention to this issue.  
Another aspect of organizational context is that of organizational values and how 
those values manifest in the decisions of organizational actors. For example, precinct-
level supervisors are given immense discretion in how infractions of administrative and 
criminal codes are handled. In this study, 42% of female “bad cops” were dismissed 
during the probationary period. This is a rather large percentage, as the probationary 
period only encompasses the first two years of an officer’s career. Consistent with 
Stoddard’s (1968) assertion, exploration of the probationary period in this study 
indicates that supervisors terminate female officers for minor administrative violations, 
over which they have extensive discretion, in order to remove female officers they view to 
be in violation of the informal code or a danger to the social group. This would be 
especially easy to do during the probationary period, when any violation is grounds for 
dismissal, no matter how small the infraction.  
This could stem from a disconnect between the organizational goals of the top-
brass and the subculture present in the rank-and-file. For example, police administrators 
have a vested interest in a diverse workforce, thus there is an organizational goal of 
recruiting large numbers of females and racial and ethnic minorities, but these officers 
are then left on the fringes of the subculture and precinct-level supervisors may then use 
their discretion to get rid of “problematic” officers. Given the additional information in 
this study using time to separation and type of misconduct for both sexes, however, it 
seems to be more likely that there was, at least during the study period, entrenched sex 
discrimination in how probationary officers were disciplined. Rather than it being a  
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method of removing threats to the subculture, as indicated by Stoddard (1968), it seems 
more likely to have simply been a matter of sexism. 
A Gendered Pathway to Misconduct? 
Scholars have found evidence of gendered pathways to crime and victimization in 
a variety of contexts (Belknap & Holsinger, 2006; Burgess-Proctor, 2012; Reisig, 
Holtfreter, & Morash, 2006). Gender-specific models are especially important when 
supposedly “gender-neutral” policies are in place without fully understanding how risk 
factors vary by gender (Holtfreter & Cupp, 2007). This study used a split-sample 
comparison approach to assess the possibility of a gendered pathway to misconduct. The 
split-sample models in Table 6 demonstrate that there are important differences 
between men and women in the effects of the predictors of misconduct. Future research, 
especially qualitative approaches, should build on this to more completely discern the 
pathways women take in their misconduct decision-making. 
Policy Implications 
Early Intervention (EI) Systems 
In terms of policy, this study has important implications regarding how early 
intervention (EI) systems are used and the hiring practices in police departments. First, 
red flags in an EI system may need to be gender-specific. The results of this study 
indicate that factors vary in their predictability for men and women. Citizen complaints, 
for example, have much more predictive value for women than they do for men, though 
they are risk factors for both sexes. Conversely, factors like divorce operate completely 
differently for men and women, so a “one-size-fits-all” approach to an EI system likely 
permits some officers to fall through the cracks. 
Additionally, EI systems are typically set up to flag official department records, 
such as citizen complaints or use of force incidents. This study suggests that these 
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systems should look at personal matters that may affect officers’ job performance. 
Officers who suddenly become caretakers of children or other family members may 
encounter financial pressures that were nonexistent prior to the new caretaking 
responsibility. Additionally, personal stresses like a divorce or a child becoming ill may 
factor into how officers respond to situations at work. 
Third, the findings of this study demonstrate the need for departments to 
examine gendered internal policies and practices. For example, if women in proactive 
investigation commands are assigned to deskwork or communications whereas men in 
these same commands are put in undercover work, men may have greater opportunity to 
commit misconduct. Likewise, if women in patrol precincts are assigned to victim 
assistance roles and men in patrol precincts are assigned to handling violent encounters, 
women may be less likely to receive a citizen complaint than men. Both of these 
scenarios affect who is flagged in the EI system as being “problematic.” 
Hiring in the Department 
Hiring practices within police departments are another important area of policy. 
As noted above, the political era of the department was insignificant for both men and 
women in predicting misconduct. Thus, increasing the number of women in the 
department may not have the same “civilizing effect” that increasing the proportion of 
minorities has had. That said, the findings in this study are time-specific; the study 
period of 1975-1996 was not a time frame that found many women in the occupation of 
policing; women made up only 13% of police officers in departments with more than 100 
sworn officers even in 2000. Thus, it may be that policing has not yet reached the needed 
threshold of female officers for the civilizing effect to take root. 
Limitations and Future Research 
As with any study, there are limitations as to what can be done and what 
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conclusions can be drawn. First, the study was quantitative rather than qualitative or 
mixed methods. Thus, the results from this study can only tell us how one factor affects 
another, not why this relationship exists. Mixed methods studies, which combine both 
quantitative and qualitative data, would be able to demonstrate how predictors affect 
decision-making mathematically as well as why these relationships exist and in what 
ways these relationships affect one another (Gaub & Holtfreter, 2015). 
Additionally, this study uses secondary data, which complicates theory testing. 
While change in marital status, for example, is used as one of several proxy measures for 
strain, these are crude measures of concepts. Additionally, the use of official data in this 
study prohibited the possibility of directly measuring opportunity, an important 
component of testing strain theory in a study of police misconduct. Future research 
should build on this limitation by anticipating these problems even before data collection 
begins; studies conducted for the purpose of testing theory will be better suited to 
developing measures specifically designed to test specific theoretical constructs. 
Specifically, new data collection efforts should, from the outset, identify a direct measure 
of opportunity.  
Third, while this study used a large sample of women (N=435), there were certain 
events that were relatively rare (e.g., being divorced). This made some comparisons 
within the female subsample difficult. This could be tied to the time period being 
studied; as mentioned earlier, it was uncommon in the 1970s and 1980s to see many 
women in police departments. While still underrepresented, police departments are 
beginning to actively recruit female candidates so more recent datasets may yield larger 
numbers of women in the sample. This would be especially important as studies move 
beyond the misconduct dichotomy to study other misconduct outcomes. 
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Fourth, new data should be gathered in the NYPD, especially after the events of 
September 11, 2001. In the wake of the terrorist attacks that claimed the lives of men and 
women alike, it is possible that department solidarity was strengthened; researchers 
should ascertain whether the events of 9/11 had any bearing on misconduct by way of 
women being accepted into the subculture. Additionally, researchers should address the 
sex differences in the use of policing tactics such as racial profiling and stop-question-
frisk, the use of which increased substantially in post-9/11 New York City. 
Finally, this study focused on the New York City Police Department (NYPD). 
Some scholars (see Manning, 2009) have suggested that the NYPD is a behemoth unto 
its own, and that conclusions drawn from studies of the NYPD cannot be generalized to 
other departments. Collecting data from other departments, especially mid-size 
departments more representative of police departments nationwide, would aid in either 
proving or disproving the notion that NYPD data is not generalizable. Additionally, 
multi-agency datasets would allow for more organizational components to be analyzed, 
which have generally been ignored in the police misconduct literature (for exception, see, 
e.g., Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). What the values and norms of police departments are – and 
whether they are gendered – could be better assessed in multi-site studies. 
Conclusion 
This study sought to answer three key research questions. First, do predictors of 
misconduct affect men and women the same way? Second, do some predictors serve as 
risk factors for men but protective factors for women, or vice versa? And finally, what 
factors affect women’s likelihood of committing misconduct? 
The results of this study show that not all predictors of misconduct affect men 
and women the same way. Being married, for example, is significant only for men, 
whereas getting divorced is significant only for women. Some factors are also stronger 
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for one sex than the other. Being a patrol officer and having citizen complaints from 
previous police service, while significant risk factors for both men and women, are much 
stronger for women.  
Regarding the second research question, the study results did not yield findings 
of predictors being a risk factor for one sex and a protective factor for the other, though 
there were some instances of a risk factor only being salient for one sex. Being married, 
for example, is a significant protective factor, but only for men. Conversely, getting 
divorced is significant only for women, but was surprisingly a protective factor for 
women.  
In looking only at the female subsample, there are some key findings that warrant 
note. First, consistent with other misconduct studies using official data, black officers 
were more likely to be fired for misconduct than white officers. Prior research using this 
dataset found that white officers were more likely to accept a plea agreement for 
mitigated discipline when confronted with misconduct charges, whereas minority 
officers pressed for an internal trial (Kane & White, 2009). Rather than racial 
discrimination, the disparity was due to defendant preference and standard institutional 
responses to those preferences. If an officer accepted an organizational plea agreement, 
he or she was more likely to be formally disciplined (e.g., administrative leave without 
pay) but not fired, whereas officers who pressed for a full trial were then fired if found 
guilty. However, Hispanic officers’ likelihood of being fired for misconduct was no 
different than that of white officers. While the difference for male and female Hispanics 
was not significant, the nonsignificance of Hispanic ethnicity among females bears 
mentioning. This finding demonstrates that female-only studies, without a male 
comparison group, may draw faulty conclusions; likewise, it shows that large-sample 
studies with sex as a control may miss nuances among predictors.  
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Additionally, the over-representation of racial and ethnic minorities is consistent 
with the use of official data. This finding could reflect greater detection or social control 
of minorities, especially given the Anglo-centric nature of policing organizations. 
Alternatively, it could represent a difference in opportunity, which typically cannot be 
accounted for in studies using official data. Regardless of the reason for this over-
representation, the finding by police scholars that racial or ethnic minorities are more 
likely to commit misconduct differs from findings in studies of other forms of workplace 
deviance, where the “typical” offender is white. 
Second, getting divorced as a protective factor for women, as noted above. This is 
contrary to a large body of life-course literature and most studies that use sex as a 
control; or at the very least suggests that, for women, divorce may a turning point, much 
as marriage is for men (Sampson & Laub, 1993). Again, this demonstrates the need for 
sex-specific models in quantitative studies and more research into this dynamic of family 
relationships in qualitative studies. 
This study sought to bridge two fields that have historically seemed to be at odds 
with one another: Feminist scholarship and policing research. Feminist policing scholars 
have typically focused on small, female-only samples while general policing researchers 
tend to use large samples with both sexes and include sex as a control variable. Both 
approaches, while understandable, have severe limitations in understanding female 
police officer misconduct. This study used a large sample of police officers in the New 
York City Police Department to analyze the likelihood of misconduct for both men and 
women using sex-specific models. In doing so, the results of this study complement the 
existing literature by providing nuance to previously held notions of the factors that 
predict police officer misconduct.  
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Policing has been, and still is, a male-dominated profession (Martin, 1980), and 
misconduct itself is a rare event (Kane & White, 2009), thus it is unsurprising that often-
male policing scholars do not focus on female misconduct. But when researchers 
understand why women are less likely to commit misconduct, police departments can 
begin to capitalize on that knowledge to bring greater legitimacy to a necessary 
institution that has historically suffered from public distrust. 
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